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rom the Editor...

W

elcome to the first re-issue of Tampa Bay History. The Tampa Bay
History Center, in partnership with the University of South Florida Libraries’ Florida
Studies Center, is proud to bring about the return of this wonderful publication.
The original Tampa Bay History was published biannually, from 1979 to 1998, by
the USF History Department. Longtime editors Robert Ingalls and Gary Mormino
published the journal largely on their own, with valuable department office staff
assistance.
The journal’s new team is headed by editor Rodney Kite-Powell, the Tampa
Bay History Center’s Saunders Foundation Curator of History. Mark I. Greenberg,
History Center Board of Trustees member and Director of USF Libraries’ Florida
Studies Center and Special Collections Department, serves as the book review editor,
and Andrew Huse, Assistant Librarian with Special Collections and Florida Studies
Center, is the assistant editor.
Creation of the new journal’s editorial board was our first priority. The board
consists of twelve scholars, all leaders in their respective areas of Florida history,
anthropology or archaeology: Jack Davis, James M. Denham, Paul Dosal, Maxine
Jones, Robert Kerstein, Joe Knetsch, Jerald Milanich, Gary Mormino, Susan Parker,
Cheryl Rodriguez, Aaron Smith, and Doris Weatherford.
The next step was to establish what kind of content we wanted for the
journal. In this we followed the path of the original, in that articles will cover a wide
range of topics, including social, political and environmental history, archaeology,
anthropology and geography. Though we will focus on the Tampa Bay area, we also
want to extend into what is termed “Historic” Hillsborough County, the roughly
twenty-county area included within the original 1834 boundaries of Hillsborough
County.
Four essays, each focusing on a different aspect of the region’s history, are
featured in this issue. The first is by Thom Foley, winner of the 2007 Leland Hawes
Essay Prize in Florida History for best graduate paper. Foley’s award-winning essay on
the Tampa Bypass Canal provides the reader with a unique perspective on the status of
the Hillsborough River and on water management issues – issues that become more
important as the state’s population continues to climb towards 20 million people.
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The second article, by Rosanna Ensley, focuses on the first ten years of the Gasparilla
festival. Ensley’s examination of the formative years of the Tampa tradition builds on
previous narratives, exploring the people and events with a fresh perspective.
Chris Day looks at an often neglected chapter of Florida’s World War II
history in his piece on civil defense and the Florida motorcycle corps. The corps and
its founder, Guy Allen, helped protect the state from the perceived threat of a Nazi
attack. Day’s article gives proper attention to this statewide effort. The forth article
is written by editorial board member Joe Knetsch. Knetsch has studied the Spanish
– American War for many years and has pulled together an amazing and diverse
collection of sources for his most recent study on the late 19th century conflict.
Readers familiar with local history will recognize Knetsch’s attention to detail and
meticulous research skills at work in this piece.
Mark Greenberg has assembled an interesting selection of book reviews. In
addition to the reviews, readers will be able to learn of the newest releases in local and
state history in our “books in brief ” section. Both of these sections will be regular
fixtures within the pages of Tampa Bay History.
We are actively seeking submissions for our next publication. As was the
case with the original Tampa Bay History, we want to produce a quality, scholarly
publication that is of interest to a diverse audience. To that end, we will follow
the guidelines established by the editors in 1979 – that “academics write so that
nonprofessionals could read and enjoy their work and that nonacademic historians
[or experts in other fields] meet scholarly standards for documentation.”
Like all worthwhile endeavors, production of this journal could not have been
completed without the help of many people. First among them is Elizabeth Dunham,
the History Center’s Director of Public Programs. Her support was indispensable.
History Center Collections Manager Travis Puterbaugh also provided invaluable
assistance. I would also be remiss if I did not thank copy editor Susan Brady and
graphics guru Bill Wilson for the help and support they provided me during my first
effort at editing a journal.
A special thank you goes out to our members and supporters. We appreciate
all you do in support of our efforts to bring regional history to life.
Rodney Kite-Powell
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T

he Taming of
the Hillsborough River:
How Tampa Gained a Moat,
Destroyed a Creek, and Forgot a River
by Thom Foley
“Wilderness? . . . What is land? A patch of dirt? Trees? Who cares? . . . This was the end of
the earth. Almost overnight, out of the muck and the mangroves, we created . . . this! . . .
Nature on a leash.” (from John Sayles’s film Sunshine State)

O

nce upon a time, the rhythms of Florida’s Hillsborough River were
tolerated and endured by those living within range of the waterway’s expansive
floodplain. For most of the twentieth century, the residents of Tampa, Temple
Terrace, and surrounding communities were subjected to the regular flooding of the
Hillsborough River. Draining an immense river valley, the Hillsborough funneled
accumulated waters through the midst of an ever-growing metropolis. Once, rainy
spells and hurricane seasons resulted in frequent urban flooding. Wet years produced
worse floods, but even in dry times a significant tropical blow or hurricane pushed
the river up over its banks, sending tannin-hued water streaming through the streets
of Seminole Heights, Sulphur Springs, and the environs of Tampa. The modern era
of flood-control systems and regional water management, initiated in the aftermath
of Hurricane Donna in 1960, has rendered the seasonal swells of the natural river a
historical memory. A sketch of the successful taming of the Hillsborough River—and
how Tampa became a city on a moat—explains how area residents have achieved the
luxury of ignoring the river that once dominated the city, and how, at the same time,
Thom Foley, the winner of the 2007 Leland Hawes Graduate Prize in Florida History, is a graduate
student in the American Studies program at the University of South Florida, St. Petersburg Campus, where
he is studying Florida’s environmental history.  Foley would like to thank Dr. Ray Arsenault and Dr. Gary
Mormino of the Florida Studies Program for their assistance with this paper.
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Photograph by the author

Present-day photograph of the upper Hillsborough River.  Though encroached by new construction on
an almost daily basis, portions of the Hillsborough River still remain fairly pristine and support a wide
range of wildlife.

another watercourse was transformed into an ecological nightmare, a regional version
of the Kissimmee River syndrome writ small.
The Hillsborough River forms of rain and seepage and gravity-fed rivulets in
the Green Swamp, the 870-square-mile water-warehouse that straddles west central
Florida between Orlando and Tampa. The marshes, uplands, low-lying flatlands, and
hardwood hammocks of the Green Swamp are also the birthplace of three other
major river systems in addition to the Hillsborough, each radiating toward opposing
compass points: the Withlacoochee to the north, the Ocklawaha to the northeast,
and the long Peace River flowing southward, stretching to the Gulf at Charlotte
Harbor. The Hillsborough percolates southwest out of this river-generating swamp,
winding some 54 miles to Tampa, then turning south to pour through the heart of
the city into Hillsborough Bay and eventually Tampa Bay and the Gulf of Mexico.
Along its course, the rural portion of the river weaves through the woodlands of
Polk, Pasco, and Hillsborough Counties, where many small streams and five major
tributaries join its steady flow. Crystal Springs adds about 40 million gallons a day to
the growing waterway, before sending it rolling west past Hillsborough River State
Park, near Thonotosassa, toward the long, sweeping curve that allows the river to
descend into Tampa.
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After arching east around the neighborhoods of Temple Terrace, the
Hillsborough widens into the U-shaped Tampa City Reservoir, formed by a dam at
Rowlett Park, some five river-miles ahead. The approximately 1,300-acre reservoir
can hold up to 1.6 million gallons and has served as Tampa’s primary source of
drinking water since it was constructed in the mid-1920s. Below the reservoir, the
Hillsborough broadens into an urban river, influenced by the tides of distant Tampa
Bay. The Hillsborough concludes its run from swamp to bay past some of Tampa’s
oldest residential and industrial areas, below new and historic bridges, growing
wider and deeper as it moves south. Root-stabilized riverbanks modulate slowly into
erosion-mitigating piles of rocks and masonry blocks, and finally into the cement
seawalls that contain the river as it passes through what a journalist once described as
the “densely packed canyons of commerce” of downtown Tampa.1
Southwest Florida Water Management District records indicate that particularly
intense flooding of the Hillsborough occurred in 1921, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1945,
1947, 1959, and 1960. Most were associated with tropical storms or hurricanes, and
sometimes resulted in loss of life and damage to structures, property, and roads. The
Hillsborough river basin, including its major tributaries—Blackwater Creek, Cypress
Creek, New River, Trout Creek, and Flint Creek—channel the water of some 675
square miles of forested Florida toward and through the city of Tampa.2
The Hillsborough River’s varied names, flowing backward through time,
speak to the long history of human interaction with the waterway. The contemporary
designation of the river—and county—honors Lord Hillsborough, Britain’s colonial
secretary in the late 1760s, and was bestowed during that nation’s brief reign over
East and West Florida. To the Seminoles, this dark persistent stream was dubbed
Lockcha-Popka-Chiska— river one crosses to eat acorns. To don Francisco Maria Celi,
a pilot of the Spanish Royal Fleet who sailed into Tampa Bay to chart its waters in
1757, the heavily forested river was the Rio de San Julian y Arriaga. To Hernando de
Soto and other Spanish explorers in the sixteenth century, the stream may have been
Mocoso. History does not record what the Tocobagan or Timucuan peoples—or their
aboriginal ancestors—called this dynamic river system, but evidence of human use
dates to late Paleo-Indian times, some ten thousand years ago, when the ecosystem of
the region was that of a vast, wet prairie.3
Neil Johnson, “From the Backwaters to the Bay,” Tampa Tribune, July 26, 1998; Tampa Reservoir
Web site, www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/education/interactive/watershed/reservoir.htm; Hillsborough River
Comprehensive Watershed Management Plan 2000 (hereinafter cited as HRP), Report of the Southwest
Florida Water Management District, 6.
2
HRP, Report of the Southwest Florida Water Management District), 39–41, 6.
3
Mike DeWitt, “Down by the Riverside,” Tampa Tribune, October 1, 2006; Neil Johnson, “From the
Backwaters to the Bay,” Tampa Tribune, July 26, 1998. Many historical narratives conclude that de Soto’s
“River of Mocoso” was the Hillsborough River. For a compelling argument that the “River of Mocoso”
was the Alafai River, see Jerald Milanich and Charles Hudson, Hernando de Soto and the Indians of Florida
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 61; and Michael Gannon, The New History of Florida
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 2.
1
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Within a half dozen years after the 1824 establishment of Fort Brooke on
the eastern bank of the mouth of the Hillsborough River, settlers had found their
way to Six Mile Creek. The accurately named stream flows six miles northeast of the
nascent military fort, on the direct path that would take one to what is now Plant
City and points inland. The creek drained from a forest of oak, pine, and palm, past
the properties of the Collar and Dixon families, who in 1828 had transferred their
homesteads from the Hillsborough River’s western bank to the relative seclusion of
Six Mile Creek. The stream meandered gently south into what would one day be
called Palm River, then flowed west into the waters of today’s McKay Bay. Seven
years later, in December 1835, as tensions between settlers and Seminoles escalated
rapidly toward war, the early settlers along Six Mile Creek barely escaped an avenging
war party of Seminoles—by poling their boats down the creek. The hapless Dixon
and Collar families survived to watch from a distance as the Indians set fire to their
homes.4
Julia Daniels Moseley, an Illinois “transplant” to Florida in 1882—the same
year that Fort Brooke was deactivated—visited Six Mile Creek in May of that year
and described her impressions of the place in one of the many letters she wrote to
a lifelong friend back in Illinois: “There were tall palms with some trunks bare and
smooth, others full of the broken stems and they, in their decay, are such a medley
of soft tints—delicate pinks, deep reds and soft browns, often covered with moss
and tall ferns and air plants growing among them.” Moseley rhapsodized over the
Six Mile Creek hammock, with its “Old cedars, bushes of lantana in bloom, scarlet
honeysuckle, and thousands of yards of trumpet vines trailing in wild abundance
down the moss grown paths.”5
Within three decades, descriptions of the area included the trappings of
increased settlement. In 1992, Tampa resident Neva Scruggs Ennis published an
article in the Tampa Tribune that recounted her childhood memories of Six Mile
Creek in the years 1915–17.
Traveling six miles east from Tampa by Seventh Avenue (Broadway) through
Ybor City, through Gary, passing Bryan’s and Litsey’s Corner, then passing
farms, pastures, and dairies, you would arrive at Six Mile Creek. You would
cross the creek on a narrow wooden bridge with iron framework; if you
stayed on this road for 14 more miles you would be in Plant City. My
grandparents, Gus and Molly Scruggs, lived in a large, two-story house with
several acres north of the road and west of the creek. A picket fence enclosed
the sandy yard, shaded by large oaks.6

Canter Brown Jr., Tampa before the Civil War (Tampa: University of Tampa Press, 1999), 31, 48.
Julia Daniels Moseley, “Come to My Sunland”: Letters of Julia Daniels Moseley from the Florida Frontier,
1882–1886 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,), xiii, 32–33.
6
Neva Scruggs Ennis, “Christmas Memories,” Tampa Tribune, December 22, 1992.
4
5
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Tampa Bay History Center Collection, 1994.004.124

Six Mile Creek was still an untouched stream when this postcard was made in the early 20th century.  The
creek, as it appears in this postcard, no longer exists.  It is now a part of the Tampa Bypass Canal system.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2007

13

Tampa Bay History, Vol. 21 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 1

          Tampa Bay History
Ennis’s description of the location of her grandparents’ property on Six Mile Creek—
considering that it was a nearly eighty-year-old reminiscence—was remarkably
precise. Hillsborough County Platt records from1916 document the location of the
Scruggs property exactly as she recounted, “north of the road” (Seventh Avenue today
becomes Broadway and later Columbus Drive) and “west of the creek,” which on
contemporary maps is in the vicinity of U.S. 301. That section of Six Mile Creek no
longer flows past the former Scruggs property.7
The bucolic character of Six Mile Creek described by Julia Daniels Moseley and
Neva Scruggs Ennis would fade, of course, as developing Tampa impressed itself upon
the landscape. The wilderness hammock of Moseley and the pastures and farms of
Ennis would be absorbed by twentieth-century urban growth. The grid, development,
roads and highways, sewers, electricity and telephones, neighborhoods, industrial
plants, strip-stores, malls, and other accruements of urbanity would eventually erase
the natural setting these women described. But the water of Six Mile Creek—for the
first six decades of the century—continued to meander east of Tampa, flowing south
into Palm River, then west into the bay. The winds of change that would seal the fate
of this watercourse would not blow across Florida until 1960.
Hurricane Donna, spinning a trail of ruin and wreckage across the state late
in the summer of 1960, has often been cited as the pivotal event that launched the
modern era of water management in Florida. The timing of Donna—as well as
weather patterns that preceded the tempest —likely played as much a role as did the
storm itself. When Donna crossed Florida in early September 1960, the hurricane
arrived at the end of a six-year pendulumlike swing of weather extremes for the
Sunshine State. For three years, 1954–56, Florida baked in a severe and extended
drought. Then, moving from one extreme to the other, the three years preceding
Donna, 1957–60, were among the wettest ever recorded. Total rainfall for 1959, for
instance, increased substantially from a yearly average of 54 inches to a record-setting
88 inches in the Tampa Bay area. Only two months of that sopping wet year offered
lower than normal rainfall figures, February and November, and for six months,
January, March, April, May, June, and October, more than double the usual amount
of rain drenched Florida’s west central coast. May was particularly wet, with eleven
rain days during the second half of the month. June witnessed the heaviest one-day
rainfall of the year on May 18, when nearly 5.5 inches fell on the city, and July offered
twenty-seven days of thunderstorms. On August 19, National Guard troops were
ordered to assist flood-relief efforts in north Tampa’s Forest Hills area, where some
fifty families were evacuated. The St. Petersburg Times, in an early 1960 analysis of
the previous year’s weather, reported that Weather Bureau records dating to 1890
indicated the period from July 6 to August 25 was the longest on record in terms of
continuous days of rain.8
Hillsborough County Plat Book, 1916 (Plat of Township 29 South, Range 19 East), 50.
Craig Pittman, “Ready for a Rainy Day,” St. Petersburg Times, March 10, 2000; Dick Bothwell,
“Hurricane Scare and Torrential Rains in 1959 Topped Weather News in St. Petersburg Area,” St. Petersburg
Times, January 3, 1960.
7
8
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In mid-March 1960, some six months before Hurricane Donna, a four-day
deluge hammered central Florida from Tampa Bay to the Atlantic. The press reported
25 inches of rain falling on one area of Pasco County, north of Tampa. Other sections
of the Tampa Bay area received 15 to 20 inches of rain during the four-day inundation.
Dozens of roads in Hillsborough, Pinellas, Polk, and Pasco Counties were washed out
by the downpour. U.S. 301 was underwater south of Zephyrhills. The Hillsborough
River, already near capacity, burst its banks, and a 30-foot breach in a flood-control
levee at Lake Magdalene, less than 3  miles northwest of Temple Terrace, released
floodwaters that spread over 8 square miles. Initial overflow was kept to a minimum
by the suction of an outgoing tide, but when floodwaters later met an incoming
tide, 1,500 people were forced to abandon their homes. In the Forest Hills region
near Lake Magdalene, some 800 people were evacuated. It would be three more days
before the swollen Hillsborough reached its crest. By then another break in the Lake
Magdalene levee flooded another section of the sodden city, sending river water along
streets to depths of 4 feet. Before it was over, the March 1960 flood, called the worst
since 1933, saw nearly 8,000 Hillsborough County residents evacuated from their
homes.9
Six months later, in early August—a month before Hurricane Donna—rains
from tropical storm Brenda again filled the Hillsborough River, which spilled into
some sixty homes along the watercourse. The next day, when flashboards reinforcing
a dam north of the business district collapsed, about one hundred families had to
be evacuated from their riverfront homes.10 By the time Hurricane Donna began
swirling into shape off the Atlantic coast of Africa, Hillsborough County and its
extensive drainage basin were saturated.
On Monday, September 5, a month after tropical storm Brenda passed
across Florida, Gordon Dunn of the Miami Weather Bureau issued a warning that
a powerful storm headed for Puerto Rico—with winds upwards of 140 miles per
hour—was following the same path as two of the most destructive hurricanes that
had ever struck Florida, the hurricanes of 1926 and 1928. Red Cross officials were
dispatched to Puerto Rico, Miami, and Wilmington, North Carolina. On Tuesday,
the hurricane—now named Donna—struck Puerto Rico, leaving a reported 102 dead
in its path. The New York Times reported that forecasters hoped the storm would shift
northward and spin into the Atlantic. Despite forecasters’ hopes, in the early hours
of Saturday, September 10, Donna clobbered the Florida Keys city of Marathon. A
Navy convoy, battling intense winds and rain, found utter destruction at Marathon
at 9 a.m. that morning. The city of Key West, less than fifty miles to the southwest of
Marathon, escaped with minor wind damage.11
“Tide Swells Flood: More Flee in Tampa,” New York Times, March 20, 1960; “Tampa Levee Break
Widens Flood Loss,” New York Times, March 21, 1960; “Floods Hit Tampa as Dam Collapses,” St.
Petersburg Times, March 18, 1960; “Flood Threat Eases,” New York Times, March 22, 1960.
10
“60 Tampa Homes Flooded,” New York Times, August 2, 1960; “More Flee Tampa Homes,” New York
Times, August 3, 1960.
11
“Hurricane Aims for Puerto Rico,” New York Times, September 5, 1960; “102 Die and 200 Are
Missing as Hurricane Hits Caribbean,” New York Times, September 7, 1960; “Residents Who Refused to
Leave Ride out Storm in Florida Keys,” New York Times, September 11, 1960.
9
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Donna careened through Florida. After colliding with the Keys, the storm
swung northwest to unleash a tempest upon Everglades City, Naples, and Fort Myers,
then turned northward, inland, brushing past Sarasota and St. Petersburg. The gale
turned again, hard to the northeast, whipping across the spine of Florida to the east
coast, near Daytona, where it moved over the open water of the Atlantic. Donna left
a brutal trail of damage in her wake. Ft. Myers was without electricity, cut off from
the world after midnight Saturday. The roof blew off the National Guard Armory in
Dade City, where more than 150 evacuees were sheltered. Among the cities hardest hit
were Venice, Punta Gorda, Sarasota, Bradenton, St. Petersburg, Clearwater, Bartow,
Winter Haven, Dade City, and Lakeland, where winds of 100 miles per hour were
reported. Some forty thousand people were evacuated from low areas along the gulf
before Donna hit land. Damage to Florida’s multimillion-dollar citrus crop, which
was reported in the New York Times ahead of the death toll and other damage, was
expected to be significant since the orange and grapefruit crops were almost ripe.12
On Sunday, waters driven into the gulf by the power of the storm were
expected to flood back to land. The counterclockwise motion of the advancing gale
had sent coastal waters far into the gulf. The edge of the water was reported 100 feet
farther out than normal along the west coast at Venice, Sarasota, and St. Petersburg.
Roland Johnson, Pinellas County’s civil defense director, reported that water had
been sucked nearly completely out of some bays in the St. Petersburg Beach area. As
the storm passed, the point where winds began coming from the west turned those
waters back toward land. Flooding along the west coast, well into Tampa Bay, was
severe. An estimated fifteen thousand people were forced to evacuate from the gulf
beaches along Pinellas County. A day later, President Eisenhower designated sections
of Florida affected by Hurricane Donna as major disaster areas. Military units were
dispatched to restore five smashed bridges on the Overseas Highway connecting the
Florida Keys with the mainland.13
Donna provided the last drop in the region’s long deluge. Waterlogged
residents demanded change. Hillsborough County in 1960 was midway through a
twenty-year growth explosion that witnessed the population doubling from 250,000
in 1950 to nearly 500,000 in 1970. The newly launched University of South Florida,
with property along the river, anxiously opened its doors in the fall of 1960. During
the decade before Donna, the population of the county had swollen by 150,000
people. Pressures on housing, water supply, sewage, drainage, and other infrastructure
elements for the mushrooming population made the disruptive behavior of the
river intolerable. Efforts of the eleven-year-old Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District, created by the Florida Legislature in 1949, had failed to control the
C. E. Wright, “Interior Florida: Hurrican Donna’s Route,” New York Times, September 18, 1960;
“Hurricane Roars up the Gulf Coast into Citrus Belt,” New York Times, September 11, 1960.
13
“Hurricane Roars up the Gulf Coast into Citrus Belt,” New York Times, September 11, 1960;
“Thousands Flee along the Coast,” New York Times, September 13, 1960.
12
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untamed Hillsborough River. Within a year of Hurricane Donna, elected officials
responded.14
Under a “fast-tracked” special act of the legislature, in 1961, the State of
Florida created the Southwest Florida Water Management District (SWFWMD, or,
more commonly, Swiftmud), an independent special district of the State of Florida.
District boundaries were developed on the basis of surface water drainage and
hydrologic divides, not political borders. The new agency—which would come to
serve as a model for four additional special water districts statewide—was charged
with the management, regulation, and protection of regional water resources for a
broad sixteen-county region. The fledgling water district was directed to “collect and
analyze water-related data, design and operate flood control facilities, manage the
consumptive use of water, supervise water well construction, regulate surface water
systems, and evaluate water supplies within its jurisdiction.” Dale Twachtman was
appointed executive director, a post he held for the first ten years of the agency’s
existence. Twatchman spearheaded the local drive to build the Tampa Bypass Canal,
which constituted one part of a far-reaching plan proposed by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, which since 1899 had been the federal agency overseeing the nation’s
navigable rivers and harbors.15
The Army Corps of Engineers, whose bulldozers at the time were just about to
begin converting Florida’s 103-mile-long Kissimmee River into a 56-mile-long sewer
called the C-38 Canal, proposed the Four River Basins Project, an elaborate system
of canals, reservoirs, and flood-control structures designed to deal with managing the
waters of the four major rivers of the Green Swamp: the Hillsborough, Ocklawaha,
Withlacoochee, and Peace rivers, as well as their extended river basin areas. All told,
some 6,000 square miles of central and southwest Florida, from Yankeetown to Port
Charlotte, were targeted by the plan. The Tampa Bypass Canal—the only portion of
the Four River Basins Project to be completed—was a multimillion-dollar strategy
for diverting floodwaters from the Hillsborough River at a point upstream from the
cities of Tampa and Temple Terrace, then rerouting the excess water through an area
east of Tampa into nearby McKay Bay. Two of the three original components of the
Tampa Bypass Canal System were the 14-mile canal itself, cut from a lowland natural
reservoir along the Hillsborough River, near its confluence with Trout Creek, to a
point some 8 miles due south to the headwaters of Six Mile Creek, which grows into
Palm River, then deeper and wider for the canal’s brief run into McKay Bay. Plans
called for the shallow stream, meandering from eastern Tampa into McKay Bay, to be
Exploring Florida Web site, http://fcit.usf.edu/FLORIDA/docs/c/census/Hillsborough.htm;
Southwest Florida Water Management District Web site, www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/about/isspapers/
responsibilities.html; Florida Bar Association Web site, “The Environmental and Land Use Law Section,”
www.eluls.org.
15
Florida Bar Association Web site, “The Environmental and Land Use Law Section,” www.eluls.
org; Southwest Florida Water Management District Web site, www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/about/isspapers/
responsibilities.html; Phil Willon, “Before the Environment Became a Big Player,” Tampa Tribune, October
8, 1991; 1899 Navigable Rivers and Harbors Act of the U.S. Congress.
14
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This enhanced map shows the Hillsborough River drainage basin, including the river’s major tributaries,
as well as the original paths of the Palm River and Six Mile Creek.

dredged to a depth of 20 feet, and widened to 400–600 feet. The second component
of the plan—the Harney Canal—involved a nearly 2-mile-long canal connecting the
proposed bypass with the Hillsborough River below Temple Terrace, but upstream
from the reservoir. A third component, the Thonotosassa Canal, was planned to run
from Eureka Springs, a dozen miles into Lake Thonotosassa and along Flint Creek to
the Hillsborough River. The Thonotosassa Canal, like the Four River Basins Project
in general, was never completed.16
The Four River Basins Project generated controversy and opposition nearly
from its inception. The Polk County Property Owners League, early in 1962,
challenged the Corps’s cost estimate of $104 million to pay for the plan. The league’s
own engineering study estimated that the initial cost of the project would near $210
million, more than twice the estimate of the Army engineers. Raymond Stuck, a
former Civil Works Division head for the Corps, conducted the study for the property
owners. Stuck concluded that Corps’ Four River Basins Project was prepared “too
hurriedly,” and that it was inadequate due to “serious omissions,” including a failure
to deal with seepage under dams, ground clearing and preparation, and the costs
Louis M. Motz, Hydrological Effects of the Tampa Bypass Canal System, Publication of the State of
Florida, Department of Natural Resources, Division of Resource Management. (Tallahassee: Bureau of
Geology, 1976), 2, 4–8; Susan M. Green, “$6 Million Restoration Plan Moves Forward,” Tampa Tribune,
January 31, 1998; St. Petersburg Times, “Canal Contract Awarded,” April 19, 1968.

16

https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/tampabayhistory/vol21/iss1/1

18

: Full Issue

The Taming of the Hillsborough River          11
of hauling dirt from borrow pits to final placement on dams. Stuck charged that
the Corps report also neglected to consider grassing and seeding of levee slopes to
prevent erosion. The Tampa Bypass Canal portion of the Four River Basins Project
was expected to cost nearly $30 million.17
Contention surrounding plans to tame the Hillsborough River was not the
only force flooding Tampa during the early 1960s. During the same period, the rising
tide of the civil rights movement washed through Tampa as activists demanded and
demonstrated for integration and desegregation of public accommodations. A series
of lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, organized by members of the local NAACP Youth
Council, brought the national movement’s challenge to vestigial Jim Crow laws to the
streets, bus stations, motels, and restaurants of Tampa. The black vote impacted local
elections. The 1963 Tampa mayoral election, wherein former mayor Nick Nuccio
defeated the incumbent Julian Lane, was in part decided by the shifting allegiances of
several blocs of voters reacting to the twin tides of civil rights and the government’s
failure to provide adequate flood-control measures. The African American community
had joined with residents of Ybor City and West Tampa to help elect Nuccio as
the city’s first Latin mayor, then deserted him for Lane in 1959 because of Lane’s
willingness to work with civil rights activists. Lane attributed his 1963  citywide
defeat to his support for integration, but he also lost support in his home district of
Seminole Heights, as well as the waterlogged communities of Sulphur Springs and
Forest Hills. An active citizens’ group in Forest Hills that had backed Lane in his first
campaign because previous administrations had not dealt with the flooding issue
realigned with Nuccio in his successful bid to regain the mayor’s office. The same
mind-set that accepted segregation as “natural” likewise saw nothing unnatural about
building homes and business within the floodplain of a major river system.18
Design work and right-of-way acquisition for the Bypass Canal project was
time-consuming. The $1 million effort was beleaguered from the start with expense
overruns and other problems. The most significant problems would eventually be
viewed as a lack of environmental safeguards and an insufficient engineering design.
The plan called for private contractors to construct the Corps-designed canal. In
April 1966, Southwest Florida Water Management officials approved a proposal to
extend the projected Bypass Canal a quarter mile into McKay Bay. They noted that
the shallow bay—2 to 3 feet deep—would otherwise act as a dam to the 20-footdeep canal. At the same time, water officials also granted authority for the filing of
condemnation proceedings for parcels within the 15,000 acres between Hillsborough
River State Park and Fowler Avenue, land required for a basin reservoir. A month
later, the Corps of Engineers awarded Trans-State Dredging Company of Ft. Pierce
“Four Rivers Cost Figure Said Too Low,” St. Petersburg Times, April 2, 1962; “Canal Contract
Awarded,” St. Petersburg Times, April 19, 1968.
18
Robert Kerstein, Politics and Growth in Twentieth-Century Tampa (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2001), 124–26.
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the $999,250 contract for construction of the downstream end of the Bypass Canal.
The contract covered dredging from the Twenty-second Street Causeway, northwest
across McKay Bay and up Palm River to the U.S. 41 bridge. Two years later, in April
1968, the Corps awarded a nearly $2 million contract for dredging between U.S. 41 
and State Road 60, to Potashnick Construction Inc., which had submitted the lowest
of eight bids for the work. The first section of the canal was completed in 1968.
What was essentially a “moat” around Tampa was finished in the early 1970s, and
the final section, where the river crosses north of the canal near Fletcher Avenue, was
completed in 1983. During periods of high water, canal flood-control gates are closed
to reroute potential floodwaters from the river, around Tampa and Temple Terrace,
south past Harney Flats, Orient Park, Palm, and into McKay Bay.19
Since completion, the canal has become more than merely a flood-control
measure. With the population of Hillsborough County doubling again between
1970 and the turn of the century, from just under 500,000 to 1 million, the demand
for potable water—and waterfront property—increased proportionately. Water from
the Bypass Canal has been used to augment the city’s reservoir during dry seasons.
During a prolonged drought in the early 1990s, for instance, when the normal flow
of the Hillsborough River was cut in half, officials began pumping about 40 million
gallons a day from the canal to supply the city with drinking water. The water in the
Bypass Canal has become one of many additional water sources for the burgeoning
population of Hillsborough County.20
The Tampa Bypass Canal System tamed the Hillsborough River. Dale
Twachtmann, the Southwest Florida Water Management Distinct executive director
who spearheaded the canal project in the early 1970s, expressed pride in the canal
in a 1994 interview with the Tampa Tribune. “It’s one of those projects where
people can’t realize its importance because it caused something not to happen,” said
Twachtmann. “Tampa never has flooded since [1960] and won’t. The canal was the
total solution.”21
The drive to tame the Hillsborough River was not without problems. It
had a devastating effect on the Six Mile Creek–Palm River system. Critical design
flaws, coupled with an augmented impact from industrial pollution, combined to
poison and suffocate life from the once-lively stream. The Bypass Canal did not
cause polluters to congregate along its southern flank, but a design flaw at the U.S.
41  bridge exacerbated pollution problems. A mid-1970s study prepared by the
“Bypass Canal Extension Okayed,” St. Petersburg Times, April 7, 1966; “Tampa By-Pass Canal Pact Is
Awarded,” St. Petersburg Times, May 26, 1966; “Canal Contract Awarded,” St. Petersburg Times, April 19,
1968.
20
Mike Salinero, “Tampa Bay, Fla., Area Has Safeguards to Control Storm Surge,” Tampa Tribune,
September 13, 2005; Exploring Florida Web site, http://fcit.usf.edu/FLORIDA/docs/c/census/
Hillsborough.htm; “Then and Now,” Tampa Tribune, April 25, 1991.
21
Deborah Vanpelt, “Many Tales Gush from Much-Underappreciated Tampa Bypass Canal,” Tampa
Tribune, November 14, 1994.
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U.S. Department of the Interior, examining the hydrologic effects of the canal,
acknowledged that “The canal system will breach the underlying artesian Floridan
aquifer in several places. Thus, it will cause drainage from the aquifer into the canal
system and will affect ground-water levels over a large area.”22
In 2005, Tampa Bay Watch executive director Peter Clark called the dredging
and straightening of Palm River a “west coast version of the Kissimmee River.”
Polluted runoff from the industrial sites on both sides of the waterway became
concentrated and swiftly moved into McKay Bay, where circulation problems had
existed since the 1920s, when the Twenty-second Street Causeway was constructed
between Hooker’s Point and the east shore of the bay. During World War II and the
postwar decades, Hooker’s Point became a shipbuilding center and entrepot. Oil
storage facilities dot its landscape. Circulation problems were exacerbated when Palm
River was channelized for the Bypass Canal project. The Tampa Tribune reported in
2005 that the Bypass Canal contains sediment laced with carcinogenic materials such
as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and two pesticides considered toxic to bottomdwelling creatures. Clark was quoted in the press as characterizing McKay Bay, postcanal, as a “contaminated mix of toxins, fertilizers, oils, and other pollutants incapable
of supporting much of the marine life that historically inhabited its waters.”23
The presence of PCBs in the canal had been noted for more than thirty years.
The U.S. Geological Survey, while gathering data for the Corps’s Bypass Canal
project, had noticed PCBs in soil samples taken in 1975. Over the next six years, all
but one of twenty additional samples contained some amount of PCB, which had
been banned around the same time—in the mid-1970s—after researchers discovered
the chemical’s carcinogenic properties. PCB is a manufactured compound once used
in a variety of industrial products, including electric transformers, plastics, lubricants,
ink, paper, and adhesives. A 1981  St. Petersburg Times account that officials with
the Geological Survey had written to the Department of Environmental Regulation
(DER) about their discovery and concerns sparked a flurry of press reports and
editorials, as well as calls for further study.24
In 1980, the U.S. Congress created a trust fund that became known as
“Superfund” to pay for cleaning toxic sites when the responsible polluter cannot
be identified or is unable or unwilling to pay. A tax levied on companies prone to
polluting, mostly oil and chemical concerns, financed the Superfund. The idea was

Motz, 37–38.
Yvette C. Hammett, “Water Project Aims to Clean Basin’s Pollution—Problem Began with Causeway,”
Tampa Tribune, November 27, 2005.
24
“Poisonous Chemical Discovered in Tampa Canal Used by Fishermen,” St. Petersburg Times, July 9,
1981; “Canal’s PCB Level Not Harmful, Says State DER Official,” St. Petersburg Times, July 10, 1981;
“Chemical-Waste Menace,” St. Petersburg Times, July 13, 1981; “Tests For PCB in Tampa Bypass Canal Are
Continuing,” St. Petersburg Times, August 1, 1981.
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Photograph by the author

View of an industrial facility adjacent to the Tampa Bypass Canal.  The introduction of manufacturing,
processing and storage facilities along the Bypass Canal has contributed to the overall reduction in water
quality of the surrounding area.

that chemical plants, oil refineries, and other industries that created toxic materials
would be held accountable, and when they weren’t, cleanups would be funded by
the tax. In 1995, a GOP-controlled Congress allowed the Superfund tax to expire,
and the administration of George W. Bush indicated that it was not in favor of
reauthorization. The amount in the trust—which peaked in 1996 at $3.8 billion—
plummeted to $28 million by 2003. At a time when the Public Interest Research
Group estimated that one in four Americans lived within 4 miles of a Superfund
site, the responsibility of funding toxic cleanups shifted, under President Bush, to the
American taxpayer.25
In addition to Superfund toxic waste cleanup sites, the category of “brownfield”
sites developed as a means of dealing with less contaminated locations—former sites
of activities associated with pollutants, such as paints, solvents, battery acid, and
cleaning fluids—which had rendered the properties undesirable to investors. The
concept of official “brownfields” held that with the targeted property inventoried
and the likely contaminants identified, potential buyers could be offered tax credits
and other incentives to spur privately funded redevelopment. Seeking a federal grant
of $200,000 to compile a list of such properties, Hillsborough County designated a
Robert Trigaux, “Toxic Mess May Stay Because Polluters Won’t Pay,” St. Petersburg Times, July 7,
2002; “Selling Out to Polluters,” St. Petersburg Times, July 6, 2002.
25
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16-square-mile area between Tampa city limits on the west and Interstate 75 on the
east, and between Harney Road to the north, and Palm River Road on the south.
The Tampa Bypass Canal flows directly through the center of this 16-square-mile
“brownfield” region.26
Pollution had long been synonymous with the community of Orient Park,
situated along the west bank of the former Palm River, now the channelized Bypass
Canal. Orient Park was originally developed in the 1920s as a site where the so-called
“Tin Can Tourists” who traveled to Florida after the First World War could set up
their tents. With both rail and port access, the area evolved into an industrial zone
and came to be considered home to one of the largest clusters of toxic waste sites in
the state. As of 2004, no fewer than five Superfund sites were located within a mile
of Orient Park. Today some three hundred families live in the community, most in
small houses, apartments, and mobile homes. In response to concerns that polluted
groundwater was infiltrating residential well fields, the Hillsborough County water
department began providing water services to residents in the 1990s.27
Three of these particularly egregious Superfund sites are concentrated together
along the Tampa Bypass Canal. The Alaric, Helena Chemical, and Stauffer Chemical
sites represent past and future environmental threats to the region. The Superfund
site at 2110 N. Seventy-first Street, today the location of an aluminum contractor, is
named for Alaric Inc., a plastics recycling firm that occupied the property between
1981 and 1986. Alaric shared the 2-acre site with Dana Marine Labs, which handled
marine varnishes. Before Dana Marine, a concrete equipment repair company
operated at the location. The EPA declared Alaric a potential health threat to the
estimated nine thousand people living within a 4-mile radius who relied on well water.
State public health officials disagreed, maintaining that even though the groundwater
is indeed contaminated by cleaning solvents, it is not a health hazard because nearby
residents have been allowed to obtain their water from the City of Tampa. Davis
Daiker, of the Health Department’s Bureau of Environmental Epidemiology, offered
that the nearest municipal wells are more than a half mile from the site, and that the
groundwater contamination plume from Alaric is moving south, toward an industrial
region. Residential areas are generally to the north of the Alaric site. In 2000, the
EPA reported that groundwater sampling turned up evidence of tetrachloroethylene,
trichloroethylene, a dry-cleaning chemical called PCE, and traces of vinyl chloride, a
liver toxin and carcinogen. A year later, EPA project manager Brad Jackson reported
at a public meeting that groundwater contamination at the Alaric site “seemed to
have doubled in size the last two years.”28
Ivan J. Hathaway, “County Targets Brownfield Sites,” Tampa Tribune, March 5, 1998.
Yvette C. Hammett, “Planting an Acorn,” Tampa Tribune, June 26, 2004.
28
Susan M. Green, “Site Joins Others in County on Superfund List,” Tampa Tribune, December 6,
2000; Josh Zimmer, “EPA: Site Has Contaminated Water,” St. Petersburg Times, December 6, 2000; Josh
Zimmer, “EPA Plans to Decontaminate Property.” St. Petersburg Times, November 9, 2001.
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The Alaric site is located just west of another pair of Superfund sites, the
Helena Chemical Co. and its immediate downstream neighbor, Stauffer Chemical
Company. In 2000, the Tampa Tribune reported that regulators were worried about
pumping contaminated groundwater at the Helena site because of fear of altering the
drift of the Alaric plume. The Helena site was built for the production of sulphur,
which was used in the processing of phosphate, in 1929. Helena Chemical Company
purchased the property from Flas Sulphur in 1967 and converted the facility to the
production of agricultural chemicals, including pesticides. Drains in the pesticide
manufacturing areas emptied into a series of three pollution-control tanks, where
hazardous chemicals were mixed with caustic soda, then stored onsite. Pesticide
production transferred to the company’s facilities in Georgia in 1981, but repacking,
warehousing, and distribution of agricultural chemicals and liquid fertilizers
continued at the Tampa location. One of the control tanks was filled with concrete,
and the above-ground portions of the other two were knocked down; the remaining
structures were capped with concrete after being filled with sand and gravel. Arsenic,
zinc, and chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides such as aldrin, heptachlor, endrin, and
DDT were found in soil, sediment, and groundwater associated with the Helena site.
Drainage on the property was directed to a concrete culvert that channeled into a
pond. When the pond overflowed—which it did at least once a year between 1979
and 1990—a concrete spillway allowed outflow to pass under Orient Road and east
into the Tampa Bypass Canal.29
Other forms of toxic pollution have assailed Palm River since it and its Six
Mile Creek headwaters were terraformed into the Tampa Bypass Canal. A notable
example occurred when high levels of the pesticide malathion made it into the canal
during the scorched-earth campaign the city waged against the medfly in 1997.
When the Mediterranean fruit fly was discovered in a Tampa residential area
in May 1997, the finding initiated an aggressive campaign to protect Florida’s $3.6
billion citrus industry, as well as other commodities favored by this insect-scourge
of agriculture. An initial component of the campaign involved aerial spraying with
the organophosphate insecticide malathion, conducted by Lee County Mosquito
Control and a company called K & K, which used refitted DC-3 bomber planes to
apply the toxicant. Within a month, the targeted area had expanded from the city of
Tampa to all of Hillsborough County and to Polk and Manatee Counties. The EPA
granted Florida’s request for an emergency exemption from the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act—the defining regulation for those engaged in
chemical pest-control. The exemption allowed usage of the pesticide malathion in
volumes that exceeded the chemical’s limited labeling mandates. Despite strict bans
against spraying malathion near or over water, sampling tests found “unacceptably
Green, “Site Joins...”; Josh Zimmer, “Federal Officials Hasten Cleanup of Chemicals,” St. Petersburg
Times, December 8, 2000; “Helena Chemical Company,” Coastal Hazardous Waste Site Review/ Helena,
57, 59, 63.
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high levels in the Hillsborough River and Tampa Bypass Canal.” An editorial in the
Sarasota Herald Tribune thundered about water pollution when a pilot for the private
contractor hired to spray the chemical flushed residues from his airplane spray tanks
over the Gulf of Mexico. Witnesses also reported a DC-3 plane spraying malathion
over the Tampa Bypass Canal at a time when up to 40 million gallons of water a day
were being diverted from the canal to augment Tampa’s drinking supply. “The river
and canal were never identified as potable supplies to program directors,” the Sarasota
newspaper reported, adding that “the pollution of the water supplies shouldn’t have
happened.” The instruction label for malathion states: “Keep out of lakes, streams,
ponds, tidal marshes, and estuaries. Do not apply where runoff is likely to occur.” A
mixed message about the program came from the EPA, which assured the public that
the aerial campaign was safe, and that “despite extensive studies, malathion, as used in
the eradication program, has not been linked to long-term human health problems.”
Nevertheless, the EPA went on to advise, “As a precaution, residents are warned to
remain indoors, avoid contact with the spray, rinse homegrown fruits and vegetables,
cover outdoor surfaces, and bring laundry, children’s toys, and pets indoors.” The
release of sterile medflies by the Florida Department of Agriculture in late July put an
end to the aerial bombardment and the malathion controversy.30
Equally problematic to the issue of chemical additives and toxic sediments in
the former Six Mile Creek/Palm River is the matter of a pair of design flaws that date
back to the construction of the Bypass Canal. The U.S. 41 overpass was already in
place when contracts were awarded for the dredging of the canal. One company cut
the canal from McKay Bay to the U.S. 41 overpass, and another dredged north from
U.S. 41. As journalist Susan Green reported in the late 1990s, rather than rebuild
the bridge and replace the pilings, the Corps simply left the shorter pilings in place,
creating an underwater dam. Depth readings in 1997 ranged from 15 feet on the west
side of the bridge to 8 feet under the bridge, then down to 20 feet on the east side.
The natural underwater flushing of the waterway has been prevented since the canal
was created. The trapped water “stubbornly clings to its measure of zero oxygen levels
on the east side of the U.S. 41 overpass,” Green wrote. Stagnant water and perpetual
algae blooms are the result. Stephen Grabe, an environmental supervisor with the
Hillsborough Environmental Protection Commission in 2003, reported that about a
third of samples taken from the bottom of the river show no signs of life. However,
Grabe said, it is hard to know whether the primary cause is the pollutants or the lack
of dissolved oxygen. The main contaminants in the sediment are PCBs, Chlordane,
and DDT because the river is not flushed. An official with the EPC pointed out
that the northern part of McKay Bay, at the mouth of Palm River, also has sediment
containing moderately high levels of hydrocarbons such as oils and grease, but it is
shallower and flushes out more, which helps wash out pollutants.31
“Medfly Mistakes,” Sarasota Herald Tribune, July 13, 1997; “Florida Expands Aerial Malathion
Spraying around Tampa,” Pesticide & Toxic Chemical News 25, no. 37 (July 9, 1997).
31
Susan M. Green, “River’s Problems Run Deep,” Tampa Tribune, March 17, 1997; “Polluted Palm
River, McKay Bay Get Attention,” Tampa Tribune, July 20, 2003.
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Multimillion-dollar restoration plans for the traumatized river way have been
discussed for years, and some small steps have been taken. An organization—the
Palm River Management Committee—formed to address efforts to restore Palm
River. The committee was founded in 1988 by river resident Sandy Odor, in response
to fish kills. The committee included representatives of the County Environmental
Protection Commission, the water department, Swiftmud, the Florida Department
of Environmental Protection, and Tampa Bay Watch. In 1997, Peter Clark, director
of Tampa Bay Watch and a member of the Palm River Management Committee,
declared that “Palm River has the worst quality of any system in Tampa Bay. It has
algae blooms all year round.” Clark labeled the river a “killing field” and proposed a
major project to replace dredged material back into the river, raising it from 20 feet
deep to its historic depths of 10 to 12 feet. The committee plan called for shoreline
improvements and the creation of marshes and small tributaries destroyed by the
dredging of the canal. Clark characterized the restoration plan as a small-scale version
of the 56-mile Kissimmee River restoration project. Clark focused on the problems
caused by the “box-cut” procedure used to dredge the canal, which made steep cuts
along the shoreline and left a flat bottom. The former gentle slope allowed plants
to grow, Clark pointed out. The Palm River Committee also believed the restored
river would not hinder flood control. A year later, the restoration plan— reduced
from 3.3 miles of the canal to partial restoration of about 2.5 miles—remained in
the discussion stage. Backers of the plan pointed out that since the original Four
River Basins Project was never completed, the Tampa Bypass canal is woefully
overengineered. It is designed to handle additional waters from Lake Thonotosassa
and Flint Creek, portions of the original plan never realized. Clark told a reporter
for the Tampa Tribune in 1997: “This is the most highly disturbed tributary in the
Tampa Bay system. Let us not forget the river that’s been destroyed.”32
Two years later, the plan was still being discussed. Tom Cardinale, an assistant
water management director of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection
Commission, agreed in 1999 that the Bypass Canal need not be so wide or so deep.
“The thing I’m really wishing for,” Cardinale told a Tampa Tribune reporter, is that
the Corps of Engineers “will admit that they over-designed the system and over-dug
it and come back in and refill it to a more natural depth.” Two years later, in April
2001, the restoration plan was described as “in the state and federal funding pipeline,”
but that “work is probably two or three years away.” The following year, with Corps
backing and a price tag that had climbed to an estimated $4.4 million, the plan
received a lukewarm endorsement at a 2002 meeting of environmental scientists in
St. Petersburg. Experts noted that the canal bottom is virtually devoid of life, and the
Corps plan to remove the underwater berm below the U.S. 41 bridge probably won’t
change that. The assembly concluded that despite the fact that the original plan that
Susan M. Green, “Palm River Restoration Pushed,” Tampa Tribune, February 18, 1997; Green, “$6
Million...”
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An enhanced view of “Tampa’s Moat”, which encircles the cit of Tampa by connecting Hillsborough Bay,
on the southwest, with McKay Bay, on the southeast, via the Hillsborough River and the Harney and
Bypass Canals.

created the canal system had been approved on a “fast track” between 1960 and 1962,
altering the design could be expected to take at least five years and cost far more that
the estimated $4.4-million.33 Meanwhile the former Six Mile Creek and Palm River
are no more. Collectively, and then some, they are Canal 135 of the Tampa Bypass
Canal System.
Once upon a time, the Hillsborough River was tamed. Today, the still-growing
population of Tampa and its surrounding sprawl is not forced either to suffer the
routine flooding of a natural river or—unless individually inclined to do so—to
consider the existence of the Hillsborough River at all. The city is well protected
by its moat. But in the progression from the pastoral scenes remembered by Neva
Scruggs Ennis to the Superfund Waste sites of Orient Park, some of the cost of that
historical amnesia and relative safety is buried below the paved-over regions of the
former creek bed, and hidden in the sediments in the murky depths of Canal 135.

Susan M. Green, “Corps Considers Redesign of River,” Tampa Tribune, June 24, 1999; Susan M.
Green, “Officials May Pull the Plug on Palm River’s ‘Bathtub,’” Tampa Tribune, April 8, 2001; Susan M.
Green, “Scientists Give Palm River Project Grudging Approval.” Tampa Tribune, September 15, 2002.
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P

eerless Pageant:
The First Ten Years
of Tampa’s Gasparilla Festival
by Rosanna Ensley

T

he Gasparilla Festival has, since its inception, both reflected and
shaped civic events and public perceptions in Tampa. A harbinger of the nation’s
imperialist and demographic expansion in the first decade of the twentieth century,
Gasparilla was attached to celebrations of the Panama Canal’s construction and of
Tampa’s population growth as reported by the U.S. Census. The festival was part of
spectacles that featured the first cars and airplanes in Tampa, heralding modernity.1
Gasparilla was further affected by national issues as it was put on hold during economic
downturns and both World Wars. In 1924, Gasparilla engaged an Egyptian theme
to honor the discovery of King Tut’s tomb, and during the Great Depression, former
participants (“pirates”) too poor to pay their dues to the organization sponsoring
the celebration received keys to the poorhouse instead of keys to the city, their
usual bounty.2 A powerful social indicator, the festival also came to shape cultural
consciousness. When Tampa was awarded a National Football League franchise in
1974, piracy already so thoroughly dominated the iconography of the area that
Buccaneers seemed the only fitting choice for the team’s mascot.3
Until 1991, the mayor of Tampa traditionally surrendered the keys to the
city to Gaspar’s band of rogues. That year, the coincidence of the local spectacle of
Gasparilla with the national spectacle of Super Bowl XXV illuminated inequalities in
the organization of Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, which sponsors the parade. With
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750 members at the time, Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla was considered the most
prestigious and secretive of Tampa’s clubs. When faced with the demand to admit
twenty-five black members, the Krewe withdrew their sponsorship of the parade
rather than comply.4 By the next year, however, Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla had
admitted some African American members and again resumed sponsorship of the
parade as Krewes more representative of Tampa’s diversity were formed.5
The 1991 controversy demonstrates the festival’s importance as an indicator
of change and social conflict. Chroniclers of Gasparilla’s early years, however, have
presented the festival as a popular, apolitical, inoffensive civic ritual. Further, scholars
have paid little attention to the motivations of Gasparilla’s organizers—members of
the urban elite attempting to work out their own sense of identity. Indeed, the festival
seems to stem from elite efforts to create and call attention to a sense of community
in Tampa. Though newspaper accounts of the festival from 1904 to 1914 portray the
crowd as passive viewers, not active participants, the evolution of the festival’s form
demonstrates that Gasparilla provides a dynamic and viable connection between
Tampa’s business and working class. By 1914, Ye Mystic Krewe had changed its
collective visage from the courtly pirate, a figure that called particular attention to
class, to the more inclusive rogue pirate. And yet, as the 1991 controversy illuminated,
while Ye Mystic Krewe had adopted styles of inclusion in form, in practice the group
often maintained mechanisms of exclusion and hierarchy.
The story of the first years of the Gasparilla Festival is one of appropriation,
where piracy was featured as an aggressive element that effected a twofold takeover
of Tampa’s public space and public consciousness. The festival celebrating King
Gasparilla had always featured piracy as its organizational theme. In the carnival’s first
few years, however, Gasparilla’s band of merry followers, Ye Mystic Krewe, affected
all the rituals and mannerisms of courtly life. Further, the Gasparilla Festival itself
was originally tangential, an amusing distraction from other expositions meant to
glorify the city of Tampa and help the state of Florida assume a place of dominance in
the New South. But the thematic content of Tampa’s festivals quickly changed from
glorifying the nation and imperialism, to addressing the state’s agricultural industry,
and finally to venerating the city itself and its appeal as a tourist destination. As
the Gasparilla Carnival assumed more importance, imagery of the rogue, criminal
pirate came to increasingly dominate the appearance of the festival itself. The specter
of pirates invading the city and seizing the keys was both a symbolic and literal
process. During this time, organizers adopted a more aggressive form—that of the
bloodthirsty pirate—to inform visitors that Tampa’s leaders would stop at nothing to
achieve the prominence their city deserved.
Gregory Bush notes that this powerful combination of promotion and
Sarah Rimer, “A Tradition for Tampa Raises Questions of Bias,” New York Times, October 15, 1990.
Robert Kerstein, Politics and Growth in Twentieth-Century Tampa (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2001), 1-2.
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Captain James McKay, Jr. was photographed astride his horse during the second Gasparilla invasion in
1905. During the early years of the festival, Krewe members invaded the city on horseback rather than
by ship.

myth had the ability to create, or at least accentuate, new modern modes of urban
engagement. In his work on Miami, the author notes that primary accounts of the
city in the first decades of the twentieth century combined vigorous promotion with
active myth-making as they described tourists and new residents alike flocking to
public festivals. These accounts emphasized attendance at these spectacles, along with
the progress of the south Florida land boom and Miami’s fast-paced way of life,
to portray the city as an idyllic vacation destination and a place to procure instant
wealth.6
French anthropologist André-Marcel d’Ans, too, examines the power of myth
as promotion in his work on Tampa’s most famous festival. D’Ans claims that José
Gaspar completed his most successful conquest by transcending historical knowledge
to commandeer the public consciousness, becoming the primary cultural identifier for
Tampans.7 Like its inspirational nucleus, the Gasparilla Festival, too, has transformed
from its humble origins. What started as a carnival sideline, a thrilling interruption
Gregory W. Bush, “’Playground of the USA’: Miami and the Promotion of Spectacle,” Pacific
Historical Review 68, No. 2 (May 1999), 54.
7
Andre-Marcel d’Ans, “The Legend of Gasparilla: Myth and History on Florida’s West Coast,” Tampa
Bay History (Fall-Winter 1980), 9.
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of an otherwise ordinary parade, has become Tampa’s foremost civic ritual. In this
way, the Gasparilla Festival has embarked on its own hegemonic process, different
from the imperial and agricultural celebrations of which it was originally a part.
Over the course of a few years, Gasparilla so consummately completed this process of
legitimation that Tampans appear to have forgotten the time when it was not so.
Previous scholars have examined the Gasparilla Festival only from an anthropological
perspective, seeing it as a redistributive or quasi-religious ritual. D’Ans, in his 1980
article, examines the genesis and structure of the legend of the festival’s inspiration,
José Gaspar, to understand how and why the Spanish pirate became the patron
of Tampa. D’Ans, like all who have written about the festival, looks to the legend
of Gaspar to historicize his work, virtually ignoring the Festival of Gasparilla as
a historical phenomenon. D’Ans focuses on the legend of Gaspar as it expressed
“striking features” of the local elites who chose to adopt the myth and organized the
festival. Further, Gaspar’s story possessed the necessary characteristics to encourage
and sustain the participation of the other social classes who shared in the legend and
voluntarily engaged in the festival.8
D’Ans examines the debate that lies behind the festival concerning the
historical authenticity of José Gaspar. He recounts the various narratives of Gaspar’s
life, claiming that the absence of records in the United States and Spain proves that
Gaspar never existed. Thus, d’Ans is able to loudly discredit the existence of Gaspar
while pointing to his cultural importance as Tampa’s most famous legend. To d’Ans,
the very absence of historical authenticity merely proves that José Gaspar’s story has
indeed become legend. Further, the historical truth of Gaspar as a legend can be
found in its annual celebration.9 Initially, Gaspar’s tale was transmitted orally, but,
fittingly, the very first written version of the Gasparilla legend can be found in an
advertising brochure for a railroad company. All other written accounts reference for
authenticity the stories of an eyewitness, Juan Gomez. Gomez, though a real person,
was a very unreliable source. He claimed, among other things, that he was a fortythree-year-old sailor aboard Gaspar’s ship in 1821, which would have made him 122
years old upon his death in 1900.10
The creators of the festival universalized the story of Gaspar and shifted to
a symbolic interpretation to suit their purposes and move the legend away from
its territorial association with Charlotte Harbor. D’Ans contends that Tampa’s elite
purposefully hid the legend of Gaspar behind an apparatus of fabrications to make it
appear authentic without losing too much of its romantic character.11 All the written
works on the pirate Gaspar, despite some differences, had to make claims to historical
truth. The existence of written historical accounts of Gaspar’s legend, despite authorial
intent, has helped preserve the legend in the collective consciousness of Tampans.12
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The organizers’ adoption of the myth of Gaspar speaks to the ethos of Tampa’s
business class, who helped create the festival in his name. The legend, itself a product
of a specific historical context, would come to act upon the circumstances in which
it was created.13 The legend of Gasparilla provided a rationale and historical character
that the local elite used, in D’Ans’s words, to “glorify its power and wealth.” A
different popular version served to “brighten the Florida landscape.” For all classes,
then, the powerful myth of Gasparilla made life more pleasant than historical reality
could have.14 According to d’Ans, the legend of Gasparilla, despite its Latin origins,
is product and property of Tampa’s Anglo establishment, reflecting the social and
ethnic divisions within the city. D’Ans examines the festival as a fraternal ritual that
ameliorated violence and class tensions. But the spectacle was only the most visible
part of a phenomenon whose “primary function lay elsewhere.”15 The large crowd
the festivals attracted made possible the central role that redistribution played; d’Ans
characterizes the festival as a ceremony similar to potlatch. But the actual redistribution
of wealth that was central to potlatch was never a part of Gasparilla since the Krewe
distributed worthless tokens and, more recently, plastic beads. Still, the population
expected the “system itself will provide its own rewards,” and symbolic gifts proved
enough to demonstrate cross-class cooperation and the efficacy of the festival as a
safety valve.16
Like that of d’Ans, the main focus of other historical accounts has been on the
pirate Gaspar and not on the festival as a historical phenomenon. Edwin Lambright’s
1936 account identified the festival as a Tampa institution that had attracted
nationwide attention. He set out to record the Krewe’s annual appearances and
provide a biography of the real Gasparilla, creating “the first and only authentic story
of the pirate himself.” He emphasized his desire to give graphic descriptions of both
Gasparilla’s life and the annual festival, imparting to the narrative the “accuracy of
history” while leaving the “appeal of romance and adventure.” Lambright’s publishers
maintained that his purpose was to make a book of “history, reminiscence, record
and reference,” that would become a “prized possession” of all who were a part of or
interested in the exploits of Ye Mystic Krewe.17
Gasparilla organizers commissioned Lambright, then the Tampa Morning
Tribune’s editor, to create the magisterial version of events that would become the
Ye Mystic Krewe’s bible. This publication was never marketed commercially and was
maintained only among Krewe members and their families.18 Lambright designed
his version of Gaspar’s story to give it every appearance of historical reality by relying
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Hillsborough County Collection, Tampa Bay History Center, 1996.051 317.109

Floats during the early years of the Gasparilla Parade took the form of automobiles decorated with flowers
and other natural materials. One of the occupants in the car pictured above is Hortense Oppenheimer,
namesake of the clock atop Tampa’s Old City Hall.

on the coincidence of the geographic place-names of Gasparilla, Sanibel Island, and
Captiva Island. Lambright further embellished his courtly version of Gaspar’s story
to make him appear the “most gallant [and] tender of men, except that he was a
pirate,” emphasizing the respectability of Gaspar and the festival that bore his name.
19
Tampa’s ruling class already emulated the ideals and mannerisms of Lambright’s
Gaspar as piracy became a mystique to the Mystic Krewe.20
The festival emerged just as Tampa’s business class was consolidating its power
during a period characterized by social conflict and the arrival of large trusts.21 As
Tampa possessed both a railroad connection and the possibility of an improved port,
business leaders organized a Board of Trade in 1885 whose function was to promote
growth in the community.22 With the end of the pioneer era, these Anglo-Saxon,
19
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Protestant men became the city’s new elite. Very quickly, though, the celebration the
elites created evolved from entertainment by and for the city’s leaders to “grandiose
festivities designed for popular consumption.” Nevertheless, only wealthy AngloSaxon men were allowed to join the exclusive Mystic Krewe.23
The carnival, as Gasparilla was initially labeled, was born out of casual
conversation between the Morning Tribune’s society editor, Louise Dodge, and
George Hardee, who suggested using the story of the already known pirate, José
Gaspar, in an effort “to develop a spectacular and merrymaking feature in connection
with the [May] Festival.” Hardee, from New Orleans, ensured that Gasparilla would
be modeled on Mardi Gras from its inception. José Gaspar would give the festival a
“name, a foundation, the Spanish atmosphere” and would serve as the “nucleus for
a fete.”24 In Gasparilla’s first few years, observers expected sumptuous costumes and
pageantry and trappings of royalty, not bloodthirsty rogues. Elites perhaps desired
to overtly demonstrate their authority and so fashioned themselves as royalty. José
Gaspar was likely conceived in this majestic manner to strengthen this association.
Newspaper accounts detailing his life labeled him the “pirate Prince,” though these
accounts never explained how or why he obtained this title.25 These early years of
Gasparilla seemed to reflect elite attempts not only to rationalize their authority but
also to exaggerate it.
D’Ans discusses Gasparilla’s first years, when the parade was initially coupled
with commercial fairs to attract businessmen from other cities. Gasparilla served
a special function during these celebrations as a demonstration of the power and
authority of Tampa’s business class and the resources the city itself offered. At this
time, Gasparilla’s display was aimed primarily at outside businessmen, not the greater
public.26 But if Tampa’s festivals were to truly emulate the great expositions in St.
Louis and Chicago, they also needed an element of popular amusement, a midway.
These amusement avenues served as “cathartic respites from social upheaval.”27
It appears that Gasparilla fulfilled both functions—it was a show of strength and
resources to outsiders and an entertaining distraction for its citizens.
The year 1904 marked the first Gasparilla celebration, but Tampa businessmen
were more concerned with national matters. The city was hosting the Panama Canal
Convention, to which delegates from all southern states were invited. It was the first
convention in the United States devoted to the development of the waterway, and
Tampa’s leaders, because of the city’s geographical location, expected to benefit greatly
from the canal’s construction.28 Florida’s governor, William Jennings, preached that the
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25
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canal would contribute to the development of Florida’s rich resources and encourage
an industrial revolution throughout the state. He predicted that the waterway would
eventually transform Florida into a great manufacturing state.29 President Theodore
Roosevelt himself encouraged the convention and the interest it would arouse.30 In
Tampa, the Panama Canal Convention was unequivocally considered the great event
of the festival. The May Festival was further designed to encourage visitors and their
capital to the city. To this end, the Tribune informed citizens that “everything that
helps Tampa helps you individually.”31
In his 1936 work, Lambright describes the first announcement of Ye Mystic
Krewe as a cause for statewide concern as Tampa’s citizens and outside newspapers
anticipated the coming of Gasparilla and his men.32 The third day of the May Festival
signaled the beginning of the Panama Canal Convention, and the parade marked
the first appearance of Ye Mystic Krewe as “distinguished guests and citizens stood
in respectful salute.” Interestingly, the first King Gasparilla did not participate in the
parade but sent a proxy instead. Lambright speculated that Colonel Edward Gunby
declined to participate out of modesty or fear he would be recognized, making it
the only occasion the reigning king did not lead his court in the carnival parade.
Whatever the reason, whether humility or the desire to create an air of secrecy, the
first king’s behavior characterized the beginning years of Gasparilla—exaggeration
and self-congratulation coupled with a sense of insecurity.33 The Tampa Morning
Tribune noted that while all eyes turned toward the Krewe, all failed to pierce the
mask that hid “his presumably handsome features.” Unable to see the king, many still
had faith in his innate superiority.34 The round of applause that greeted the king and
his court during the inaugural ball showed “no ill will was felt for this sudden attack
upon [their] peaceful borders.”
Lambright described the virginal white gown the queen wore at the coronation
ball that “enhanced her dark beauty and regal carriage,” making the respectable
woman appear dark and exotic, like José Gaspar himself.35 A Morning Tribune
reporter, writing about the whole spectacle, was delighted by the ball and thrilled that
Gasparilla would become a permanent institution with plans for annual appearances.
Lambright noted that Tampa society and the Tampa public, both the working and
business classes, were likewise so enthusiastic about the invasion that they demanded
the organization be made permanent and a carnival produced each year. The account,
however, was furnished by the fair’s participants, who likely stood to benefit from the
transformation of the invasion into tradition.36
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Invitation card for the Sixth Annual Gasparilla Ball, which took place at the Casino at the Tampa Bay
Hotel (now the University of Tampa) on February 22, 1912.

The next year, the carnival was moved to coincide with the Florida State Fair,
a decision Lambright stated the Krewe members “deemed best.” The Krewe again
invaded the city without any sort of vessel, but Lambright noted they assembled
“presumably just ashore from a pirate craft.” It was in the second year of Tampa’s
annual festival that new “horseless carriages” were used in the parade as Gasparilla II
led a parade of what Lambright labeled “trusty pirates.” In this phrase, Lambright
employed a description perhaps never before used on a group typically characterized
as entirely untrustworthy as he highlighted the civic virtue of Gasparilla’s pirates and
dismissed their transgressive nature.37
That year the pirates—or knights, as they fashioned themselves—staged
various tournaments. The use of regal nomenclature in the first years of the festival
is intriguing. The festival’s promoters could have merely been confusing powerful
archetypes, or perhaps they desired spectators to conceive of them as royalty. It
is simple enough to assume that elites merely enjoyed regal titles, but it is more
problematic to consider why they chose to mix these archetypes of authority with
those of transgression. Perhaps King Gasparilla and his court enjoyed their liminal
status, appearing to promote transgression from the pedestal of privilege. The legend
of José Gaspar that Ye Mystic Krewe propagated so vigorously served an important
37
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function since the pirate’s life represented a vital link between respectability and
depravity.38 The connection between pirates and monarchs was nevertheless strange
since, by the first decades of the eighteenth century, pirates had become targets of the
Atlantic empires. Marcus Rediker notes that these imperial powers, led by Britain,
embarked on a vigorous international campaign of extermination and terror, hanging
pirates throughout Great Britain and the New World.39
The Tampa Morning Tribune noted in its coverage of the first year of the
festival that Prince Gasparilla made his first official proclamation stating he would
visit, not capture, the city. In fact, the proclamation made no mention at all of Gaspar
as a pirate. He was the sovereign, surrounded by knights and his royal court paying
friendly visit to the beautiful city. Accounts that followed referred to Gasparilla merely
as “his majesty.”40 It was not until the day before the May Festival that the Tribune
mentioned Gasparilla as a pirate king. The paper barely mentioned Ye Mystic Krewe,
except as the carnival feature of the May Festival exercises. The following week, the
Krewe debuted in the opening parade on horseback. The paper noted that “mounted
pirates will be something of an innovation,” but added that the men were sure to
be as adept in the saddle as they were on the decks of their buccaneering ship. In
this first appearance, Ye Mystic Krewe behaved more like medieval knights than the
eighteenth-century pirates from whom they descended.41 The closing evening of the
May Festival witnessed Gasparilla’s coronation ball. The Morning Tribune labeled it
the social highlight of the week and delighted in the royal court’s display of pomp and
pageantry. Descriptions of the parade and the ball dwelled on the ancient court dress
and made no mention of piratical deeds. It seems that in the first year of the festival,
King Gasparilla did not invade Tampa to pillage and plunder—he was merely on
vacation.42
Despite proclamations of the May Festival’s success, organizers scrapped the
celebration the following year, and Tampa leaders focused their attention on the State
Fair to be held in November 1905. The Morning Tribune depicted the festivities as
becoming more opulent each year, and organizers promised the fair would eclipse
anything before imagined. That year, organizers focused on displaying the prosperity
of Tampa and the agricultural wealth of Florida. The fair, not without its amusement
features, would benefit every soul in the state.43 Dedicated to the untold wealth the
future of Florida held, the president of Gulf Coast Railroad, Charles Brown, subverted
the adage “see Naples and die,” urging southerners to “see Florida and live.”44
King Gasparilla was again to embark on his invasion of the city and effect his
D’Ans, 18.
Marcus Rediker, Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (Boston: Beacon Press,
2004), 10.
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“peerless pageant,” but Tribune writers still characterized the festival as an innocuous
amusement. The Gasparilla Carnival was not even the only pageant of the fair,
though all were employed to signal the state’s “era of prosperity.” As expected, all
descriptions of the Gasparilla Carnival and its participants were couched in regal
vocabulary.45 Further, King Gasparilla’s coronation was only one of two balls to
be held that year, and the event was still by invitation only.46 An observer of the
opening parade described His Majesty, who wore royal purple and carried the scepter
of authority, as looking “the picture of a monarch.” His band of merry followers
even staged a knightly tournament to entertain the crowds. In these first two years,
not only were Tampa’s celebrations not about the Gasparilla Festival, but Gasparilla
was not even about pirates.47 The Morning Tribune’s summaries of the fair further
noted the industrial parades and expositions, against which the knightly pageantry of
Gasparilla must have seemed a ridiculous anachronism.48
In its first years, King Gasparilla appeared only during the opening parade and
closing ball, and by 1906 the Gasparilla Carnival had become even more obscure.
The Morning Tribune made no advance mention of any invasion, either royal or
piratical. In fact, the opening parade was cut altogether. The fair’s committee decided
the parade delayed other opening-day activities and distracted participants from the
exhibit booths. The interests of all should have been assisting in making Florida
“the greatest State south of the Mason Dixon line.”49 Gasparilla was to have its
own parade during the afternoon but would not be the focus of the day. Indeed,
the Morning Tribune made clear that all could amuse themselves by observing the
Gasparilla spectacle, but that they were then expected to attend the many agricultural
and industrial exhibits.50
Gasparilla was still accompanied by a royal band, and in 1906 he arrived
“without incident,” not in a pirate ship but rather in a “stately galleon.”51 He was
labeled the Carnival King, mildly transgressive but more benevolent and regal. For
the first time, Gasparilla rode on a float, but he still carried his scepter of authority
evoking the pleasant memory of a “modern Camelot.”52 The coronation ball was
still the most prominent social event of the season, and invitation was “absolutely
essential for admittance.” The “kingly” invasion ended, and the Krewe returned to
their distant home.53 These first three years, the Gasparilla Krewe carried themselves
with a royal demeanor, reflecting the exclusivity of their functions.
The first lapse in Gasparilla’s celebration occurred from 1907 to 1909.
45
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The Gasparilla Krewe was still formulating its traditions when this photograph of a medieval jousting
tournament was taken during the Gasparilla festivities in 1914. During this time, MKG could have just
as easily stood for “Mystic Knights of Gasparilla”.

Lambright cryptically stated “various causes conspired to disband the organization.”
Notably, Lambright admitted there was no auspicious local occasion to which the
festival could have been connected during these years “to enlist its interest and
prompt its activity.” It was not that Gasparilla was illegitimate, according to its
proponents, but rather that there was merely nothing spectacular enough to warrant
the king’s appearance. Again, Lambright ascribed to the festival an imaginary level
of importance.54 D’Ans proffers a different reason for Gasparilla’s hiatus in 1907,
claiming it was a result of financial crisis due to the “Rich Man’s Panic” that depressed
the nation’s economy. Either way, in these early years the festival clearly lacked the
viability to exist on its own.55
The opportunity to stage another fete presented itself in 1910 with the Panama
Canal Convention. As Tampa was deemed the closest adequate port to the canal, it
was in the advantageous position of receiving the new commerce the construction
would help produce. That year the knightly tournament was abandoned. Gasparilla
the next year was part of a celebration of Tampa’s growth and magnificence. The
census celebration, which marked Tampa as having the largest growth of any city east
of the Mississippi River, provided the legitimizing opportunity for the appearance of
54
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Gasparilla. Clearly, the first ten years of the twentieth century had afforded Tampa
great cause to celebrate.56 The year 1911 was the first in which the Krewe arrived by
ship. It was also the first year that the mayor would surrender the key to the city to Ye
Mystic Krewe.57 By the following year, the Krewe and their admiring onlookers would
abandon their rigid adherence to courtly ritual and royal vocabulary and, possibly
recognizing the arrival of modernity, would fashion more aggressive identities for
themselves.
The year 1912 proved to be a turning point for Gasparilla. It was the first
year the invaders of the city were continuously identified as pirates, and although the
festival was a part of another celebration, George Washington’s birthday, organizers
acknowledged their active emulation of New Orleans and Mardi Gras. That year the
“bloodthirsty” Krewe arrived under the Jolly Roger intent on capturing maidens and
carrying them to their distant island. In fact, the outlaws would bodily take the city,
as Tampa’s mayor surrendered the golden key. The Tribune mentioned José Gaspar as
the inspiration for the festival for the first time since Gasparilla’s inception, signaling
a rebirth for the pirate and the festival that bore his name.58
Pirate bands and pirate captains led the parade and carnival attractions.
The coronation ball, originally the quintessence of royal excess, featured different
decorations that year—electric lights and walls covered in skulls and crossbones.
The Tribune labeled the costumes for the ball more splendid than any previous year.
While Krewe members still wrote many of the articles for the Morning Tribune, it
appears that the more the Krewe presented themselves as criminal pirates, the more
popular the festival became.59 Tampa’s leaders even acknowledged that the festival
had taken a darker turn and that the city itself was changing. At the ball, Tampa’s
mayor surrendered two sets of keys to the city, a gold key representing the city’s joys
and a black key to the city jail, meant to signify Tampa’s own dark side.60
In 1913, the Gasparilla Festival witnessed another breakthrough. Realizing the
importance of the festival, Tampa’s merchants paved the way for a more “elaborate
presentation.” Desiring to further emulate Mardi Gras, merchants went on record
stating they would assist Ye Mystic Krewe in implementing all its future plans. While
their promises were vague, merchants for the first time acknowledged the significance
of the festival and the need for its continuation.61 The legitimation that Tampa’s
merchants afforded Gasparilla in 1913 would help transform the festival the next
year and make the 1914 celebration a watershed moment for Gasparilla. Any hint of
the festival’s illegitimacy or the need to attach it to other celebrations vanished. It was
the most important event, unrivaled by any other. That year, the Tribune mentioned
56
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Washington’s birthday only to call attention to how incidental it had become, stating,
“it will be marked by nothing more than the closing of banks and the city hall.”62
Indeed, the 1914 festival was a rebirth for Gasparilla as a modern celebration. The
Tribune also took care to publish the festival’s mythical inspiration and its actual
origins. The newspaper even featured a special border for Gasparilla Week—a oneeyed pirate with a cutlass in his teeth. Further, Krewe members grew more militant in
their proclamations. The Tribune announced the “bloody crew,” death’s head flying,
would arrive and capture the city, “putting to death all persons who dare resist [their]
orders.” Gasparilla was still a mighty monarch, this time reigning over a festival
that “would not be second in point of brilliancy to even the world-famed Mardi
Gras festivities.” King Gasparilla would appear before the city’s fathers demanding
surrender, “with death and destruction as the alternative.”
By 1914, organizers consciously abandoned royal terminology in favor of more
piratical vocabulary as they self-consciously modernized the festival. Gasparilla was
actively molding itself after and competing with Mardi Gras, as organizers used New
Orleans artists to design parade floats. Like Mardi Gras, Gasparilla finally existed
in its own right, occurring annually for the sake of itself. The Tribune estimated
record-breaking attendance and great crowds of tourists. The paper even presented
in a positive light the need for Pinkerton guards to control crowds, reporting that
the guards had described the behavior of Tampa’s citizens as “first-class.” By 1914,
Tampa’s leaders appear to have recognized the need for a celebration that was exclusive
to the city to boost its appeal as a tourist destination as they outlined their intentions
for Gasparilla.63 They aimed to please the people of Tampa while advertising the city
and amusing its visitors.64
Meanwhile, Krewe members continued to project a frightening image. While
complimenting Tampa and her brave citizens, they declared themselves prepared to
“devastate; to kill; to burn and destroy,” stating that they would demand the city’s keys
and her daughters. Pirates had taken over the visage of the Gasparilla Festival just as
surely as they had taken over the city.65 In mock relief, the Morning Tribune remarked
that fortunately the Krewe had committed no acts of depredation in capturing the
city.66 At week’s end, Ye Mystic Krewe staged their coronation ball, at which they still
clung to regal imagery, thus inverting the Victorian paradigm of public respectability
and private depravity. The Krewe’s public face was the fearsome countenance of the
bloodthirsty pirate; it was during their invitation-only coronation balls that members
again behaved as royalty.67
The willingness of organizers to transform Gasparilla during its first few years
62
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Hillsborough County Collection, Tampa Bay History Center, 1996.051.378

Invading Tampa by sea was still new for Ye Mystic Krewe when this photograph was taken in 1914.
Finding a suitable vessel for the invasion was a vexing problem for the pirate Krewe for forty years, until
the acquisition of the current ship in 1953.

ensured it would remain viable for the next century and demonstrates that festival’s
sensitivity as a social indicator. In 2002, in response to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, one of the Gasparilla Krewes invited New York firefighters to ride
the float of their patron saint, Saint Florian.68 But cannons booming and guns ablaze
had assumed new meaning after 2001, and, in light of that tragedy, the image of
invasion by bloodthirsty pirates that the festival’s organizers had so carefully cultivated
over the past century may have added overtones more unsettling than lighthearted.
In addition to the new vigilance against terrorism, officials dealt with their chronic
concern with controlling the drunken, rowdy fans integral to the celebrations.69 More
ubiquitous than the Pinkertons of 1914, Tampa police and federal agencies stationed
officers every ten feet along the parade route.70
Had Tampa’s affair with pirates been permanently contaminated? Marcus Rediker
argues that pirates indeed utilized terror to accomplish their goals—to obtain money,
to inflict punishment, to exact revenge, and to instill fear in all who wished to resist
them. And yet, pirates have become cultural heroes.71 Had their image come full
Amy Scherzer, “NY Firefighters Invited to Join 97th Gasparilla,” Tampa Tribune, December 1,
2001.
69
Kathy Steele, “Security a Focal Point of This Year’s Gasparilla,” Tampa Tribune, January 26, 2002.
70
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circle, from terrorist to hero, back to terrorist again? If the festivities that marked
Gasparilla’s one-hundredth anniversary in 2004 and celebrated its continuing
cultural significance are any indication, the answer is “no.” The imagery of pirates in
Gasparilla and the festival itself still truly resonate with Tampa’s citizens and visitors
alike.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Gasparilla’s organizers, namely Ye
Mystic Krewe, seemed to have recognized the need to democratize the festival and the
legend of José Gaspar. Once the Krewe adopted representations of rough, criminal
piracy, the festival evolved from merely an annual elite appropriation of public space
to an active event that incorporated Tampa’s citizens. Indeed, the 1991 controversy
seems to have forced Ye Mystic Krewe to shed even more of its elements of hierarchy,
secrecy, and exclusivity as the local festival was thrust into the national spotlight. In
its first years in the early twentieth century, a period where festivals often fell by the
wayside with variations in the economy or public opinion, the Gasparilla Festival
proved itself a success, becoming the most popular public spectacle for perpetuating
Tampa’s growth and celebrating the city’s prominence in Florida and the New
South.
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ivilians Protecting Civilians:
The Florida Motorized Unit
During World War II
By Chris Day

I

n the first half of the twentieth century, two events dominated the
historical landscape: World War I and World War II. The first conflict led to the
creation of a calamity beyond comparison and scope. The rise of Nazi Germany
has been a favorite topic of historians for decades following the end of hostilities in
Europe, but Nazi Germany was not the only story of the period. The Allies stood
in the face of a modernized German onslaught, but the Allies learned quickly and
adapted to this form of warfare. Many countries learned new methods of destruction
from one another. For example, the Japanese learned how to attack naval bases in
shallow waters from the British, who did so to the Italian fleet anchored at Taranto.
The lessons of war were not only found in the waters of Taranto. The American
military was watching the events in Europe closely and started planning for the
eventual conflict. At the same time, the American civilian population was also aware
of the German Blitzkrieg and the success of the Panzer divisions. One such civilian
was a Tampa resident by the name of Guy Hobson Allen.1
Allen was a branch manager for the American Oil Company and a member of
the American Legion, which was planning to write handbooks on civilian defense based
on information from Britain. Allen was aware of the events transpiring in Europe and
believed that he needed to do something to protect his home and country. It would
be easy to judge Allen’s motivation to start a defense program as an opportunity to
further his career in the oil business or bolster his own position in the community
at large, but perhaps his time had a different outlook on life. Allen was a World War
Chris Day is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Florida State University. His research interests include African
American history and Florida history.
Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1,
“Florida Motorized Unit,” Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1. R. A. Gray Building, Florida State
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Iveteran and a family man. As a former soldier, he could be simply characterized as
a patriotic man furthering the ideals of his country, but it was probably the sense of
duty to his fellow citizens that drove him to start the Florida Motorcycle Escort Unit.
This was Allen’s response to the German Panzer Blitzkrieg. He concluded that if the
Nazis were able to strike quickly, the United States, if invaded, must be faster and
better prepared.2
Allen was a motorcycle dispatch rider during World War I and was familiar
with the vehicle’s advantages.3 In a letter to Florida senator Claude D. Pepper, he
wrote, “I feel that we are in sore need of a modern cavalry mounted on motorcycles.”4
As early as 1940, Allen believed that the United States needed to defend itself against
enemy attack from within and abroad. He feared the activities of Fifth Column
groups that sought to further their political and military aims through sabotage.5 The
goal of the motorcycle troops was to put down any Fifth Column uprising or any
other disturbances made by “isms,” as well as coastal defense. Allen was elaborate in
his description of what the troops would be capable of doing. For example, for coastal
defense he outlined how the troops would be able to quickly move to the coastline
of Florida to defend against enemy landings. The unit, using fast automobiles and
trucks, would have antiaircraft guns in tow that could be used to shoot down enemy
planes. He believed mobility was the key to a successful motorized cavalry.6
Allen reasoned that since Florida’s western coastline was only six hours from
Mexico, defense was needed against parachute troops from these areas. It is unclear
exactly how Allen came to this conclusion, but the concern was there. If enemy
personnel did indeed land on American soil, he planned for the unit to participate in
guerrilla warfare in order to disrupt enemy advancement. They could also be used as
an advance unit in an effort to scout American troop routes, as well as provide flank
and rear guard protection for military personnel. Lastly, Allen envisioned a unit that
would be used as Engineer and Dynamite Squads, which would mine roads used by
the opposition and attack disabled tanks and armored cars quickly and effectively.
The possibilities, as evidenced by its author, were limited only by the imagination of
the coordinator. He listed ten ways in which the troop could be used in a military
setting. Allen’s outline appeared to be a wish list of things that could be done with a
2
“5 Legion Posts Will Install New Officers,” Tampa Morning Tribune, May 11, 1941, folder titled:
Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1. Biennial Report: State
Defense Council of Florida, 1941–1942 (Tallahassee, Fla., March 25, 1943), 7. Guy Hobson Allen to
Colonel Louis Johnson, assistant secretary of war, July 12, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans
#2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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“Tampa Motorcycle Riders Form Unit for Armed Defense,” Tampa Morning Tribune, August 26,
1940, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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motorized cavalry and expressed the ambition he had for the project. Before any of
his wishes could be realized, Allen first had to find the right type of person to fill this
position of protection.7
The personnel of the motorized cavalry had to fit a certain profile. Allen
wanted them to be recruited from “the ‘Cracker’ type young men of the South and
the West for in those sections you find real Americans.”8 He did not want any men
picked from foreign families even if they had been naturalized. His opinion was that
the West and the South still produced tough men who would fight to the end for
their country. As far as men from foreign families were concerned, Allen felt that
the American government could not have any confidence in men “representing the
melting pots of all nations.”9 Allen believed that the personnel outlined would form
a motorized cavalry group that would renew the memory of J.E.B. Stuart, Nathan
Bedford Forrest, and other historical cavalrymen.10
According to Allen’s initial plan, when the troop was organized it would fall
under the command of two different military branches, depending on the situation.
First, he proposed that it could be organized under the National Guard so that, if
needed, they could travel across state lines in times of emergency. If the situation
proved more drastic, the unit could be commanded by the regular army, with the troop
acting as part of the army reserves.11 This particular question about acknowledgment
was the focus of Allen’s work during 1940 and 1941. He tried to receive some sort
of recognition from either the state or the federal government. Allen sent the letter
outlining his plan to Senator Pepper because he wanted Pepper to see if he could find
a way to make this outfit part of the American military. Senator Pepper at the time
was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an interventionist.
Allen wrote, “Please understand that the motive behind this move is purely patriotic
and that again I would like to advise that if some form of official or semi-official
recognition is made of these troops that I would like to turn the outfit over to an
experienced Army officer who is trained in this type of service.”12 Pepper replied,
commending Allen on his work and stating that he supported Allen’s efforts. Pepper’s
support may have only been superficial, but an article from the September 5, 1940,
Tampa Morning Tribune noted that Pepper had given a plan to the Senate Committee
on Military Affairs regarding home guard units.13
Senator Pepper was not the only person Allen contacted to try to get national
recognition. Within his own company, American Oil, he corresponded with
Ibid.
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, August 24, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2,
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Courtesy of the Florida State Archives

A large contingent of the Miami motorcycle unit turned out for this photograph, taken during the early
years of World War II. Troop organizers believed that over 250 men and women could be called upon to
participate in the motorcycle corps in each of Florida’s larger cities.

Lieutenant Colonel J. B. Osborn, who was a branch manager in Atlanta, Georgia.
Allen hoped that Osborn could contact some people he knew in Washington D.C.,
and pass on the information about his proposed motorized cavalry. Osborn was later
contacted by the U.S. military and informed that these types of cavalry units had
already begun forming at Fort Knox in Kentucky and Forts Benning and Oglethorpe
in Georgia. It was stated that they had been watching the events that had transpired
in Europe and were responding accordingly.14 This letter signaled the end of Allen’s
pursuit of affiliation with the U.S. military. He now turned his attention to the state
of Florida.
Allen began his search for that recognition during the 1940 election year that
witnessed Spessard Lindsey Holland’s victory in Florida’s gubernatorial race. Allen
sought out Holland in an effort to gain some acknowledgment from the governorelect. By that time, troops were organized in three cities, Tampa, St. Petersburg, and
Orlando. Allen wanted the troops to get together and participate in the governor’s
inauguration day parade.15 This was just one way that Allen tried to get the attention of
Major General, Adjutant General E.S. Ada[?] to Lt. Col. J. B. Osborn Jr. of the American Oil
Company, August 2, 1940, folder titled: 1940—Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316,
Carton 1.
15
Guy H. Allen to William Salinas, November 23, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2,
Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
14
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the governor-elect. In December 1940, Holland accepted an invitation from Allen to
come and inspect the motorcycles troops. Allen wrote to Williams Salinas, member of
the St. Petersburg troop, “You realize that this inspection will aid us greatly in getting
some kind of recognition of our outfit from the Governor who will have charge of
all future Home Guard organizations.”16 Holland inspected the troops from Tampa
and St. Petersburg. The group from Orlando was unable to attend. Holland was
pleased with what he saw and took a copy of Allen’s file back to Tallahassee in order to
discuss it with the State Defense Council.17 Allen later contacted Governor Holland
to inform him that the Tampa troops had been organized through motorcycle clubs
and that it would easy to use the same method throughout the state.18
Allen did not stop at Governor Holland in his quest to become part of Florida’s
defense. He contacted Florida’s adjutant general, Vivien B. Collins, to find out if they
could be a part of the state guard. Allen told Collins he felt “sure that we can promise
a representative group of riders from these cities to join the State Guard.”19 The State
Guard did not take on the motorcycle troops as part of their organization. Allen’s
group did not officially become a part of a state organization until May 1941, just a
few months before the United States was hurled into the war by Japanese bombers. By
that time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had already called for a state of emergency
and proposed the Lend-Lease Act, placing America in a more active role in the war.
These efforts had an impact on the chances of Allen’s group getting recognized. The
national government began planning for civil defense under the leadership of Fiorello
H. LaGuardia, and Florida fell into line with the plan right away.20
The State Defense Council was created in October 1940, when Governor
Fred P. Cone called together a group of leaders representing the interests of the state
to begin planning for civil defense.21 After Holland won the election, he set out to
continue what Cone had started in late 1940. Holland approved of the men selected
by Cone to head the council. By doing this, Holland was able to create continuity
and nonpartisanship in the call for defense. In his message to the joint session of
Congress in 1941, the governor called for volunteers and stated that they would be
accepted for their merits. He believed that this would create an environment in which
Guy H. Allen to William Salinas, December 11, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2,
Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
17
Guy H. Allen to U.S. Senator Claude Pepper, February 7, 1941, folder titled: 1941—Organization
Plans #2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
18
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#2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
19
Guy H. Allen to Adjutant General of Florida Vivien Collins in St. Augustine, February 12, 1941,
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20
Office of Civilian Defense, Washington D.C., Administrative Order No. 2, “Policies under which
the Office of Civilian Defense and the Offices in Its Designated Areas Will Function,” from Fiorello H.
LaGuardia, U.S. director of civilian defense, July 10, 1941, Governor Spessard Holland: Administrative
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all patriotic Americans could participate.22 Until the congressional session opened for
business in April, the Defense Council was maintained by the Governor’s Emergency
Fund, which gave them about $50,000. Holland believed that this amount could
not sustain the organization and pleaded with the legislators to pass a bill that would
create a Defense Council as part of the regular state activities until the national
emergency was over. He further stated, “I beg to advise that this Act is sponsored by
the American Legion and other patriotic societies and that its passage is strongly urged
by our National Government and by the National Defense Agencies.”23 House Bill
30, calling for the creation of a State Defense Council, passed on April 15, 1941, by
a unanimous vote.24 This was the state office that Guy Allen had been anticipating.
Before Allen’s chase for governmental legitimacy, he began organizing a
motorcycle troop in Tampa in July and August 1940. The majority of the members
came from Tampa’s Gasparilla Motorcycle Club. Allen believed it would be easier
to organize units from local clubs, because the members already knew each other
and could be easily contacted en masse. He corresponded with L. W. Patrick, the
president of the Florida Motorcycle Association (FMA), because he understood that
Patrick was willing to assist in the formation of troops through various motorcycle
clubs.25 In the beginning, Allen looked to use this idea to branch out onto the national
level. The Gasparilla Motorcycle Club was charter member 545 of the American
Motorcycle Association (AMA).26 E. C. Smith of the AMA liked the idea of forming
motorcycle units. He stated, “It will certainly add much favorable publicity for your
club as well as the sport in general, all because it is a worthwhile community effort.”27
This particular option for Allen was not pursued with enough vigor to spread out
nationally.
Allen focused on Florida’s motorcycle unit and its beginnings in the Gasparilla
Motorcycle Club. He gave speeches attempting to rally the members to his cause.
In an address given to the club on August 16, 1940, Allen expressed his fears that
when the Nazis conquer Europe their next target would be the United States. He
supported his assertion by stating that Nazis had been found in Argentina with rifles
and ammunition. He truly believed that this proved that America would be a target
and needed to defend itself.28 At this point Allen may have appeared paranoid, but he
Ibid., 7.
Journal of the House of Representatives, State of Florida: Twenty-eighth Regular Session, April 8th to June
7th, 1941 (Tallahassee: Allied Printing, 1942), 7.
24
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was not alone. Many Americans believed that if Britain fell, the United States would
be next. The general population was not privy to Hitler’s real intention of invading
the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Allen was able to rally the Gasparilla members to his
cause and was able to form a troop of twenty-seven members.29 The majority of the
men were married and about thirty years old. These were Allen’s “Cracker type” men,
and the group practiced infantry skills on Wednesday nights at Plant Park and on
Sunday practiced fast and cross-country riding near the outskirts of Tampa.30
Troop formations did not stop in Tampa; St. Petersburg, and Orlando also
began to organize units. The St. Petersburg troop was led by Carl Plummer, and
it was formed in the hope of becoming a part of the home guard unit there.31 At
the time of Governor Holland’s inspection, it had twenty members to its credit. In
Orlando, Sidney Crenshaw, who worked for the Orlando Linen and Towel Supply
Co., organized a unit.32 They were not ready for Holland’s inspection, but at the
time they had eighteen members.33 Allen hoped to expand troop mobilization to
other cities in the state, but the creation of two other troops in the state without
government assistance was quite an accomplishment. Not all of these tasks were
simple because the draft and the need for traditional home guard units affected troop
formation in early 1941.
Age restrictions created problems for Allen as early as October 1940. In a
letter to Senator Pepper, he mentioned that since 90 percent of the membership was
within the age restrictions of selective service, activities had been suspended until a
solution could be determined.34 This sentiment was relayed to Governor Holland
by Allen, who told the chief executive that the group would remain organized until
“something definite could be arranged.”35 This issue continued to plague the troop’s
existence. None of the evidence showed that something definite was ever arranged,
but as will be seen later, many units had trouble maintaining their numbers because
members were being picked for military service.
In the formation of a defense unit, some form of hierarchy must exist or the
group would cease to be organized. Allen did not approach the situation without a plan
of action. Since he had a military background, he relied on his previous experiences
to incorporate a hierarchical command. While he was seeking national recognition,
Guy H. Allen to L. W. Patrick, September 26, 1940.
“Motorcycle Corps Formed for Defense,” August 26, 1940, folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity
(Scrapbook), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
31
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Soldiers are shown training on the grounds of the Mirasol Plaza Hotel (now called Hudson Manor) on
Tampa’s Davis Islands in this World War II era photograph. The tremendous need for soldiers, sailors and
Marines cut into the ranks of civil defense groups like the Florida Motorcycle Escort Unit.

Allen created a chain of command based on a military model. During a proposed
wartime scenario, he decided cities such as Miami Beach, Tallahassee, Pensacola, and
Jacksonville would have 250 men in their ranks.36 These individual groups would be
officered by a captain, two first lieutenants, and four second lieutenants, and each
troop would be under military regulation. These troops would then be divided into
three squadrons. The chain of command based on military protocol was concurrent
with his vision of a viable unit of the armed forces. This was also evident in the
equipment that he proposed was needed for the troop.37
During the initial planning stages, Allen wanted the troops to be furnished
with a variety of equipment including sidearms, grenades, gas masks, bowie knives,
and ammunition bandoliers. It must be mentioned that the men in the troop provided
their own motorcycles. The necessary items did not stop with the gear carried by
troop members. Allen went on to explain how the motorcycles could be modified
for combat. It was proposed that the motorcycles have shields for the motor and
36
37

The peacetime force would consist of 50 members.
Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, June 20, 1940.
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tires, a front shield that extended above their heads with bulletproof glass, and also,
if the motorcycle had a sidecar, it would be used to carry machine guns. These were
to be heavily armored and armed motorcycle riders, but Allen did not stop there. In
order to make them more self-sufficient in the field, he wanted armored trucks for
a mechanic squad, field kitchen, ammunition supply, and radio station.38 This was
quite an endeavor, but how realistic was this wish list, and what, in the end, did the
motorcycle troop become?
After the motorcycle troop became part of the State Defense Council in May
1941, the plan went through a few changes and even expanded from a motorcycle
troop to a unit that had trucks, emergency cars, and later a taxicab unit. The next
installment of the proposal was a streamlined version of the one given to Senator
Pepper. Allen reported to the senator that the State Defense Council had accepted
his plan with a few modifications.39 The first state plan once again created a military
hierarchy beginning with the overall command of a captain. This rank was followed
by a first lieutenant, three second lieutenants, and a first sergeant. The motorcycle,
emergency car, and auxiliary truck platoons were directly headed by one of the
second lieutenants with a line sergeant communicating directly with the men in the
platoon.40 This version of command did not vary greatly from the previous design.
The possible duties of this group were different than the earlier proposal given
to Senator Pepper. Instead of a swift attack force, the motorcycle troop became an
escort group. The purpose of the group now was to guard truck and car convoys
within the state while focusing on speed in cases of emergency. Other possible duties
were to include scouting, advanced patrols, guarding bridges during marches, and
convoy coordination. The men in the platoon were supposed to have an excellent
knowledge of the roads in their local area, which made them the best candidates to
find the fastest route for military or other convoys in the case of emergency.41 Instead
of being a frontline assault force, the units had been formed as a support group to
make military operations move faster and more safely throughout the state.
Since the duties of the troop had changed, did the membership also adjust? In
the original plan, Allen wanted “Cracker”-type southern men as well as those from
the West. He wanted rough-and-tumble men who could weather the ills of war and
who were between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The qualifications were made
more succinct in the new version. It called for white males ages eighteen to fortyfive who could pass a mental and physical examination, be an American in heart
and mind, take an oath of allegiance, and never have belonged to any un-American
organization. These qualifications allowed for only a select group of individuals to
Ibid.
Guy H. Allen to Claude Pepper, July 27, 1941, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2, Record
Group 191, Series, 1316, Carton 1.
40
Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication,
State Defense Council of Florida from Guy H. Allen, Bulletin no. 1, May 25, 1941, folder titled: 1940—
Organizational Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1, p. 3.
41
Ibid., 1.
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join the Motorcycle Escort Unit. It was clear that the initial intention was not to
allow African American or women to participate, but war can change everything.42
After a group of eighteen select white men were formed, a unit could be created. In
order to do this, the unit had to be sponsored by three men of excellent reputation
and standing in the community. The sponsor’s role was to coordinate public events
with the chairman of the unit. Allen stated that public relations were necessary for
“building up prestige for the unit.”43 The sponsors were supposed to give legitimacy
to the corps and use this to bring more members to the organization. An example
of the type of people considered applicable sponsors were found in Tampa. They
were Port Tampa mayor A. T. Rollins, former president of the Tampa Chamber of
Commerce Frank M. Traynor, and former president of the Ybor City Chamber of
Commerce John Diaz.44 These particular sponsorships were going to men who had
strong ties in the community and could organize the necessary support for the troop.
They could only be categorized as recruiters because they had no authority over how
the unit was managed.45 This portion of the organization did not exist very long after
the State Defense Council became involved.
Allen’s project became part of the Defense Council’s Division of Transportation
and Communication. Under that title, the actual group came under the heading of
Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation, with Cody Fowler, a lawyer from
Tampa, as the chairman. After receiving Allen’s proposal in May 1941, Fowler made
a few modifications and sent out a finalized version of the organizational plan on July
2, 1941. Fowler’s revisions structured the group under the guidelines of the staterecognized plan. The motorcycle troops were considered a civilian operation and
not military. Therefore, military titles would no longer be used in reference to those
in charge, and it was also unnecessary for the unit to participate in formation drills.
Its objective was to stay organized and be ready to be called a moment’s notice. The
leadership of the escort unit now consisted of group leaders and chiefs with directors
and assistant directors over them.46 This seemed to take the military luster out of the
motorcycle corps. No longer would they be seen as the frontline group, but in the
end Allen accomplished his goal of setting up a defense force that, if necessary, could
save lives.
The plan sent out by Fowler did not greatly change the duties of the Motor
Escort Unit or the qualifications for membership. It did eliminate the need for
sponsors. The County Defense Council chairmen became the new recruiters, and
Ibid.
Ibid., 2.
44
Clipping from Tampa Daily Times, August 26, 1940, folder titled: 1941—Organization Plans #2,
Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
45
Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication,
State Defense Council of Florida from Guy H. Allen, Bulletin no. 1, May 25, 1941, 2.
46
Memorandum to All County Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication,
State Defense Council of Florida from Cody Fowler, July 2, 1941, folder titled: 1940—Organizational
Plans #1, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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Courtesy of the Florida State Archives

Members of the Winter Haven motorcycle group are pictured here in this 1942 photograph. The Polk
County city was chosen by the state as the rallying point for the January 11, 1942 test mobilization. Units
from eleven Florida counties participated in the civil defense exercise.

they used vehicle registrations to find potential volunteers for the unit. This idea did
pose problems for organizers in later years because the numbers on paper did not
always match usable participants. Along with the changes in Allen’s original plan
came the organization of car units. When the unit was still referred to as Motor
Patrol and Transportation, a memorandum was sent out detailing the organization
of automobile units. Allen had never ignored the necessity of cars, but the unit
structure created by this helped solidify the use of cars.47 The subdivision maintained
this organization through 1942, but made some minor alterations, which included
changing the Emergency Car Group into an Automobile Unit. The Auxiliary Truck
Group moved out of the subdivision, and the Taxicab Unit took its place. The
Subdivision of Motor Escort and Transportation became a group that would assist in
evacuations, first aid, supplies, and convoy assistance. Despite all of this organization
and the numbers on paper, the State Defense Council did not know exactly what the
group was capable of doing. They got their first and only real test in the mobilization
and movement toward Winter Haven.
In December 1941, orders went out to the county chairmen of the Division
of Transportation and Communication calling for the mobilization of their units
Memorandum to chairman, Division of Transportation and Communications, from Cody Fowler,
chairman, Division of Transportation and Communications, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T.—
Bulletins—Sub-Division, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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and their movement to Winter Haven on Sunday, January 11, 1942. Eleven counties
and 740 vehicles—including 68 motorcycles—participated in the event.48 After the
units mobilized and made their way to Winter Haven, they traveled into the city and
paraded through the town. It was not clear exactly why Winter Haven was chosen
as the place for this to occur. It did not seem to have any value as a military target,
and it was not a place vital to the security of Florida. The only thing of significance
there was that Governor Holland’s brother and personal representative to the State
Defense Council, Frank L. Holland, lived in that town. It was quite possible that
the organizers of the event felt it was relevant to bring the units to him for review.
Regardless of the motives for picking Winter Haven, the organizers needed the test
mobilization to determine if there were any problems or defects that needed to be
handled.49
In order to make sure that everything went well, Cody Fowler sent out field
orders to the county chairmen so that they knew exactly what to do, where to go,
and how to get there. Part of these orders dealt with the rules of the march. The
order of the march, the distance between vehicles, and the speed of motorcade were
all established before the units were called to participate. For example, the summary
of rules sent to James L. Ferman, chairman of the Hillsborough County Division of
Transportation and Communication, clearly outlined vehicle placement within the
column. It started with the county division chairman’s car in the lead followed by
the subdivision chairman and his staff. Then the Motorcycle Units followed them
with the Auxiliary Truck and Car Units in tow. This large group had two motorcycle
scouts ahead of them in order to monitor road conditions and alert them to any
problems they might encounter.50
Not only was the order of the march strenuously demarcated, but so were the
speed and the spacing of the cars. The units were supposed to be fast and safe at the
same time because wrecked vehicles were not useful. The maximum speed set for the
exercise was forty miles per hour. Each vehicle was to maintain a distance twice the
amount of its speed in feet. For example, if a car were traveling at twenty miles per
hour, it would have to maintain a distance of forty feet between it and the car in front
of it. That spacing was just between the cars in the group. Each team had to remain
ninety feet away from another team, groups had to be 120 feet apart, and units had
to be 150 feet apart. This was how the columns should maintain their formation, and
it required discipline and practice that had not occurred on this scale.51
The counties that participated were Hillsborough, Polk, Pinellas, Pasco, Sarasota, Manatee, DeSoto,
Hardee, Osceola, Indian River, and Highlands.
49
“Winter Haven Sees Massing of 672 Autos,” Tampa Morning Tribune, January 12, 1942, folder
titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook). James T. Swann, Assisting Cody Fowler, to General A. H.
Blanding, January 21, 1942. Letter contained critique of mobilization from Guy H. Allen, folder titled:
Test Mobilization—Winter Haven (Reports), Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1. Florida State
Association of Retail Grocers, letter, July 30, 1941, folder titled: Gov. Holland Defense Council, State—
1941, Box 24, FF 9, Governor Spessard Holland: Administrative Correspondence, Record Group 102,
Series 406, Box 24: 1941–1944.
50
Cody Fowler to James L. Ferman, December 28, 1941, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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The test mobilization took place in three different columns traveling to Winter
Haven. Each column had set criteria and a route to travel so that one group could
connect with another as they traveled to their destination. For example, Column
#1 originated in Pinellas County and traveled State Road 17 and State Road 2. The
group was due to arrive in Plant City in order to meet up with the Plant City and
Tampa units. All of these movements were placed on a schedule. Then they proceeded
east on State Road 17 through Lakeland and stopped in Auburndale to meet up with
the unit from Pasco County. The entire group then moved along State Roads 17
and 2 until they arrived at their final destination outside Winter Haven. There were
detailed instructions on how to meet, where each group should be in reference to
the column, and how long to wait at each point. Columns 2 and 3 received similar
directions, and all of them were supposed to end up outside Winter Haven, where
they would be assembled for a parade through the city.52
While these units were mobilizing, ten airplanes with ten observers and four
passengers circled above, watching the movement of the convoy below. The observers
were supposed to report on whether the units arrived at their assigned points on time,
conditions of the formations, mishaps en route, safety precautions when columns
halted, number of vehicles in column, and any other information they felt might be
important. Planes flew out of the Tampa airport and traveled toward Winter Haven
and observed on their way. Then they landed in Winter Haven and gave a report to
Al R. Hathaway, chairman of aviation participation. The pilots then took off again
and went toward Auburndale and observed the column once again. The observers
then landed a second time to give another report before taking off and returning to
Tampa.53
After the test mobilization, Allen had all of the reports compiled and sent out
a memo indicating issues of concern. The problems that occurred during the test
were not of great significance. It must be remembered that this was a civilian group
whose members may or may not have a military background, so they may not have
been used to responding to certain commands. Most of the issues that arose were lack
of timing, not responding to the forward march call, confusion, and spacing. These
mistakes were probably caused by lack of practice in a large-scale scenario, but there
were two incidents that caused some concerns about safety. The first was that some
of the participants arrived under the influence of alcohol, which helps to explain the
problems of spacing, and the second was that when a column halted on the side of
the road, the participants got out of their cars and congregated in the middle of the
road, becoming a traffic hazard. Even with these minor issues, the Winter Haven test
General Instructions, folder titled: Test Mobilization—Winter Haven (Reports), Record Group 191,
Series 1316, Carton 1. “Civilian Auto Defense Units to have Review,” Tampa Morning Tribune, January 6,
1942.
53
General Instructions, folder titled: Test Mobilization—Winter Haven (Reports), Record Group 191,
Series 1316, Carton 1.
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mobilization was considered a success.54 Cody Fowler remarked about the event, “this
mobilization proves that this division is not a ‘paper’ organization.”55
The test mobilization was a high point for the Subdivision of Motor Escort
and Transportation, but as the war became more demanding of the resources of the
United States, the makeup of the units began to change. In order for a country
to be successful in a time of war, it needed the participation of all its citizens as
a team. Nobody could be left on the sideline because some people in society did
not regard them as worthy. The units in late 1942 and into 1943 began to lose
valuable members to military service. This was one of the problems that it faced in its
maintenance of their membership strength. The Florida state government realized the
necessity of bringing everyone together for a common cause. Women were brought
into the defense council during its early stages of planning in order to deal with the
needs of health and home. African Americans were later asked to help organize their
communities for civil defense in 1941, which some had already started doing. The
motorcycle escort units were not an all-white male organization. Even though the
initial call for members was directed specifically to white men, African American men
also became part of the organization along with women.
In the days before the American entrance into the war, the question of how
to bring in the African American community was one of the items discussed by
Governor Holland and Frank Holland. The latter stated that African Americans would
be “extremely important in labor and other auxiliary groups, may present a terrific
problem in morale if we are actually subjected to a severe attack, and as a class are the
most fertile field for subversive propaganda by enemies of our nation.”56 He believed
that blacks would be an important source of labor, but at the same time did not
trust that they would support their country. It was a mistake to think that blacks did
not view the United States as their country. This was evident in the correspondence
between Allen and L. W. Patrick from Miami. In a letter dated December 29, 1941,
Patrick wrote: “I have been approached by the Colored district asking to help set up
a motorcycle unit of colored riders only.”57 Why would African Americans volunteer
to start a unit if they did not feel that their country was in danger? Allen replied to
the letter by stating: “The colored question is being considered now. There will be a
definite place for them in this work. Just keep in contact with them until you receive

Memorandum to Chairmen of the Division of Transportation and Communication from: Guy
Allen, Divisional Bulletin XII–15, February 13, 1942, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1. 55
Florida Civilian Defense News: Official Bulletin of the State Defense Council of Florida, no. 19, Tallahassee,
Fla., February 1, 1942, folder titled: Florida Civilian Defense News, “Florida Motorized Unit” Record
Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 2.
56
Memorandum to Spessard L. Holland from Frank L. Holland, June 20, 1941, folder titled: Gov.
Holland Defense Council, State–1941, Box 24, FF 9, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 24: 1941–1944.
2.
57
L. W. Patrick to Guy H. Allen, December 29, 1941, folder titled: Advisory Board M.P.T.—Bulletins—
Sub-Division, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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Courtesy of the Florida State Archives

This photograph, likely taken in Miami in 1942, shows nine members of the African American motorcycle
escort unit, including one woman (seen sharing the second motorcycle from the right).

definite ruling from the council.”58 In early 1942, Patrick did begin to organize the
black riders in Miami along the lines of the state defense plans. He wrote:
Mr. Allen back to this colored subject again, it seems that when there is a
job to be done the colored people are most always the first to complete the
job that has been assigned to them, now don’t get the idea that I love them
but you must give credit to them for being patriotic. These people wanted
the motorcycle boys in uniforms and raise money to get same. No white
people have even thought to [do] such a thing here as yet.59
This comment was in direct contrast with the ideas of Frank Holland. The African
American population in Florida was not a foreign group that happened to live in
America. They were Americans living in Florida.
On October 28, 1941, the State Defense Council approved a plan that started
the organization of blacks in Florida.60 The resolution stated that all programs needed
Guy H. Allen to L.W. Patrick, December 31, 1941.
L.W. Patrick to Guy H. Allen, February 2, 1942.
60
Florida Civilian Defense News, no. 13, November 1, 1941, folder titled: Gov. Holland, Defense
Council, State—1941, Box 24 FF10, Record Group 102, Series 406, Box 24: 1941–1944.
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to be extended to blacks. This was justified because blacks composed one-third of the
total population of Florida. The information bulletin stated that neglecting blacks
meant overlooking “numerous . . . patriotic citizens,” and it would be a “costly loss
of willing assistance.”61 This call for participation did not direct the activities, but it
created a situation in which blacks could work with local and county organizations.
This resolution created the Negro Defense Committee headed by Florida A & M
College president John Robert Edward Lee.62 Following these events, counties began
organizing local African American taxicab units. For example, three units were formed
in Monroe County, four in Marion County, and one in Leon County. In April 1942,
it was reported that Leon County had completely organized the African American
Escort Cars and Drivers. Several different counties saw the creation of black taxicab
units and automobile units, and in Dade County two motorcycle escort units were
created.63 This proved that blacks were willing to take an active part in the defense
of the country as well as the state. Lastly, in 1943 President Lee reported that the
organization of blacks in the state had gone well. He stated, “Negroes in Florida have
gone ‘all out’ for defense.”64
During World War II, women played a significant role in the defense of the
nation and the buildup of wartime industries. This was as true in Florida as elsewhere
in the United States. From the beginning of the organization of the motorcycle troops
by Allen in 1940, women participated in the unit. Seven women from the Gasparilla
Motorcycle Club’s ladies auxiliary signed applications to join the Tampa troop.65 In
1942, the only female member of the Tampa troop under the Subdivision of Motor
Escort and Transportation was Evelyn Harger. Her husband, John Harger, was the
director of the unit.66 This did not mean that she rode around on the back of his
motorcycle and was considered a member. She had her own motorcycle and was her
own member. All over the state, women were becoming part of the defense force.
This occurred more in the car units though, especially when circumstances forced
organizers to use women instead of men.
This occurred in Dixie County, where 866 automobiles were registered for
defense, and 81 of them were driven by women. When Allen found out about this,
he wanted to know if county chairman W. R. Pratt was taking his job seriously.67
Memorandum to Council Chairmen and Secretaries, from George L. Burr Jr., executive director,
Informational Bulletin no. 4, November 10, 1941.
62
Ibid.
63
Albert E. Peirce Jr., chairman of Monroe County, June 4, 1942. F. O. Hicksen, chairman of Marion
County Division of Transportation and Communication, June 25, 1942. “Leon County, Florida, Defense
Council Minutes, March 18–April 29, 1942.” Located in Strozier Library, Florida State University.
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Biennial Report: State Defense Council of Florida, 1941–1942 (Tallahassee, Fla., March 25, 1943),
77.
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Guy H. Allen to Cody Fowler, May 17, 1941, folder titled: 1941–1942 Tampa, FL— M.P. & T.
Hillsborough 2, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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“Tampa Motorcycle Escort Unit Does Speedy Efficient Job,” Tampa Daily Times, July 27, 1942,
folder titled: Sub-Division Publicity (Scrapbook).
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Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
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Pratt’s response was that most of the automobiles in Dixie County were being used to
transport workers to the local mills, whose business was 75 percent defense contracts.
Since the county was thinly populated and most of men were working defense jobs,
he decided that the best and only way to accomplish the task at hand was to enlist
women.68 Allen replied that Pratt had done an excellent job considering the adversity
that he faced. Allen wrote, “Results are the things that will count most from here on
out.” He also wanted Pratt to send him a picture of the women’s unit and expressed
his appreciation for their spirit.69 Surprisingly, Allen was not any more understanding
about the women’s car unit formed in Quincy under the direction of Gadsden
county chairman T. P. Harvard. The unit was led by Mary Celia Davidson, and it was
comprised of thirty-eight cars.70 After he received the report, he told the chairmen
of the automobile unit, motorcycle unit, and taxicab unit that Harvard needed some
guidance in his organization.71 Even though some disapproved of certain roles for
women, the fact remained that they were an essential part of the defense of Florida
because without everyone participating, the numbers needed could not have been
achieved.
Even with all of this unity, the Subdivision faced problems that could not be
controlled. As they later found out, war industries need everyday resources. The two
main resource problems that affected them were tire and gasoline shortages. As early
as 1942, the group began to feel the pinch when it came to tires. Allen hoped that the
federal government would give them some relief because they were part of the defense
force.72 He also asked for some sort of modification of the law that would allow his
units to get tires, especially for the motorcycle riders. He felt that if they were not
allowed to get tires, they would be forced to disband.73 This problem, coupled with
gasoline shortages, made it difficult for the unit to function and practice like they did
in Winter Haven. In an article from the Tampa Morning Tribune Allen urged people
not to get discouraged because of the gas and tire shortages. He told people not to
sign up for conflicting duty even though they were not able to practice at this time.
He said that even though they feel as if they were doing nothing, they were helping
the war effort just by staying organized and allowing themselves to be called at a
moment’s notice.74
W. R. Pratt, chairman, Dixie County Division of Transportation and Communications, to Guy H.
Allen, February 19, 1942.
69
Guy H. Allen to W. R. Pratt, February 22, 1942.
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SDC–10 Form from T.P. Harvard, chairman of Gadsden County, to Guy H. Allen, June 9, 1942,
from the city of Quincy, folder titled: SDC–10, 1-17-42, M. E. & T., Record Group 191, Series 1316,
Carton 1.
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Tampa Bay History Center Collection, 2000.008.001

Though slightly idealized, the scene depicted in this postcard would have been a common sight around
Tampa during World War II. Resources necessary to keep planes like these in the air, such as gasoline and
rubber, limited the quantity of these items available for civil defense efforts.

Apathy was another problem that Allen had to face. In the beginning, people
were willing to join due to outrage over the tragedy at Pearl Harbor, but as time
passed the sentiment faded. In a letter from Harry F. Stearns, Hillsborough county
chairman of the Motor Escort Unit, he stated that he only had about ten members
who were willing to make the personal sacrifices necessary to maintain their position
in the unit. He complained that some were taking defense halfheartedly and only
attended meetings when it was convenient. Stearns wrote that one man said, “Uncle
Sam never did anything for him, why should he do anything for Uncle Sam.”75
Stearns asked him to leave. The same sort of difficulties occurred in Pensacola as
well. The chairman there stated that it was “difficult to make the population here,
away from actual submarine sinkings and similar disasters, realize there is a war going
on.”76 This, along with the fact that most of the people in the town were part of the
Navy, made it difficult to recruit in Pensacola. Apathy and loss of members to the
draft made maintenance of the unit an arduous task.

Memo from Harry F. Stearns, chairman of Motorcycle Escort Unit, Hillsborough County, n.d.,
folder titled: 1943—Various Activities, Record Group 191, Series 1316, Carton 1.
76
Brown Rainwater, chairman, Transportation and Communications, Escambia County Defense
Council, to Guy H. Allen, April 29, 1942, folder titled: Escambia County—Pensacola.
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By 1943 and 1944, the need for the Motor Escort Unit began to diminish.
The tide of the war had turned in favor of the Allies, and fear of a German or Japanese
invasion had lessened. It is difficult to determine exactly when the group formally
dissolved, but the correspondence and memos for the group lessened dramatically
in 1943 and disappeared in 1944. Guy Allen created a civil defense force in his free
time, and it was propelled from a local organization into a viable state defense unit.
Allen was not seeking to promote his company or himself to any large degree. He
did receive recognition for his work by being named chairman of the Subdivision of
Motor Escort and Transportation, but he did not start it for titles. Allen was a soldier
who remembered the horrors of World War I and was keenly aware of the terrible
things taking place in Europe in 1939 and 1940, and how those events had affected
the civilian population more than the events of the first war. He was a man of duty
and believed that as a citizen of the United States, it was in his power to protect it
any way he could. World War II made many people rise up and join the team for
victory.
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F

lorida, Cuba And
The Spanish–American War:
The Intelligence Game
by Joe Knetsch, Ph.D.

I

n 1898 officers headed to the newly erupting conflict between the
United States and Spain in Cuba were handed a valuable piece of information.  
Entitled “Military Notes on Cuba” and issued by the Adjutant General’s Office,
Military Information Division (MID), this document provided the young
commanding officers with valuable data on nearly every important city, railroad,
harbor, etc. on that long-suffering island.  The intelligence gathered to create this
useful and carefully documented volume came from our military attache’s, the Spanish
archives (and those of other countries), consular reports, travelers and numerous
unnamed “insurrectionists” both in and outside of Cuba, many living in Tampa.  Its
compilation began with the efforts of Captain (later Brigadier General) George P.
Scriven of the Army Signal Corps in 1892, a full three years before the outbreak of
the revolution of 1895.  Scriven not only gave a picture of the physical characteristics
but also an explanation of the Cuban railway system, Cuba’s topography and it
contained a general discussion of the military situation on the island.  Some personal
reconnaissance was also included in the volume but its most important components
came from Cubans.   As Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell has explained in his “History
of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff,” (the
unpublished version), “In addition to this source, a well-organized Cuban Nationalist
Junta had been functioning in New York City ever since 1868.  Having engineered
the still smouldering revolt against Spanish rule which opened in 1895, its members
remained perfectly willing at all times to furnish the War Department with desired
Joe Knetsch holds a Ph.D. in history from Florida State University.  Knetsch, a Government Analyst II
within Florida’s Bureau of Survey and Mapping, Division of State Lands, has authored numerous articles
on Florida topics, with an emphasis on Florida’s pioneer era and military history.
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information about the Caribbean area.   When supplemented by a considerable
amount of further research along similar lines, these two main sources enabled the
Military Information Division, AGO, in June 1898, to publish a very comprehensive
pamphlet entitled “Military Notes on Cuba …”  This book was placed “at the disposal
of every officer” of the Army headed to that troubled land.1
The gathering of military intelligence by the U. S. Army in an organized,
bureaucratic sense did not begin until Adjutant General R. C. Drum, on his own
initiative, established the Military Intelligence Division in the fall of 1885.  This was
three years after the U. S. Navy had created its own intelligence agency, the Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI).  Like the Navy the Army was very soon attaching Military
Attaches to our foreign legations throughout most of Europe and the major capitals
in Latin America and Asia.  Drum created the MID from the Reservations Division
of the Miscellaneous Branch of the Office of the Adjutant General.  He placed the
new organization under the command of Major William J. Volkmar, the chief of the
Miscellaneous Branch.  The assignment of the new agency was to gather as much
information as it “deemed useful and beneficial to the Army at large.”2  Maps were
gathered in great quantities from all available sources both at home and abroad and
checked against each other for accuracy and other fine points that may be strategically
useful.  Reports from the newly appointed attaches also added to the depth of the
Division’s knowledge and these officers were required to search newspapers, reports,
libraries, archives for useful data and to question travelers about things they witnessed
or saw in the country while visiting.  The Division’s avid collecting demanded that
the space and numbers allotted to it should be increased which soon brought it to the
attention of the head of the Signal Corps who felt it was his office’s duty to collect
this data.  The infighting soon became very bitter and counterproductive.3
Briefly told the Signal Corps under the dynamic leadership of Brigadier General
Adolphus W. Greely was certain that it had been assigned the duty of intelligence
gathering and was not willing to share the responsibility.  Greely based his assumption
on an act of Congress passed in October of 1890 stating that the Signal Corps would
“collect information for the Army by telegraph and otherwise.”  By the beginning of
1892 Greely was ready to put up a full fight for this duty.  Unfortunately for him,
Drum had the strong support of Secretary of War, Stephen Elkins, and Lieutenant
General of the Army, John M. Schofield who was then the Commanding General
of the Army.  By March 1892 the War Department General Orders were issued that
gave the task of gathering “military intelligence” to the MID.   Not only was the
Division given this daunting task but it was also assigned the duties of making and
Bruce W. Bidwell. “History Of The Military Intelligence Division, Department Of The Army General
Staff.” Office Of The Chief Of Military History, Department Of The Army, “Historical Manuscript File
– Unclassified” 2-3.7 Aa.N Pt. 1. Washington D. C., 1959-61.  Vii-1 Thru Vii-3.
2
Bruce W. Bidwell. History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff:
1775-1941. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1986. 54-55.
3
Ibid., 55.
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Members of Company H, 157th Indiana Volunteer Infantry, are seen drilling amongst the palmetto and
pine near Port Tampa.  Though making up almost half of the 30,000 soldiers encamped in and around
Tampa before the war, volunteer troops made up a very small percentage of those who actually participated
in the Spanish-American War.

issuing all military maps, books and instructions for use by the Army and militia
officers and State troops.  It was also to develop and prepare plans for mobilization
and the transportation of volunteer units and State troops “and for the concentration
of the military forces of the United States at the various strategic points on or near
the frontiers of the country.”  In other words the MID was to take on the functions
of a smaller General Staff, which the United States had not yet implemented.  Under
the leadership of Major Arthur L. Wagner the Division soon began organizing for
these tasks with a staff of eleven officers in addition to forty state based officers and
sixteen military attaches.   One of the most strategically placed attaches was Captain
Tasker Bliss whose reports from Madrid, when added to the information provided
by the Junta and exiled Cubans in Florida, allowed the Army to compute, “with
unusual accuracy” the actual strength of the Spanish Army units located throughout
Cuba.4  Wagner’s men also cooperated with the Secret Service in identifying Spanish
Ibid., 55-61.  Also see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. American Espionage: From Secret Service to CIA. New
York: The Free Press, 1977. 26-27.
4
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spies attempting to infiltrate American units headed for Cuba in Tampa after the war
began.5
The Navy also was just beginning its intelligence service in this era and had
actually preceded the Army’s organization by a couple of years.  The emphasis here
was also with the attaches and their duties overseas.  The Office of Naval Intelligence
was created as a part of the Bureau of Navigation in 1882.   There had been a
movement within the naval establishment to modernize the United States Navy and
a wide recognition of its decline since the Civil War in comparison to other navies.  
The reformers included Admiral Stephen B. Luce, Captain French Chadwick, W. W.
Kimball, Charles C. Rogers and a young officer just then entering the main part of
his career, Alfred T. Mahan.  The first chief of the office was Lieutenant Theordorus
Bailey Myers Mason, a widely traveled and savvy collector of data.  At first, Mason
tried to work with the established Naval Institute but found that this was too
cumbersome and the participants were interested in the mechanical modernization
but not intelligence gathering and distribution.  Mason worked well with his bureau
chief, Commodore John Grimes Walker, who appreciated his subordinate’s talents and
tenacity.  They were fortunate in having William H. Chandler as the new Secretary
of the Navy who supported most of their efforts.   At the 25 July 1882 meeting
between Mason and Chandler the Secretary outlined a plan to gather intelligence,
compile, record and correct information and he created fourteen categories into
which each type of intelligence would be placed and organized.  Following a period
of political interference with the intelligence gathering by Under Secretary of the
Navy James Russell Soley, the ONI underwent a dramatic change for the better with
the appointment of French E. Chadwick as the new chief in 1892.  Budget cuts in the
election year of 1892 did not enhance the gather of intelligence preparatory to the war
with Spain.  The attaché staff was cut and the collection of overseas intelligence fell
as a result.  Chadwick did not have a chance to reform or improve the product since
he was in only for about a year  The second Cleveland administration did not have its
eyes on collecting intelligence since it opposed the Republican expansionist program
and was forced to deal with the Panic of 1893-94, domestic violence, labor disputes
and inflation.  Luckily, ONI had one ally in the new administration, Secretary of the
Navy Hilary Herbert.  Herbert allowed observers to go into the Sino-Japanese War
area and sent intelligence agents to observe the harbor at Rio de Janeiro during the
Brazilian rebellion of 1893-94.  Herbert allowed ONI to dispatch attaches and others
throughout Latin America, including Venezuela where the United States had a major
disagreement with Great Britain.  Despite the presence of a report that Spain had
approached Great Britain about a possible anti-United States alliance, the ONI did
not become involved in the immediate planning for naval operations in the Atlantic,
Caribbean or Asia.   Not until Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright took
over ONI with the new McKinley administration did the office begin to gear for war.  
5
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Wainwright shared many ideas with the old reformers with whom he had graduated
from the Naval Academy and with the new Under Secretary of the Navy, Theodore
Roosevelt.  In agreement with Mahan, Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and
others, Wainwright shared the “large picture” concept.6
Wainwright had to face the immediate task of getting vast amounts of
information ready for distribution.  Japanese interest in Hawaii had been brought to
the fore with the pressure of the Hawaiian Revolution, the large Asiatic population
in the islands and the development of U. S. interests in the Asian market and
expansion.   At the same time the German fleet had increased dramatically under
the skillful guidance of Admiral Von Terpitz.  Disputes with Great Britain over seals
in the Pacific Northwest, Venezuela’s boundary and other little problems made the
increasingly important Anglo-Saxon alliance between the United States and Britain
unlikely although paraded constantly in the press and popular magazines.
By the advent of the McKinley administration the situation in Cuba was
rapidly heating up.  The war had begun in 1895 and was dragging on with neither
side the apparent winner.  The limited resources of Spain were being rapidly used up
as was its eligible military-age population.  With the beginnings of the revolution
in the Philippines the end was clearly on the horizon.   Getting information to
answer policy questions and military inquiries meant that the ONI (and the other
intelligence agencies) would have to greatly increase their presence.  At the same time,
the Naval War College was organizing and planning for the coming war by producing
numerous scenarios that could be applied given certain situations.  ONI was called
upon to supplement the information available at the college and to quietly assist in
implementing the plans should war come about in the near future.  One of the major
problems was where to focus the attention.  In response to some alarming reports and
Roosevelt’s public statements more attention was actually paid to German aims than
those of Spain.  Not until the sinking of the Maine was the attention entirely drawn
to war with Spain.7
ONI relied heavily upon the reports of attaches during this crucial period,
especially those stationed in Europe.  From Madrid Lieutenant Commander George
L. Dyer reported in 1897 the Spanish rumors of war against the United States.  The
Spaniards, according to Dyer, had full faith in their squadrons and believed that if
an encounter should take place they could defeat the U. S. Navy and destroy our
commerce.   Brash talk in Spanish circles of attacking the American coastline was
also bandied about in Madrid.  From Germany came the warnings of Albert Niblack
that Spain had purchased two Italian cruisers more heavily armed than the New York,
thought to be the best in the U. S. Navy.   Roosevelt required ONI to produce a
number of papers on coaling stations, fire power of opposing vessels, cruising range of
6
Jeffery M. Dorwart. The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency,
1865-1918. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979., 12-54.
7
Ibid., 55-59.
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Members of the 71st New York Volunteers wait to board Cuba-bound transports at Port Tampa.  The 71st
was one of the few volunteer units to fight in Cuba during the Spanish–American War.

both our ships and those of Spain, and other vital intelligence for military planning.  
With the small staff allotted over the recent years and the many areas to be explored
it is no surprise that the intelligence system was not up to the standards of the day
and both the Navy and Army had much to learn in a very short time.8
Tensions with the government of Spain in Cuba were adding to the increased
need for information.  Many Cubans had migrated to the United States primarily
to go into business to assist their families and friends back home.  Many of these
men and women brought back information concerning conditions in Cuba and
the problems of the Spanish administration and army.   This led to the arrest of
numerous individuals who held such citizenship and put the United States in an
awkward position relative to the disposition of their cases.  The arrest in 1896 of
Mark (Marcos) E. Rodriguez, Luis Someillan y Azpeitia and Luis Smoeillan y Vidal
created such a sensation that the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs investigated
the matter.  Rodriguez was taken in broad daylight while boarding the Olivette, of the
Plant Steamship Line, for a return trip to Tampa.  All three men were arrested and
8
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charged with sedition and rebellion.  Senator Wilkerson Call of Florida led the charge
to get these men released and returned to their families.  Just what information these
men could pass on is in question but the Spanish government was sure that they were
spies assisting the rebels and refused to release them in a timely matter.9
When it came to raising the diplomatic and emotional heat no one was
better suited to the task than the great Cuban revolutionary, Jose Marti.  Much has
been written about this intriguing figure but one of the most important services he
performed for his country was in getting the people of Florida, and especially Tampa,
directly involved in supporting the revolution.  As historian Joan Steffy has written:
“Thus it was Tampa which became the catalyst for the movement to join all Cubans
in the struggle for independence.  It was in Tampa that Marti proposed his ideals
of national unity, of democratic revolutionary activity, and the joining of all groups
under a common banner.”   It was also in Tampa where the Spanish government
allegedly attempted to assassinate the writer-turned-revolutionary by poisoning his
wine.  From that time on each visit to Tampa found him in the home of Ruperto
and Paulina Pedroso, an African-Cuban couple whom Marti trusted.  Marti’s interest
in Tampa was the cigar-workers and their associations.  In these he found followers
and contributors to the extent that the money donated by the people of Tampa and
Key West grossed more than that received from all other Latin American countries
combined.  Almost all of the funds raised went to the purchase of arms, ammunition
and medical supplies for the revolutionary army in Cuba.10
Tampa was looked upon as “the very heart of the American conspiracy,” to free
Cuba from Spanish control.11  It was in Tampa that Marti announced the creation
of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) and the place where the party organization
began to take shape in the form of many localized “juntas”.  Many of the local juntas,
organized by the cigar workers and some of the manufacturers, were actively involved
in fund raising and campaigning on behalf of Cuban independence.  More directly
some of the juntas in Tampa and elsewhere “coordinated support of filibustering
expeditions leaving Florida for Cuba.”12  That these organizations were infiltrated
by Spanish spies is undoubted but they were remarkably tight in their local security
measures.
One of the stories of clandestine warfare, the notification of the revolutionaries
in Cuba that the “grito de Guerra” was to begin, was sent wrapped in a special cigar
marked by two tine yellow specks by Blas O’Halloran in the O”Halloran cigar factory
in West Tampa.  Miguel Angel Duque de Estrada carried the message through the
United States Senate Document No. 16. 54th Congress, 1st Session. 1896.  Serial Set 3353.
Joan Marie Steffy. “The Cuban Immigrants of Tampa, Florida: 1886-1898.” Masters Thesis.
University of South Florida, 1975, 43-74. The author would like to thank Consuelo Stebbins at the
University of Central Florida for sharing her work regarding the Cuban Revolutionary parties in Tampa
and Key West during this time period.
11
Steffy, 78.
12
Louis A. Perez, Jr. “Cubans in Tampa: From Exiles to Immigrants, 1892-1901.” Florida Historical
Quarterly. Volume 57, October 1978, 133-134.
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tight Spanish customs office and delivered the message to Juan Galberto Gomez who
set the final date for February 24, 1895.13  Recent scholarship and the publication
in Havana of Juan Gualberto Gomez’s memoirs have brought to light the facts in
this matter.  In actuality the message was too large for any cigar to hold and it did
not go through the closely watched Tampa Juntas but it was sent through the more
tightly controlled Cuban Convention in Key West.  The chain of curriers began with
Gonzola de Quedada in New York through to Juan de Barrios thence to Manuel de
la Cruz who delivered the final message in Cuba to Gomez.  Although these men
were known to the Spanish officials their quick and silent work within the growing
network made their mission a success.14
Publication of the Spanish correspondence between its Consuls and the
Ministry of Ultramar by Dr. Consuelo E. Stebbins indicates the intensity of the
intrigue at this stage.   Since many of the revolutionaries were participants in the
Ten Years War it was somewhat easier to follow them and report on their contacts in
Tampa and Key West.  In a report dated March 8, 1895, Pedro Solis, the Consul in
Key West noted: “This consulate is closely observing and reporting on the activities
of the Separatists, not only in Key West but also in Tampa and other cities in Florida.  
Since I assumed the responsibility of this office several years ago, I have maintained
constant surveillance of the insurgents, and I have sent detailed reports of their plans
to Cuba and Washington D. C. …”   Solis then noted the eminent threat of an
expedition to be led by Generals Carlos Roloff and Serafin Sanchez.  It left Big Pine
Key and landed in Las Villas province on July 24, 1895.  Even with foreknowledge the
consul could do little but inform those in charge of enforcement.15  The documents
clearly show an active consular service but also the constant frustration it experienced
in trying to halt the numerous filibustering expeditions or the revolutionary fund
raising especially by the cells of the Central Revolutionary Council in Key West
or the numerous clubs in Tampa.16  Even when Enrique Collazo was “organizing a
council of war in Tampa,” the frustrated consul, M. R. Esudero, was advised not to
even press charges as it would be a waste of time and money.  Convinced that this
assessment of the situation was accurate the consul did not press for charges knowing
that no conviction could be won against the insurgents who had the support of the
populace in both Key West and Tampa.17

Steffy., 79-80.
Consuelo E. Stebbins. “Key West Declares War on Spain.”   Unpublished paper delivered to the
Florida Historical Society annual meeting, Clearwater, Florida, May 26, 2007.  See also Juan Gualberto
Gomez. Por Cuba Libre. Havana: 1905. 348-349: and Manuel Deulofeu. Marti, Cayo Hueso y Tampa.
Cienfuego. ND. 285.  The author would like to thank Dr. Stebbins for her assistance in seeing these
sources and sharing her work in progress.
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Consuelo E. Stebbins. City of Intrigue, Nest of Revolution: A Documentary History of Key West in the
Nineteenth Century. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007., 183.
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Ibid., 177-233.
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Tony Pizzo Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department

This map shows the proximity of the various encampments, the docks at Port Tampa City and the City of
Tampa.  Henry Plant’s single track railroad, connecting Tampa and Port Tampa, was overwhelmed by the
number of people and amount of supplies that had to travel its nine-mile length.
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Filibustering relied upon secrecy and tact in the face of constant observation. The
Ten Year War had proven that the Spanish Navy could not stop all such traffic and
this was to be true in the War for Independence too. However, Marti and company
were not always successful in getting their arms and supplies to their compatriots
in Cuba. In one of the most conspicuous captures made by the Spanish and
American customs agents during the period before United States intervention the
insurrectionists were stopped in mid-shipment in Fernandina. Simply put the plot
at hand was the smuggling of arms and ammunition to Cuba through the sleepy
port of Fernandina, which had little in the way of military shipping in early 1895.
Marti, using the name of D. E. Mantell, a wealthy “Englishman” about to sail on a
cruise to the West Indies, chartered the yacht Lagonda through the good offices of his
friend, Nathaniel Barnett Borden, a prominent Fernandina businessman. Borden’s
warehouse held a number of ammunition crates variously labeled and destined for
the Lagonda. Two other vessels were hired for the adventure, the Amadis, out of
Rockland, Maine, and tramp steamer Baracoa then in harbor at Boston. The latter
was hired out to one “Abe Moreas of Tampa. The claim of Borden was that around
two hundred men, laborers, would be picked up at various ports in the West Indies
and transported to work on one of the islands, name unspecified. Such uncertainty
aroused the suspicions of one of the captains. The New York World got wind of the
sailing of the Lagonda and alerted its Fernandina correspondent, T. A. Hall, to be on
the look out for anything suspicious because rumor on the New York docks had it
that a filibustering expedition might be sailing from the quiet port. Hall, a county
judge, showed this dispatch to the local Collector of Customs, George L. Baltzell
who began to pay closer attention to the comings and goings of some newly arrived
vessels. In New York City, an informant, James Batewell, wrote to Secretary of the
Treasury John G. Carlisle, that the Lagonda and the Amadis had been chartered for
a filibustering expedition. The fate of the expedition was therefore sealed before the
arrival of the final ship. The agents of the customs service, including special agent S.
W. Paul of Tampa, descended upon Borden’s warehouse and seized the vessels in the
harbor. The expedition had been crushed. However, it did have a positive impact on
the Cuban cause and, as historian Antonio Rafael de la Cova has noted, it inspired
the cause with greater energy and determination to organize even more expeditions
to obtain national independence for Cuba.18
For many in the United States the first real indication that the nation had
an intelligence network was the assignment given to Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan.
Rowan was perfect for the job which entailed getting into Cuba, making contact
with General Calixto Garcia Iniguez, commander of Cuban forces in the eastern end
of the island. Like many others who preceded him to the island, he took advantage
Antonio de la Cova. “Fernandina Filibuster Fiasco: Birth of the 1895 Cuban War of Independence.”
Florida Historical Quarterly. Volume 82, September 2003., 16-42. Also see Enrique Collazo. Cuba Heroica.
Havana, Cuba. 1911., 170-172.
18
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of the network established by the filibusterers in obtaining passage to Cuba.  Rowan
had experience at intelligence gathering in the field having made an inspection of the
entire length of the Canadian Pacific Railroad.  He also had experience in Cuba and
authored a book on the island’s resources.  In addition to contacting Garcia Rowan
was also to attempt to contact General Maximo Gomez y Baez the leading military
officer in the insurgent ranks and, like Garcia, a holdover from the “Ten Year’s War”
from 1868-1879.   Rowan’s mission was an overwhelming success but hardly the
daring-do adventure written up in the famous “Message to Garcia” piece of Elbert
Hubbard.  Garcia was to give Rowan the layout of the Spanish forces on the island,
their numbers, weapons, dispositions, etc.  For MID this was not all new information
but it supplemented that which was already known through other Cuban sources,
namely the exiles in Florida and New York.19   For Americans reading the adventure
published by Hubbard, it romanticized the roles of the filibusterers and others daring
to flaunt the power of Spain.
On a less adventuresome level, local intelligence gathering took on some
typically peculiar twists.   In her charmingly brief “My Service in the SpanishAmerican War, 1898,” Mabel Bean (Williams) tells her story of minor but important
espionage.  Ms. Bean worked in her father’s store and post office at Port Tampa.  After
describing the impact of thousands of troops descending upon the town she tells of
her sitting in the family parlor when Colonel Groesbeck arrived.  The Colonel was an
old friend of her parents and could be trusted to look after the young lady in her new
role – following the activities and mailings of two well-known Spaniards suspecting
of spying on the operations in Tampa.  These men were regular customers and often
seen in the vicinity. Her job was relatively simple.  Keep an eye on these men and
search their mail.   She was to report her findings to General William R. Shafter,
Commander of Fifth Corps, personally.  There she often translated the documents
for the general and presumably his staff.  The bright young, curly headed girl in the
trim sailor suit would hardly be suspected of being a spy by the men and that was
what Groesbeck expected.  As she summed up her experience: “Gen. Shafter, Col.
Groesbeck and my father all seemed pleased with the work I had done but I couldn’t
see that it amounted to much.  Perhaps it did prevent contraband information from
going through the mail.”  Whatever she delivered it had to account for more than just
general information for her to be reporting it directly to the commanding officer.  In
espionage little things add up to larger things and in the bigger picture it could be
very important.20

19
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Few areas indicate
the nature of the intelligence
war during the Cuban
Revolution and the SpanishAmerican War of 1898 than
the episodes involving the
filibusterers, most leaving
from Florida ports.   The
United States was neutral
in the war between Cuban
insurgents and the Spanish
government and therefore
was required by international
law to forbid and prohibit
such exploits as filibustering.  
Raids into Cuba from the
United States were of long
tradition.  The most famous
of the early expeditions were
those of Narciso López in
the period from 1849-52.  
During the Ten Years War
there were many attempts
to get arms to the Cuban
insurgents and many of
these came from Florida and
Louisiana.  The most famous Dime Novel Collection, University of South Florida Library Special Collections Department
affair in this era came with
The Starry Flag Weekly was a popular Dime Novel during the
the capture and execution time of the Spanish-American War.  Though “Tampa’s Dynamite
of Captain Fry and the crew Fiend” was a fictional story, the threat of Spanish saboteurs was
of the Virginius.   As soon as on the minds of many Americans during this time.
the war of 1895 began the
boats coming from Florida, New York, Pennsylvania and other points along the
eastern coast of the United States appeared to be a continuous flotilla.  The Revenue
Service was drawn into a constant game of cat and mouse all along the coast.  The
Morrill, the McLane, the Forward and the Hamilton all attempted to halt the traffic
in arms, ammunition and men headed for Cuba.  They received constant tips from
the Spanish Ambassador, the Spanish Consular service and numerous spies up
and down the coastline.  The George W. Childs, the Lark, the Commodore and the
Laurada were all part of the early ships attempting to land articles of war and men
on Cuba’s beleaguered shores.  In November, for example, the Spanish Ambassador
requested that the Customs Service detain and search the James W. Foster as she sat
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off of the Delaware Breakwater.   In January of 1896 the Spanish minister stated
that the steamer J. W. Hawkins was just leaving New York to rendezvous with the
Commodore somewhere near Palm Beach and that the arms confiscated earlier at
Cedar Keys figured into the mix headed towards Garcia’s army.  By March of that
year the minister was complaining once more about the schooner S. R. Mallory taking
its cargo from Cedar Keys to meet with the schooner Adel off of Tampa where they
would later connect with the famous Three Friends which would make the final leg
to Cuba.  This last exploit even stated that the S. R. Mallory contained thirty tons
of supplies for the insurgents and that the Adel was transporting Enrique Collo and
a body of men to join up with the Three Friends after leaving Longboat Key (stated
as Longport Inlet in the report) and rendezvousing somewhere near Alligator Key.  
Such specific information could only have come from a rather sophisticated spy
network operating out of Tampa and Jacksonville.  The S. R. Mallory was seized in
this instance but soon released for lack of direct evidence showing a violation of the
neutrality laws.21
According to a report to the House of Representatives given in February of
1898 the U. S. Customs Service allegedly put its entire eastern force of 2,408 men
onto the task of suppressing the trade in arms and the shipment of men to Cuba.  
This same report stated: “That only 6 out of 13,585 American vessels succeeded in
reaching Cuba and that less than 50 have had any share in these expeditions …”  It
bragged that the U. S. citizens were thereby proven to be law abiding and that a
“wholesome and repressive fear” kept those more disposed to undertake such action
in line.  The Service even produced an impressive chart to show the results of sixty
attempted expeditions, which it claimed very few ever reached Cuba.  According to
Dr. Samuel Proctor, Napoleon Bonaparte Broward’s biographer, the Three Friends
alone had eight successful voyages to Cuba providing weapons, men and hospital
supplies to the insurgent army.22  The Three Friends was assigned a “shadow” in the
Revenue Cutter Boutwell while in Jacksonville, however there were many well known
escapades where the captain of this cutter simply waived goodbye after Three Friends
crossed the bar.  The same report stating that the Revenue Service had stopped so
many of the expeditions also noted how many times (complete with dates) these same
vessels actually delivered their cargoes to Cuba.  In light of most of the evidence and
the numerous newspaper reports of these exploits the report can only be viewed as
“window dressing” for the Spanish government and an answer to its charges that the
United States had been too lenient with the violators.23
The Cuban Revolution of 1895-1898 was financed heavily by Cubans and
their sympathizers in the United States, especially in Tampa and Key West, Florida.  
United States Senate Document No. 180. 54th Congress, 1st Session, 1896. Serial Set 3353.
Samuel Proctor. “Filibustering Aboard the Three Friends.” Broward Legacy. Volume 4, Spring/Fall
1981., 19.
23
United States House of Representatives Document No. 326. 55th Congress, 2d Session, February 28,
1898. Serial Set 3679.
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Many of the funds raised by the efforts of the Cuban Junta and its numerous suborganizations went directly to fund the guns, ammunition and hospital goods
shipped by the filibusterers.   According to historian James Robertson, “General
Maximo Gomez, commander-in-chief of the Cuban Army, early and continually
emphasized the importance and necessity of promoting filibustering as a means of
sustaining the revolutionary movement, …”24  Cuban historian Jose Rivero Muniz
has also noted that even though the attempts to raise money for the revolution were
publicly known and promoted in the local press, United States authorities did little
if anything to prevent them.  The nearly constant military preparations which the
Spanish Ambassador and others denounced and demanded a halt to were almost
totally ignored by the powers in Washington and throughout Florida.  Clearly the
sympathy and admiration for the Cuban cause was one that struck a responsive cord
in the hearts of Floridians and other citizens.25  Tampa’s denizens in particular were
very supportive of the Cuban cause and donated as much from this one town as was
raised in all the other Americas.26   Indeed, the cigar-makers of Tampa contributed the
astounding amount of twelve to fifteen thousand dollars per month, or $150,000 per
year (in round numbers).27  The centers of Cuban emigrant population, Tampa, Key
West and New York were the most fertile fields for fund-raising.  With a combined
population of over 8,000 Cubans Tampa and Key West were quick to raise needed
funds.28
Probably the most famous intelligence coup of the war came with the discovery
of the whereabouts of the fleet of Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete.  This fleet was well
undermanned, incomplete in composition and did not have all of its guns and turrets
in place, yet as a “fleet in being” it presented a threat, especially to the frightened
and nearly hysterical governors of the New England states who feared the bombing
of Plymouth or some other coastal community.  It had to be found and destroyed
before a land invasion of Cuba could be attempted because the Army could not sail
unprotected to Cuba in open boats.  Two operatives of the Navy Department, not
linked to ONI, were Ensigns Henry H. Ward and William H. Buck who chartered
yachts to cruise off of the Spanish coast and keep watch on the fleets of Cervera and
Admiral Miguel de la Camara.  Thrown into the intelligence mix in Europe were the
various operatives of the Naval Attaches, including Edward Breck, a former fencing
champion who went in disguise to Spain and played the role to the hilt and did not
get caught.  Unfortunately, none of these operatives or attaches could locate the vital
fleet of Cervera once it left the Cape Verde Islands.  Not until it reached Curacao
on 14 May 1898 did the United States Navy have an idea where it was headed.  It
George W. Auxier. “The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the SpanishAmerican War, 1895-1898.” Hispanic American Historical Review. Volume 19, 1939., 288-89.
25
Jose Rivero Muniz. The Ybor City Story (1885-1954). Tampa: E. Fernandez and Henry Beltran
publishers, 1976., 25.
26
Gary R. Mormino and George E. Pozzetta. The Immigrant World of Ybor City: Italians and Their Latin
Neighbors in Tampa, 1885-1985. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998 edition., 80.
27
Muniz, 101.
28
Marshall M. True. Revolutionaries in Exile: The Cuban Revolutionary Party, 1891-1898. Doctoral
Dissertation, University of Virginia. 1965., 172.
24
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had been assumed that Cervera would head to Havana where coal and naval stores
awaited him.  The North Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral William T. Sampson was
charged with the blockade of Cuba, especially the northern coast.  The blockade was
extended east and west of the capital city but covered little of the southern coast.  The
second assumption was that if not Havana then Cienfuegos would be the next logical
port of call.  The “Flying Squadron” under Admiral Winfield Scott Schley was called
upon to prevent this possibility.  Yet, for ten complete days, so the old story goes, the
fleet of Admiral Cervera was lost to Naval Intelligence.29  This is surely not the case.
At the official declaration of war President William McKinley ordered the
head of the U. S. Army Signal Corps, A. W. Greely to take control of all telegraphic
lines in the country.  This order included both cable and land lines.  Most important
were those from Havana to Key West and from Cienfuegos to Haiti.  This latter
was cut under severe circumstances on 11 May.  The line from Havana to Key West
was not cut during the war for good reason, it provided too much intelligence,
including on 19 May the arrival of Cervera’s fleet in the harbor at Santiago de Cuba.  
Captain James Allen had been assigned to Key West and this energetic officer soon
recruited the local manager of the telegraphic service, Martin L. Hellings.  Hellings
immediately offered his services and those of his men in Havana, in whom he had
explicit trust.  He had done the same for Captain Charles Sigsbee arrived in Key West
with the battleship Maine.  Besides the control of the official telegraph office and
staff, Allen now had access through to the highest offices in Cuba.  It was through one
of these operatives, named Villaril that the arrival of Cervera’s fleet became known.  
This information was immediately sent to Washington where Greely states he gave
his assurance to the President and Secretary of the Navy Long that it was for real
and reliable.30  Commodore George C. Remey, then commanding at Key West, was
given the information directly and he also vouched for its authenticity.  As Remey
related: “The next morning, May 19th, about 9 A.M. Captain Allen U.S.A. the chief
Signal Office, came, excited, and evidently in great haste, and said that [he] had a
very important dispatch to tell me.  So I cleared the room, and he informed me that
his office had, a few minutes before, received a telegram from Havana, stating that
Admiral Cervera’s fleet was entering the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.”  Remey then
sent the message onto Washington where, he later learned, the officer of the day at
the Navy Department did not believe the story until he got several stories over the
next few hours.31  Admiral Sampson was notified of the event and he soon sent his
message to Schley, then on the way to Cienfuegos, to continue on to Santiago de
Cuba and blockade that port.  Schley did not believe the story either and delayed
for several days before actually confirming the story by direct observations done by
Dorwart, 64-65; and O’Toole, 195-97.
O’Toole, 188-90.   Also see A. W. Greely. “The Signal Corps in War-Time.” Century Magazine.
Volume 66, October, 1903., 816-17.
31
Charles Mason Remey. Some Exerpts from the Life and Letters of Rear Admiral George Collier Remey,
United States Navy, 1841-1928. Washington: Self-published, 1939., 43-46.   Copy obtained from the
Monroe County Public Library, Key West, Florida.   See also Rebecca R. Raines. Getting the Message
Through: A Branch History of the U. S. Army Signal Corps.Washington: Center of Military History, United
States Army, 1996., 88-90.
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Lieutenant Blue aided by his Cuban guide.  Inner-service rivalry appears to have been
the culprit in not getting Schley into position earlier and the fact that Schley was
upset that Sampson was over him even though he had longer service made it doubly
bad and forced the two men into a disagreement that led to Congressional hearings
and public disgust.
  
A final note to this episode came with the publication of Willis Moore’s account
of the founding of the West Indian Weather Service, a branch of the Department
of Agriculture.   According to Moore’s story, the important message was encoded
into the weather observations from Belene College in Havana and deciphered at Key
West.  If this is the case the President’s fear of a hurricane and its effects on the fleet
made an important contribution to the war effort.32
In one of the strangest fetes of imagination the Cuban Army does not receive
any credit for its role in the five month campaign conducted by the United States
in Cuba which brought about the end to the Cuban Revolution and the SpanishAmerican War.   The movement of Fifth Corps, under the command of General
William Rufus Shafter, was slow and ponderous.  There was little secret as to its
destination once Cervera was bottled up on Santiago’s narrow harbor.  Prior to their
leaving Tampa the S. S. Florida took 312 Cuban volunteers from Tampa and other
Florida cities and landed them near Banes.  The Rowan mission had also introduced
General Nelson Miles to two of Garcia’s most trusted subordinates, General Enrique
Collazo and Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Hernandez.  These gentlemen gave the Major
General some of the most vital information on the strength of the Spanish forces near
Santiago, the entrenchments and the possible reinforcements available to General
Linares commanding Santiago.  Miles sent a message back to Garcia and asked him
to provide more details and broached possible cooperation.  Garcia replied on 9 June
that he would consider Miles’ orders as his orders and cooperate any way he could.  
He offered almost exact numbers of Spanish troops in the area and promised to hold
the forces at Holguin in place.  When Shafter and the Fifth Corps finally arrived, the
officers immediately disembarked and rowed to shore to meet with Garcia unopposed
by any Spanish guns.  Garcia’s forces had cleared the area before the shelling of the
“forts” by Schley’s fleet and few were left to oppose either the officers’ landing or the
disembarking of the Fifth Corps.  Reinforcements from Manzanillo, Holguin and
Guantanamo had been blocked by smaller forces under Garcia.  When Shafter and
the Army landed at Daiquiri and Siboney on 22-24 June they were unopposed.  All
of this thanks to Garcia’s forces and a feint of about 500 men attacking from the west
of Santiago under his command.  Miles acknowledged the contribution of the Cuban
Army and noted that they held the most strategic locations on the western side of the
town and harbor and assisted in the assault on the entrenchments before the town.33  
Yet no where do you see this contribution mentioned in the text giving the history of
this war.
Willis Luther Moore. “I Am Thinking of Hurricanes.” The American Mercury. Volume 12, September
1927., 81-82.
33
House of Representatives Document No. 2. 55th Congress, 3d Session. Annual Report of the War
Department, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898., 27-28.
32
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from The Story of the Spanish-American War by W. Nephew King (1898)

An American officer questions an alleged Spanish spy in this drawing dating from the Spanish-American
War.

This cursory review of the Cuban Revolution and the Spanish-American
War’s intelligence battles is not meant to be all inclusive.  However it should bring
questions to mind as to why Shafter, Miley and others testified in front of the Dodge
Commission into the Conduct of the War that they had little intelligence concerning
the forces in front of them.  Given the “Military Notes on Cuba” compiled so carefully
by Scriven, the very large number of exiles willing to give information, the forces of
Garcia and Gomez who assisted in the landing of United States troops and the nearly
four hundred years of interaction with the island these assertions ring very hollow.  
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Almost every harbor and the road network surrounding it were mapped and available
to the commanding officers.  The train schedule and other transportation facilities
were well known as was the topography of most of the island.  The Consular reports
and the information gleaned from our attaché corps added even more depth to the
available knowledge.  To make the claim that there was little intelligence to use is
almost ludicrous.  
In one of the more revealing letters of the day, Brigadier General William
Ludlow, then Chief Engineer, wrote to Adjutant General Henry T. Corbin the
following: “The Spanish strength has been greatly exaggerated.  They claim to have
had 250,000 troops.  They never had them.  They have existed on paper doubtless,
and drawn pay, but 150,000 would cover all they had.  Of these, many have been sent
home, many have been killed, and very many have died of disease in their filthy and
unsanitary barracks and hospitals.”  Ludlow continued: “At this time, from detailed
and specific information, checked from several well informed sources, I cannot
find more than 70,000 Spanish soldiers in the entire island of Cuba, and these are
divided into scattered garrisons.  I can approximately locate them from recent data.”  
Ludlow then became very specific as to how many forces were in what locations.  
Most importantly for the operations around Santiago, he noted that the eastern
troops were almost totally isolated from the middle and western groups and that
the transportation system did not allow any rapid consolidation or concentration of
Spanish forces.  He also speculated that it would be very difficult, even with four rail
lines leading into Havana to concentrate any more than 40,000 troops for the capital’s
defense.  General Ludlow then stated that with the Spanish treasury nearly broke,
the fall of Manila in everyone’s mind, the constant sighting of the Navy cruising
along the coast intercepting all traffic, knowledge that their fleet was bottled up in
Santiago and knowing that the Cubans were constantly being further supplied by the
expeditions sent by the Army and supporters in the United States that the only course
open to thinking Spaniards in Cuba was a rapid capitulation.  The letter is dated 5
June 1898, and was sent from Tampa.  Just three days before the first order to sail was
given and executed General Ludlow was in possession of some very specific data that
allowed him to give such an accurate picture of what was going on in Cuba.34  The
problem was not enough or accurate information but how to put it to use during the
campaign.  That is the crux of the problem for Major General William Shafter and
his staff.  It would take this type of campaign complete with all the errors and faults
to bring about the most important change in the Army, the creation of a real General
Staff.

Henry T. Corbin Papers: Library of Congress. Container No. 1, Folder “Gen. Wm. Ludlow.”  
Manuscript Division. Washington, D.C.  The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Gerard
Casale of Bethesda, Maryland for his procuring of this document.
34
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The Silencing of Ruby McCollum: Race, Class, and Gender in the South. By Tammy
Evans. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. xv, 167 pp. Foreword by
Jacqueline Jones Royster, acknowledgments, introduction, photographs, conclusion,
afterword by Lynn Worsham, appendix, works cited, index. $29.95 cloth).
Readers of Florida history will be familiar with the events of Sunday, August 3,
1952. Ruby McCollum, a thirty-seven-year-old well-to-do African American mother
of four, walked into the Live Oak medical office of State Senate nominee Dr. Clifford
LeRoy Adams and shot him dead. In the “official” version of events, a dispute over
a medical bill provided McCollum’s motive, but it soon emerged that she had been
Adams’s unwilling and abused mistress. Adams was the father of one of her daughters
and was alleged to have fathered the child she was carrying at the time of her arrest.
On December 20, McCollum was convicted of first-degree murder, and there was no
recommendation of mercy from the all-male, all-white jury, which included former
patients of Dr. Adams. A month later, a defense motion for a new trial was denied,
and McCollum was sentenced to death on January 17, 1953. She was remanded to
Suwannee County Jail rather than the state prison farm at Raiford while her case was
appealed to the state supreme court. Eighteen months after her conviction, in July
1954, the court reversed the death sentence and ordered a new trial, but this never
took place. In September, McCollum was deemed mentally incompetent to stand
trial and was committed to the state mental hospital at Chattahoochee, where she
would spend the next twenty years.
By utilizing many court, private, and published sources, as well as a range of
theoretical tools, to analyze the competing narratives surrounding the murder and
its central actors, Evans presents an intriguing and compelling study of the race,
gender, and class dynamics of segregated small-town Florida at mid-century. As a
native of Live Oak, and growing up as part of its political and economic white elite,
albeit a decade or so after the McCollum-Adams case, Evans offers insights that have
particular salience with regard to the conundrums of private, public, and historical
memory (especially as the murder is not freely discussed by Live Oak residents fifty
years on). Indeed, she describes her study as “dialectic both with and against memory”
(xxvi).
Divided into three main chapters, the study begins with an exploration of
the use of silence in southern myth making and how this shaped media and popular
explanations for McCollum’s actions. “Silence” is indeed the central trope in the study.
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Life in the segregated South was characterized by silence and denial. As Evans reminds
us, white communities were governed by, and white supremacy was perpetuated by,
codes of silence and surveillance. In order to fully understand the complexities of
southern history and culture, scholars must attempt to unravel the ways in which
dichotomies of race, gender, and class created and perpetuated acts of silence that
in turn could both shield people from and expose them to inequality and indignity.
In the second chapter, which focuses on McCollum’s courtroom experiences, Evans
unravels the discursive formations of religion and law that surrounded McCollum’s
“silence-filled” trials. Full exposure of Adams’s relationship to Ruby and her wealthy,
bolita-operator husband; the extent of local officials’ involvement in illegal gambling
and other dubious activities; and a frank discussion of McCollum’s motives for
shooting her abuser would have levied a serious blow to white supremacy and
patriarchy. Thus, court officials and politicians sought, with the complicity of Live
Oak’s black and white residents, to shape and censor the testimony to conform to
an acceptable narrative and to shore up a corrupt and nefarious system. The third
chapter provides fascinating insight into the relationship between Zora Neale
Hurston and William Bradford Huie, both of whom covered the case for northern
black newspapers, published articles and a book on the McCollum-Adams case, and
tried unsuccessfully to establish a connection with McCollum and to uncover the
“real” story of the murder.
As the book’s title underlines, the study focuses on the silencing of Ruby
McCollum by legal and community members, but Evans considers also the reasons
why McCollum herself may have chosen not to or been unable to articulate her version
of events, perhaps as a means of self-preservation to avoid execution. Nonetheless, as
Evans notes, “Ruby McCollum is—and has always been—what the words of others
have made her” (14). Despite the author’s best investigative efforts (for example, in
the search for her burial site as detailed in the conclusion), McCollum remains an
enigmatic figure—and perhaps aptly so.   
Vivien Miller
University of Nottingham, United Kingdom

Constructing Floridians: Natives and Europeans in the Colonial Floridas, 1513-1783.
By Daniel S. Murphree. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. x, 188 pp.
List of maps, acknowledgments, notes, bibliography, index. $55.00 cloth).
Daniel Murphree asserts that for more than two and a half centuries whites
(Europeans) constructed an identity for Florida Indians that changed little from the
time of the early Spanish entradas until the American Revolution. Colonial Florida
offers a good venue to explore this idea because it was the area of the earliest, longest,
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and most constant interaction between Indians and Europeans. Colonial Florida
encompassed much of the Southeast, reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Mississippi River, from the Florida Keys to well into today’s Georgia, South Carolina,
Alabama, and Mississippi.
Murphree contends that colonial-era Europeans and Euro-Americans (whites
born in the Americas) perceived and described Indians in terms that we today would
consider “racist.” But racism, he says, did not fit the mind-set of the colonials. Their
“racialization” of the Indians was not done to “gain social, legal, or political privileges
(9), which are the goals of racism. “Racialization consisted of the articulation primarily
in written form of collective European perceptions regarding the character, behavior,
spirituality, intellectual capacity, and physical appearance of the native peoples of
the Floridas” (8). For example, through racialization, Europeans came to associate
Indians’ skin color with laziness.
Experiences and impressions of early colonial adventurers recounted in works
published in Europe provide the material for the author to trace European perspectives.
Murphree looks to well-known works, such as Garcilaso de la Vega’s story of the
expedition of Hernando de Soto (published 1605) and Antonio de Herrera’s General
History (1601). James Adair, an English trader in the Gulf South, and a perennial
favorite, naturalist William Bartram, provide their observations for the end of the
period under study. Bartram, however, falls outside of Murphree’s criteria. Americanborn Bartram’s travel account was published in 1791 in Philadelphia in the new
United States. Other descriptions come from whites who spent many years in the
Floridas—French and Spanish colonial officials and missionaries. Their descriptions
appeared in reports and other communiqués seen by few eyes. Thus the writings of
the short-term observers were more widely disseminated than those with repeated,
long-term contact with the Indians.
Murphree asserts that Spanish, British, and French opinions differed little from
one another, and that through racialization Europeans “achieved common ground”
(123). He claims that Europeans saw Indians as part of the natural environment and as
barriers to European plans. When Europeans’ schemes foundered or failed, Europeans
scapegoated the Indians as the cause of failure. Europeans employed written words to
erect psychological borders between themselves and Indians. Through this “othering”
process, Europeans diminished the individuality of tribes and clans and facilitated the
relegation of Indians to an inferior though undefined category.
Murphree poses an interesting approach to questions about identity formation.
The process of identity formation by whites living in the Americas has been well
explored, usually focusing on how colonials living in the Americas saw themselves in
comparison to their contemporaries in Europe. Murphree takes a different approach
and looks at the path of the colonials’ relation to the Indians, concluding that
“racialization helped colonists define their own identity in the Floridas” (10).  But,
he does not address that for most colonials the relation to things European was far
more important. On both sides of the Atlantic, items, ideas, and persons originating
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in Europe almost always were considered socially superior to things American.
Murphree combines similar remarks made over three centuries about Indians to
illustrate unchanging attitudes, but he does not deal with the changing attitudes
and behaviors of the Europeans making the observations. The early explorers left a
European world where religion ordered daily life and international relations. Three
centuries later, Reason and the modern state had replaced religion’s role in shaping
European perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic. For the early Spanish in Florida,
religion was the defining element. Heretics were worse than heathens, making
wrongheaded Europeans worse than uninformed Indians. Europeans’ methods in
Florida changed as well. “Conquistadoring” ended with Juan Pardo’s 1568 expedition
into the southeastern interior.
We must ask if the Europeans’ constructed views of Indians differed much
from their constructed views of “others.” Yes, Europeans demeaned the skin color
and the indolence of Indians, but Europeans employed the same language toward
other Europeans. An anonymous British spy of the 1740s described the Spanish in
Florida to be “of swarthy complexion,” adding that the women were “very brown.”
Lack of industry brought disapproval toward any group. Murphree quotes French
official Villantray de la Sauvole, who noted in his journal that the Indians of the
Louisiana-Florida region were easily manipulated because “they are very lazy” (77).
South Carolina governor Nathaniel Johnson in 1719 called the Spanish in Florida
“very lazy, raw fellows.” His successor, Sir Francis Nicholson, complained that his
own Carolinian soldiers were “inactive and morose and lazy and mutinous.” Did
the negative remarks arise because Indians and soldiers were not “improvers,” not
changing the land for profit?
Murphree takes a fresh and interesting approach, but the discussion is not full
enough for his conclusions to be convincing. The problem may be the short length of
the book at 158 pages. More information about the most important published works
is needed for the reader to assess the works’ influence and understand their audience.
Who, in fact, had access to the publications and who read them? It is unclear just who
is doing the racializing: high officials in Europe making imperial decisions, Europeans
traveling through Florida, residents in Florida? This is an important distinction if
current identities indeed remain little changed after five centuries as Murphree claims
on his book’s first page.
Susan Richbourg Parker
St. Augustine Historical Society

Losing It All To Sprawl: How Progress Ate My Cracker Landscape. By Bill Belleville.
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. xx, 199 pp. Foreword, acknowledgments,
preface, introduction, photographs, bibliography. $24.95, cloth).
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In this eloquent elegy to a disappearing time and place, award-winning author
Bill Belleville tells the very personal story of how creeping development eventually
forced him to move from what had been a rural Florida homestead. The reason Losing
It All To Sprawl: How Progress Ate My Cracker Landscape resonates so loudly is that
it is really the story of Florida’s last century—the tale of all-consuming, cancerous
development, misuse of natural resources, the end of neighborliness, and the “grief of
loss” that accompanies the recognition of what the state was and is becoming.
Whether a person has been in Florida for four months or four generations,
the impact of sprawl and its attendant furies of infrastructure overload, cookie-cutter
development, loss of native lands, and water abuse are evident on a daily basis. It
is a complex issue, but Belleville reaches the heart of it by sharing his narrative of
passion and pain, interwoven with hard facts, history, and literature that illustrate
this problematic, changing landscape.
In 1990, Belleville fell in love with a Cracker-style home on a dirt road in
what was then the rural outskirts of Sanford. Others may have quickly dismissed the
thought of living in a house without air-conditioning where the wooden floor sagged
from the work of termites and the sheet metal roof reverberated in rainstorms. But
Belleville saw that the 1928 heart cypress home was built in wise accommodation to
the Florida environment—large windows for circulation, elevated on blocks for air
and water flow, wide gables and overhangs to reduce sunlight, and rooms configured
to deal with seasonal changes.
“The place made wonderful sense—in fact, it had a very real vernacular wisdom
literally built into it,” he writes, noting the house was built to withstand Florida
weather “far better than the more modern hermetically sealed block and stucco ranch
homes that require thick insulation and a constant running of the central air or heat
to make them inhabitable” (13).
It immediately felt like home, just as novelist Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings sensed
when she moved in 1928 to a similar cottage in Cross Creek outside Gainesville.
Belleville often quotes her eloquent prose to express the sense of place he finds in his
home—an affinity that too many Floridians lack, he sadly decides. As residents lose
their connectedness to the land and to each other, growth becomes a “maelstrom.”
(xx).
With a naturalist’s curiosity and a journalist’s nose, Belleville investigates his
landscape, meeting neighbors and talking with people who once lived in the house.
He worries about the wildlife and homeless people that inhabit nearby woods and
is disheartened when the acreage is leveled for a new development. Soon he also will
be pushed out of his home, the victim of sprawl that has already consumed rural
acreage and replaced it with a mall, big-box stores, and chain restaurants. In the
meantime, he uses this chronological account to detail the steady hum of growth that
is music to the ears of Florida’s pro-growth leaders, cheering news media, and out-ofstate developers who promise to be “good neighbors” but will never be neighbors at
all. The conflicting message offered by promoters has long been, “We’re a beautiful
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place. Come on down and help us build it out,” Belleville notes, characterizing it as
“delusional and vaguely hallucinogenic” (37).
In his ruminations, Belleville tells the story of the geological formation of the
land, describes the long-disappeared native Indians who once populated the area,
and recounts how early white entrepreneurs brought big schemes and created an
agricultural boom that has since given way to bedroom communities and strip malls.
Belleville shows that sprawl creates hidden problems and costs for everyone. State
attempts to manage growth are laudable, but have been manipulated by politicians
who didn’t see the forest for the trees.
When things get bad enough, this modern-day Thoreau escapes to nearby
state forests, preserves, and rivers for long hikes and kayak paddles in relatively
untouched habitat. He finds that there is still much to discover in the 25 percent of
land that has been preserved by the state, including endangered species, rare plants,
and that elusive peace of mind. When the sound of wind reverberates through an
untouched cypress-lined lake, Belleville finds that his “hope for wild Florida places .
. . is rekindled once again” (113).
In this book of love and loss, Belleville makes the subject of sprawl, long
detailed by journalists and historians, a personal story of loss and a cautionary tale for
anyone living in the state.
Leslie Kemp Poole
Rollins College

Florida on Film: The Essential Guide to Sunshine State Cinema & Locations. By
Susan Doll and David Morrow. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. xiv,
394 pp. Acknowledgments, introduction, B&W photographs, illustrations, notes,
bibliography, index. $19.95 paper).
“Florida on Film” is the title of a college course I have taught for fifteen years,
and I look forward to literature on the subject. In 1983, Richard Nelson opened the
scholarly gates with his two-volume study Florida and the American Motion Picture
Industry, 1898-1980. Nelson examined chronologically the entrepreneurs, studios,
stars, and films through historical and mass communications perspectives from the
first newsreels to the rise of television in the post–World War II era. In 1992, James
Ponti helped promote the study of cinema and the rise of the industry in Orlando
with Hollywood East: Florida’s Fabulous Flicks. Ponti applied the knowledge and
training he received at the University of Southern California’s film school in witty
and sharp synopses of a number of films.
Susan Doll, a professor of film at Oakton Community College, and David
Morrow, an editor of reference works, draw on both of these approaches. They divide
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their study into nine chapters: Silent Florida; The Golden Age; Florida Noir; Starring
Miami; Florida Bust; Flori-Drama; Fun in the Sun; Florida as Paradise; and Florida
Façade. Each chapter starts with an essay placing the time period and genre into
context. Next, the authors provide a tight interpretation of more than eighty films.
“Selection was based on how well the films fit into the central topic of each chapter
and on what unique characteristics they could add to the coverage of Florida. Care was
taken to ensure that all regions of the state would be represented. Special attention was
paid to people with a direct connection to Florida filmmaking, such as Burt Reynolds,
Ricou Browning, and Victor Nunez” (xiv). The coverage is wide: The Idol Dancer, Key
Largo, Cape Fear, Scarface, Rosewood, Where the Boys Are, Parenthood. And finally, Doll
and Marrow offer a quick tour of the places the films were either shot at or about:
Cypress Gardens, St. Petersburg, Tarpon Springs, the Everglades, the Keys, Panama
City Beach. The research is broad-based: biographies, autobiographies, histories,
professional journals—but no studio archives, unless accessible on a Web site.
The films addressed comprise a selective, rather than comprehensive, list.
There will be some complaints on the selections. How could The Yearling, or the
pilot for Miami Vice, be left out? But choices had to be made. The content of each
chapter varies according to the technological advances, complexity of texts, stars’ and
studios’ significance, and contributions to culture. Beneath the Twelve Mile Reef, for
example, focuses more on Hollywood’s responses to the challenge posed by television
(that is, 3-D, spectaculars, widescreens, behind-the-scenes visits) than on the texts of
the film. There are times when the analysis comes up short. How could Cross Creek
be discussed without reference to the misinformation on Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings’s
life and career that the biopic conveyed and ingrained in the public mind? Her first
marriage, relocation to Florida, drinking habit, relationship with her editor, Maxwell
Perkins, have all been messed up. A chapter titled “Florida Bust” will educate and
entertain most readers with its accounts of movies that bombed: Blood Feast, The
Cape Canaveral Monsters, The Fat Spy, Health, and Jaws 3-D among others. The
authors observe that “cost and artistic accomplishment is not necessarily related”
(160). Poor quality, timing, sequels, studio politics, vanity projects, limited release,
and finishing a contract can be contributing factors.
When all is said and done, Florida on Film is an insightful and informative
reference guide that advances our understanding of the art and craft of cinema, of the
movie industry, of the role the Sunshine State played in film aesthetics, and how the
study of cinema should be approached.
Robert E. Snyder
University of South Florida, Tampa
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Harold Newton: The Original Highwayman. By Gary Monroe. (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2007. 160 pp. Preface, acknowledgments, photographs, color plates.
$34.95).
Gary Monroe’s book on Highwayman Harold Newton (1934–1994) comes
six years after the publication of his book The Highwaymen: Florida’s African-American
Landscape Painters. Monroe’s first book was successful partly because it came at a time
when the Highwaymen were just beginning to be collected seriously and there was
little in print about the artists.
The Highwaymen story is compelling. A group of young African American
artists, centered in Ft. Pierce and more or less associated with the white painter Albert
Ernest Backus, created brightly colored Florida landscapes that were originally sold
along the Florida roadways. The “Highwaymen” name was bestowed on the artists by
an early collector. Monroe’s 2001 book about these artists helped define this group
of young men and one woman, most of whom began painting in the 1950s and
1960s.
Monroe’s book on Harold Newton has been created in the same format as his
book on the Highwaymen, probably in an effort to replicate his earlier success. There
are twenty-six pages of text and about the same number of color plates (fifty-nine in
the first book, sixty-two in the Newton book).
The Highwaymen provided readers with a foundational story of determination,
inventiveness, talent, and camaraderie, all in the context of the segregated South.
Since its publication in 2001, other books, articles, and even a few films about the
group have appeared. In 2004, Alfred Hair (who is often identified as the leader of
the group) and the Highwaymen were placed in the Florida Artist Hall of Fame.
Harold Newton is less satisfying than The Highwaymen. The twenty-six pages of text
provide little insight into the man, offering instead only tidbits of information: The
artist didn’t learn that Harold was his first name until he was in his fifties. He drew
when he was young and was already an artist before meeting Backus and working
with Hair. He sold paintings on the road during his pre-Backus days, although not
very successfully. He was a drinker. In his early years, he painted Christian themes
on velvet. He loved to fish. He was basically a loner except when he drank. He liked
the comics.
Perhaps the most appealing part of the story has to do with Dorothy, Newton’s
early love interest, whom he married late in life. Her description of Newton, however,
portrays him as an irresponsible womanizer who finally settles down in his later years.
He had maybe eleven children out of wedlock.
We learn little about what drove Newton to paint and how he thought about
the landscape. Monroe plays down issues of segregation, poverty, and Newton’s
relationships with other Highwaymen. In fact, Monroe goes so far as to dismiss racial
issues when he writes, enigmatically, “The Highwayman’s story transcends race” (18),
a comment that he leaves largely unexplained. Is this because there is a moral to the
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story? Can this story be told without talking about race? Does it matter that there
were no African American artists in any of the art history books at the time the
Highwaymen began painting with Backus? Monroe seems to think not.
The twenty-six pages of text are not well organized and are sometimes vague
and uninformed. The author could have given us far more insight into the man and
his artwork by drawing more carefully on his own earlier work and the scholarship,
exhibitions, and films on the Highwaymen that have been completed in the last several
years. The book has no bibliography, and there does not seem to be any attempt on
the author’s part to curate the paintings in the book in chronological order or in any
other manner that would have given us a new perspective on the artist. Still, many of
the paintings are delicious. In fact, the best insight we get about Newton in this book
is from looking at the reproductions of his work, which are superbly photographed
and presented. Newton did portray light beautifully.
In spite of some stunning images of Newton’s paintings, Monroe is not
convincing when he says that this artist’s “paintings provided the measure of excellence
that the other artists could only dream of achieving” (3). And Monroe’s claim that the
story of the Highwaymen is “the last great untold tale of modern Florida” (preface)
is simply mind-boggling—try convincing Carl Hiaasen of that! Comments like this
make it hard to take the author seriously.
Nonetheless, Harold Newton: The Original Highwayman is useful because it
presents a Florida artist who painted Florida as longtime Floridians understand it.
And for serious collectors and historians of Florida art, the paintings make it a book
worthy of a place on the bookshelf.
Kristin G. Congdon
University of Central Florida

Floridian of His Century: The Courage of Governor LeRoy Collins. By Martin A.
Dyckman. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. xii, 332 pp. Series
foreword, acknowledgments, photographs, illustrations, notes, bibliography, index.
$29.95 cloth).
Martin Dyckman’s Floridian of His Century provides a journalist’s reflections
on LeRoy Collins, Florida’s most important governor of the twentieth century.
Dyckman briefly chronicles Governor Collins’s formative years and initial foray
into politics during the Great Depression and Second World War, before turning
to his main subject, Collins’s gubernatorial career. Highlighted as a matter of course
are Collins’s battles with the Florida legislature over reapportionment and his
management of crises brought on in Florida--and, consequently, in his own political
career--by the struggle for racial equality in the United States. The story of Collins’s
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postgubernatorial activities is handled in terms of the 1960 Democratic national
convention, chaired by Governor Collins; his stormy tenure as head of the National
Association of Broadcasters; his career-breaking position as President Lyndon Baines
Johnson’s director of the Community Relations Service, and his last, badly managed,
1968 campaign for George Smathers’s seat in the U.S. Senate.
Dyckman provides a more comprehensive perspective on Governor Collins
than anything previously available to readers and students of Florida history. While
Tom Wagy’s pathbreaking 1985 study, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of
the New South, remains a standard work, Dyckman develops the political campaigns
waged by Governor Collins in 1954 and 1956 to a far greater degree than anything
previously published. Dyckman is spot-on in his conclusion that these campaigns were
the most pivotal in Florida’s history, particularly given the gubernatorial alternatives
of Charlie Johns and Sumter Lowry during the daunting, racially charged political
atmosphere of the mid- to late 1950s.
Drawing on a long career as a journalist for the St. Petersburg Times, Dyckman
heavily employs his stock in trade: the interview. While Dyckman has consulted
most written works on Florida history and the people and events of Collins’s era, and
has culled a fair amount of material from the Collins papers deposited at the Florida
State University, the University of South Florida, as well as the State Archives, his
writing is largely informed by the oral histories he has collected. His perspective, too,
is undoubtedly impacted by his own experiences as a young journalist living through
the era that Governor Collins so greatly influenced and changed. Yet, Dyckman is
willing to look beyond the aura created around Collins after his “moderate view on
civil rights” was vindicated during and after the 1970s, and to point out Collins’s
struggles and failings.
While Dyckman quickly touches on Governor Collins’s philosophy on
good governance and the role of government in a chapter entitled “The Glory
of Government,” he does not develop this important aspect of Collins’s career
throughout the narrative. Though this represents a missed opportunity, as do the
muted roles assigned in Dyckman’s study to Spessard Holland and Dan McCarty,
these are relatively small problems in such a good body of work.
The largest success of Dyckman’s book is his tracing of LeRoy Collins’s
“courage” from Collins’s early days as an advocate of the status quo, white-supremacist
South, to his acknowledgment that segregation was not “morally” defensible, but
probably not something that mere laws could change, to his active participation in
attempting to heal the racial rift in American society. It was a journey taken by many
Americans, but not many had to display their itinerary in such a public fashion as one
of Florida’s most public figures was required to—and chose to—do.
As a broader view of the most consequential politician of twentieth-century
Florida, Floridian of His Century deserves a place on the shelves of any person interested
in the tumultuous political history of Florida during the period of the 1950s and
1960s. Martin Dyckman has written a highly readable, insightful, and sometimes
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challenging volume that treats LeRoy Collins as something more than the sainted
figure he is sometimes portrayed as being. In Dyckman’s narrative, Collins emerges
instead as a real person, with his courageous character helping to overcome his flaws.
Brian Lewis Crispell
Florida College

Brutal Journey: The Epic Story of the First Crossing of North America. By Paul Schneider.
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006. x, 366 pp. Introduction, maps,
illustrations, notes, bibliography, acknowledgments, index, $26.00 cloth).
In July 1536, three Spanish men and a black Moroccan, all dressed like and
accompanied by Indians, stumbled across a group of Spanish slavers in Mexico. After
eight exhausting years, the Pánfilo de Narváez expedition had mercifully ended.
This attempt by Spain to conquer Florida and the American Southeast began with
four hundred well-armed men and unbridled optimism. When it ended, only these
four men remained alive, thanks to little more than a combination of luck and their
willingness to do anything to survive.
In this gripping and often compelling narrative, Paul Schneider reconstructs
the harrowing story of the Narváez expedition. The journey—which began in Tampa
Bay, hugged the Gulf coast to modern-day Texas before crossing to Mexico’s western
coast and South Sea—hardly lived up to expectations or the precedents established by
Cortes and other conquistadors. The lone four survivors had traveled five thousand
miles before they escaped their travails, and their journey could hardly be measured
by the geographical distance they traveled. During their eight years as conquerorsturned-refugees, they “had become killers and cannibals, torturers and torture victims,
slavers and enslaved. They became faith healers, arms dealers, canoe thieves, spider
eaters, and finally . . . they became itinerant messiahs” (2). In short, their journey was
physical, emotional, and psychological.
Brutal Journey creatively addresses the problem of sources that complicates all
attempts to describe the early American interactions between Natives and Newcomers.
In the case of the Narváez expedition, only two firsthand accounts exist. Álvar Nuñez
Cabeza de Vaca published the best-known version in 1542, and Spanish authorities
in Spain and Hispaniola authored the second. Schneider treats both sources with
suspicion as they were both written to justify actions that occurred after the fact.
Schneider augments his close reading of translated versions of these sources with
various archaeological findings and ethnohistorical studies of the region. He also
relies heavily on studies of other expeditions in the Americas to provide indirect
insights when the direct sources are silent.
In a few places, hyperbolic and unnecessary rhetoric in Brutal Journey detracts
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from the text. For example, Narváez’s expedition was not, as the book’s subtitle
suggests, the “first crossing of North America,” and comparisons to Lewis and Clark
are both misplaced and often lead to mischaracterizations of both journeys. Perhaps
just as importantly, the volume’s rhetoric implicitly but unmistakably draws what
seem to be unnecessary parallels to today’s current conflict in Iraq. Discussions of
“quagmires” (5) and “peoples waiting to be ‘liberated’” (4) gloss over the nature of the
expedition and the more complex Spanish outlook on the world and Native peoples.
Academics will likely be disappointed by the sparseness of citations in the
volume. This is more than academic quibbling. Schneider certainly provides citations
for all of his quotations, but one of his great achievements is to piece together a wide
range of sources and to sift through conflicting evidence. For example, in several
places Schneider’s infers “further details about the expedition . . . from the many
other, better-documented Spanish intrusions into the region during the same period”
(2). Too often, Schneider provides little insight into how he arrived at his conclusions.
In addition, Schneider’s selected use of ethnohistorical evidence leads him to see a
“myriad [of ] mysterious inconsistencies” (248) in the behavior of Native Americans.
For example, Schneider sees a contradiction in the Mariame Indians’ plucking of the
facial hair of their Spanish captives before befriending them. A quick glance at the
literature on captives and adoption rituals in the American Southeast and Southwest
would clear up any uncertainty about whether this was designed to be “torture.”
Schneider is the first writer to bring this tumultuous story to the general
public. Academics have long explored the topic, with contentious debates over the
precise paths taken by the conquistadors-turned-refugees, the nature of the Indian
societies they confronted, and the validity of the sparse written sources that retell
the tale. This volume is largely free of these squabbles, and instead offers a rather
consensual view of these issues. The result is a remarkably engaging, well-written,
evenhanded, and often sophisticated narrative.
Despite its academic shortcomings, Brutal Journey deserves a wide readership. It
successfully augments the historical record with materials from a variety of disciplines,
most notably from archaeology, in a rather seamless and engaging manner. The result
is a work of nonfiction that proves the truism that sometimes truth is stranger than
fiction.
Andrew K. Frank
Florida State University

Ybor City: The Making of a Landmark Town. By Frank Trebín Lastra. (Tampa:
University of Tampa Press, 2006. xix, 466 pp. Acknowledgments, editor’s preface,
foreword, introduction, photographs, illustrations, afterword, tables and exhibits,
notes, bibliography, index, about the author. $39.95 cloth, $29.95 paper).
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Today, little remains of historic Ybor City, except for aging buildings and
fading memories. And these remains do not speak for themselves. They require a
historical context to explain their meaning and significance. To Frank T. Lastra’s
credit, he places his own experiences and those of friends and family in the context of
the much larger history that he constructs in Ybor City: The Making of a Landmark
Town.
Drawing heavily on the work of previous writers, Lastra adds his own
perspective, giving his book a personal touch. In the extensive footnotes, for example,
he frequently cites “Frank T. Lastra’s personal memory” or “Author’s personal
observations.” His own background undoubtedly explains the book’s decidedly
Spanish flavor. A product of Ybor City, Lastra is the son of a Spanish father from
Galicia and a Sicilian mother. Born in 1922, Frank Lastra experienced both the highs
of the 1920s and the lows of the Depression years before leaving to serve in World
War II and then earn a degree in engineering from Georgia Tech. In the 1960s, he
returned to Tampa, where he became active in Ybor City organizations and began
writing about his birthplace. This book is the culmination of those efforts.
While noting the contributions of many ethnic groups, including Romanian
Jews and Germans, as well as the more numerous immigrants from Cuba and Italy,
Lastra stresses Spanish influences in the creation of Ybor City and its culture. From
the lingua franca to the first cigar-factory owners, the roots of the community lay in
Peninsular Spain, but they were also deeply entangled in Cuba, the birthplace of the
single-largest group of immigrants to Tampa.
Lastra describes a qualitative difference between Spaniards and other
immigrants. “The attitudes of workers and residents alike in [Ybor City’s] formative
years were strongly rooted in firm, positive underpinnings of Peninsular Spanish
mores,” he writes in the introduction. “A solid sense of propriety, correct manners,
law and order, and the ethic of hard work were hallmarks of the time. . . . These
Spanish values that I speak of were the ones we learned at home” (xviii). In contrast,
Cubans in Tampa initially focused on winning the island’s independence from Spain,
and according to Lastra, they “found themselves in a situation unsuited to raising
families, pursuing education, or setting down roots. This impeded the early growth
of new Cuban families in Ybor City, and the concomitant affirmation of schools,
churches, and other family oriented cultural institutions” (103). Such judgments
reflect common ethnic stereotypes, especially among local residents of Spanish and
Italian heritage, but Cubans undoubtedly saw things differently. Their views remain
largely unrecorded, except perhaps in the novels of José Yglesias.
Lastra’s recounting of the history of Ybor City from its founding to World
War II covers familiar ground, but he enlivens the story with his own memories and
details of his family’s history. In addition, he brings the past alive through the use of
hundreds of photographs, some never before published.
The book’s most original contribution is its coverage of the years since World
War II. Lastra devotes fully half of his text to the little-known years of Ybor City’s
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steady economic decline and physical destruction under the federal “urban renewal”
programs that bulldozed decaying structures in the 1960s but failed to fulfill promises
to redevelop the community. Lastra traces in great detail the litany of broken
government promises and the unrealized dreams of local Latins who championed
a variety of proposals to revitalize the former Latin enclave after the collapse of the
handmade cigar business and the relocation of local Latins to other areas.
Amidst this saga of political and economic failures since the 1950s, Lastra
also documents the vitality of Ybor City institutions and the people behind them.
Despite various obstacles, surviving institutions include most of the social clubs,
the Columbia Restaurant, the Ybor City Chamber of Commerce, the Spanish Lyric
Theater and La Gaceta, the trilingual newspaper run by the Manteiga family since
1922. New organizations, such as the Barrio Latino Commission and the Ybor City
Museum Society, also have emerged as part of the drive to preserve what remains of
historic Ybor City.
Ybor City: The Making of a Landmark Town should appeal to both longtime
residents familiar with local history and newcomers who want to find out what made
Ybor City so special. The book’s features include not only its many illustrations,
but also a very useful index and numerous appendices containing data on the cigar
industry, lists of businesses, and the names of leaders of social clubs and other
community organizations since their founding. The volume is a tribute to Frank T.
Lastra’s commitment to relating the history of Ybor City as he knew it.
Robert P. Ingalls
University of South Florida, Tampa

Sunshine in the Dark: Florida in the Movies. By Susan J. Fernandez and Robert P.
Ingalls. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006. xv, 283 pp. Acknowledgments,
introduction, illustrations and color plates, epilogue, appendix, notes, bibliography,
index. $34.95 cloth).
With Sunshine in the Dark: Florida in the Movies, Sarah J. Fernandez and
Robert P. Ingalls have written a guide for watching any film about Florida. Pretty
much every movie about Florida is here, regardless of genre or quality. The authors
cover critically acclaimed Florida films like Scarface, Cocoon, and Key Largo, but
they also devote plenty of time to Ace Ventura: Pet Detective, Nightmare Beach, and
Clambake. And they write about movies long consigned to the back racks at the
video store—how many of us have actually seen Juke Girl? Sixteen Fathoms Deep? Big
Trouble? Curdled? Fernandez and Ingalls have watched them all.
Divided into three parts—settings, plots, and characters—Sunshine in the
Dark groups films by theme in eleven chapters with titles such as “Re-Creation:
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Starting Over in Paradise” and “Workers and Retirees.” Some movies crop up in
more than one place—Sunshine State, for example, is discussed in terms of its images
of African American women and its portrayal of the built environment in Florida.
Black-and-white photographs illustrate each chapter, and a color section with more
pictures appears in the middle of the book. A helpful appendix lists films with Florida
scenes in alphabetical order, including the year and genre of each.
Sunshine in the Dark is unapologetically nonargumentative. “Our modest goal
is to analyze what we see as dominant messages of films about Florida and to examine
how these messages have changed over time,” write the authors in the introduction.
“This book is not specifically directed at academics or specialists in film studies, but
rather at general readers with an interest in images of Florida and Floridians” (11).
The discussions, accordingly, are unfettered by academic jargon, with only the
occasional foray into film theory. But this straightforwardness does mean that much
of the book relies upon plot summary. Demonstrating which films are alike and into
what categories they fall often includes fairly comprehensive retellings of the movies’
stories.
The authors meticulously parse the various Florida images and themes within
big-name Florida movies such as Scarface, which is notable for its portrayal of Cuban
Americans as well as that of the drug underworld and Miami. They also discuss the
recent film Adaptation, with its forays into the murky world of orchid collecting
and southern eccentrics. The picture-within-a-picture situation of Marjorie Kinnan
Rawlings, who came to Florida from New York and wrote The Yearling, the north
Florida novel that became a movie, recurs in many chapters, especially when layered
with the more recent film Cross Creek, which tells the story of Rawlings and the
writing inspired by her move to Florida.
Fernandez and Ingalls pull no punches. “While continuing his life of crime
in south Florida, Junior meets Susie Waggoner (Jennifer Jason Leigh),” they write
of the Alec Baldwin film Miami Blues, “a dumber-than-dumb hooker from Lake
Okeechobee” (81). Although they claim not to review the films, the authors can’t
help but stand up for Florida and its people, such as in the discussion of Cross Creek,
with its depiction of north Florida’s agricultural communities. “Rawlings’ associations
with rural Floridians provided her with rich sources for characters, but this particular
film fails to portray either the author or her subjects with the depth that her writing
and her biographers have revealed” (217).
The book delivers on its promise of broad range. The authors cover settings
from Miami to north Florida and approach characters with a similarly broad reach.  
“Within these plots,” they write, “a wide array of peculiarly Florida characters appeal—
Seminoles, crackers, retirees, Cuban immigrants, astronauts, Spring Breakers—along
with various heroes, criminals, warriors, and athletes” (10).
The most outstanding accomplishment of Sunshine in the Dark is that for
all of its claims to be nonargumentative, the writers do have a point to make about
filmic representations of Florida, which is that Florida occupies the farthest reaches
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of any spectrum. Onscreen, Florida is a place with no gray areas, representing instead
a space of sun-drenched happiness and a prime location for failed hopes; in short,
Florida is anything from “dreamland to nightmare” (251).
For anyone who loves both the movies and Florida in all its many forms,
Sunshine in the Dark will prove a rich read. With this book, readers will learn ways to
categorize and consider the next Florida film they see, whether it portrays a holiday
in paradise or a journey to hell.
Eliza McGraw
Washington, D.C.
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Michael Gannon’s History of Florida in Forty Minutes. By Michael Gannon. (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 2007. 80 pp. Acknowledgments, illustrations, bibliography,
audio CD. $24.95 cloth).
Since Florida has the longest recorded history of any place in the present-day
United States, readers might wonder how the University of Florida historian Michael
Gannon managed to present The New History of Florida (1996) in just 480 pages. His
previous Florida: A Short History (1993) had condensed Florida’s Spanish, British,
Spanish, territorial, and statehood eras to only 182 pages. Imagine, in Gannon’s latest
volume, 494 years of Florida history in just forty minutes—in barely seventy pages of
text!
In response to requests from Leadership Florida to put in writing his oftdelivered lecture to its annual statewide leadership class, Gannon has highlighted ten
key populations, periods, groups of periods, and factors that shaped Florida history.
They include the original inhabitants; the first Spanish settlers; the Franciscan
missions; the British; the Spanish restoration and American territorial periods; early
statehood, the Civil War, and Reconstruction; the Flagler era; the 1920s runaway
land boom; the Second World War; and, finally, air-conditioning, mosquito control,
and Veteran Administration loans.
Gannon can say little about each topic in the few hundred words and handful
of evocative illustrations given to each era, but that is not the point. Even if Florida
history were routinely taught in the public schools, barely one-third of the state’s 18
million residents were born here. How many people, for example, can name the five
flags that have flown over this land or the two railway barons that laid the path for
millions of future settlers?
Too busy to read the history of Florida in forty minutes? The book comes with
an audio CD containing Gannon’s melodious voice reading his text.
Mark I. Greenberg
University of South Florida, Tampa
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African American Sites in Florida. By Kevin M. McCarthy. (Sarasota: Pineapple Press,
2007. xxi, 336 pp. Introduction, photographs, illustrations, conclusion, further
reading, index. $29.95 cloth).
Much of Florida’s African American history remains undocumented. In this
volume, written by a well-known authority on Florida literature, history, and culture,
Kevin McCarthy identifies current landmarks in the Tampa Bay area, and throughout
Florida, of which many readers may be unaware. African American Sites in Florida is
Kevin McCarthy’s fourth book exclusively treating Florida’s black history. McCarthy
also discusses the origins of each Florida county, introducing readers to key events
and conditions that shaped its unique history, including Native American and African
American interactions.
McCarthy’s research both involved field studies and was built upon existing
documentation of regional African American history. Through the assemblage of
archival research and public records, McCarthy helps the stories and voices of African
Americans to find their rightful place in the broader narrative of North American
history.
Sherri Anderson
Washington, D.C.

Florida Plantation Records from the Papers of George Noble Jones. Edited by Ulrich
Bonnell Phillips and James David Glunt. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
2006. xl, 596 pp. Introduction to the University Press of Florida edition, glossary,
index. $55.00 cloth).
Originally issued by the Missouri Historical Society in 1927, eight decades later
Florida Plantation Records remains an essential resource for the study of plantation
slavery in antebellum Florida. Containing transcripts of plantation journals,
overseers’ reports, slave inventories, and other records, it documents life and work at
El Destino and Chemonie, two large cotton plantations near Tallahassee owned by
Georgia planter George Noble Jones (1811-1876). Jones was an absentee landlord
who relied on a series of overseers to manage his Florida estates. The frequent reports
and meticulous accounting he required provide uncommonly detailed information
about plantation operations, particularly the employment and condition of the slaves
who constituted the most valuable part of his property. These records cover the period
from 1832 to 1898. The majority date from the 1840s through the 1870s, though
there is very little relating to the Civil War years.
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips (1877-1934), the leading historian of American
slavery in his day, edited Florida Plantation Records, assisted by his doctoral student
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James David Glunt (1895-1962), later a professor of history at the University of
Florida. The University Press of Florida edition provides a facsimile of the complete
1927 text, with a new forty-page introduction by historian John David Smith of the
University of North Carolina at Charlotte. Smith’s introduction provides very useful
perspectives on the original work and its creators in the light of current historiography.
The 1927 book, which appeared in a limited edition of only five hundred copies, has
long been ranked as a rare Florida collectible, and the subsequent 1971 reprint by
the New York publisher Burt Franklin is also quite scarce, so the new University Press
of Florida edition provides a welcome opportunity for libraries and individuals to
acquire a copy of this Florida history classic.  
Paul Eugen Camp
University of South Florida, Tampa

Amidst a Storm of Bullets: The Diary of Lt. Henry Prince in Florida, 1836-1842. Edited
by Frank Laumer. Foreword by John K. Mahon. (Tampa: University of Tampa Press,
2006. xxvi, 166 pp. Illustrations, foreword, preface, introduction, epilogue, notes,
bibliography, index. $15.00, paper).
A meticulous transcription of a diary kept by a young army officer serving
in the Second Seminole War (1835-42), Amidst a Storm of Bullets provides a unique
firsthand description of military life in Florida during the longest and most costly
of the nation’s Indian wars. Of the few personal journals and diaries chronicling
the war that have survived, Prince’s is arguably the best of its kind in detail and
readability. When the University of Tampa Press published the hardcover first edition
in 1998, Canter Brown Jr., historian-in-residence of the Tampa Bay History Center,
commented, “The Second Seminole War’s day-to-day reality can be discovered in no
single original source better than through the Henry Prince diary.”
As a newly minted brevet second lieutenant, Maine native Henry Prince (18111892) began his Florida diary on January 10, 1836, less than two weeks after the war
with the Seminoles began. With only two breaks, his Florida service spanned virtually
the entire war—the last entry in his diary being April 25, 1842. Lieutenant Prince
was an observant, articulate writer who recorded his impressions of life and war in
Florida in descriptive, readable prose, often written while the battles and other events
he recorded were still in progress. He was also a skilled artist and draftsmen who
embellished his daily entries with detailed sketches and maps. The entries relating to
his several visits to Tampa and the sketches he made of Ft. Brooke and Ft. Foster will
be of particular interest to readers in the Tampa Bay area.
Frank Laumer’s introduction and epilogue provide useful context, tracing
Prince’s life before and after the period covered by his Florida diary, and Laumer’s
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notes provide helpful explanatory detail about the people and places to which Prince
refers. The book is well illustrated with all forty-six of Prince’s sketches and maps,
including views of forts, camps, and other scenes. The cover is particularly attractive,
being a full-color reproduction of Florida artist Jackson Walker’s painting The Battle
of Camp Izard, Day Two, February 29, 1836, which includes an officer representing
Lieutenant Prince writing in his diary while bullets chip the pine trees overhead.
The hardcover first edition of Amidst a Storm of Bullets is now out of print, so this
new paperbound version, including the complete text block and illustrations of the
original, makes Prince’s diary available to Florida historians and general readers at
about half the cost of the earlier edition.
Paul Eugen Camp
University of South Florida, Tampa

Ecological Landscapes of the South. By Jack Temple Kirby. (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2006. 361 pp. Preface, photographs, epilogue, endnotes,
index. $29.95, cloth).
Using the mockingbird as an emblem of the American South, Kirby presents
a postmodernist’s narrative exploration in story and song. His Ecological Landscapes
roams literary, historical, musical, and cinematic works to yield a personal, reflective
examination of a region marked by waves of prosperity and neglect, by crosscultural encounters and exodus. In surveying vistas from the earliest civilizations to
the present day, Kirby perceives a diverse region loosely united in its paradoxical
relationship with the land. What does the mockingbird have in common with the
Coen Brothers’ O Brother, Where Art Thou? or the greater South for that matter, but
an ability to reconcile difference through homogenization, coupled with a certain
degree of indifference?
A Florida resident himself, Kirby begins his analysis of the South’s ecological
history with the ill-fated de Soto expedition, the Spaniards’ arrival in Tampa Bay,
and their eventual journey to Mexico through the mouth of the Mississippi. Florida
reappears in nuanced homages to Marjorie Kinnan Rawlings and Zora Neale
Hurston, and in an account of Henry Morrison Flagler’s ambitious efforts in St.
Augustine. The ecological devastation of Florida’s pine forests through lumbering and
the Everglades through canalization, as well as the detrimental introduction of the
water hyacinth and nutria into the environment, provide sobering vignettes of one
generation’s progress becoming another’s bane.
Keli Rylance
USF Tampa Library Special Collections Department
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Down in Orburndale: A Songwriter’s Youth in Old Florida. By Bobby Braddock.   
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007. xii, 271 pp. Acknowledgments,
Orburndale, illustrations, photographs. $24.95, cloth).
Bobby Braddock’s memoir Down in Orburndale: A Songwriter’s Youth in Old
Florida upholds the promise of its title. The legendary country music songwriter
shares his life experiences of growing up in central Florida’s citrus land of Auburndale.
His memoir highlights southern life as he carries his readers through his boyhood,
adolescence, girls, youthful pranks, adventures around Lake Stella, love, music, and
travels throughout the South on his path to success. Bobby Braddock has written
multiple hit country songs such as “D-I-V-O-R-C-E,” performed by Tammy Wynette;
“Time Marches On”; and the contemporary country hit “I Wanna Talk about Me.”
Cyrana Wyker
University of South Florida, Tampa

The Spirit of the Bay: Tampa, St. Petersburg, Clearwater.  By Steve Otto.  (Tampa:  
Community Media Corp., 2007.  400 pp.  Introduction by mayors of Tampa, St.
Petersburg, and Clearwater, index to advertisers.  Price to be determined.)
In The Spirit of the Bay, longtime Tampa Tribune columnist Steve Otto captures
the essence of life in the Tampa Bay area through both historic and contemporary
perspectives. Otto makes the case that from the time of the earliest explorers to this
region to that of the transplants who now call the Tampa Bay area home, this is a
community built on diversity. This can best be seen today in the rich heritage of
the communities featured in the book: Tampa, St. Petersburg, and Clearwater. Otto
explores the big-city neighborhoods and beachfront communities of Hillsborough and
Pinellas Counties, bringing both their unique character—and unique characters—to
life. From the cigar rollers in Tampa to the sponge divers in Tarpon Springs to the
carnival culture of Gibsonton, Otto leaves no stone unturned in a book that proves
revealing to natives and transplants alike. In addition to the compelling stories
and anecdotes offered by Otto, the imagery from page to page should satisfy any
photo buff. Vintage black-and-white photographs provide balance to the stunning
contemporary images that perfectly illustrate the spirit of Tampa Bay.
Travis Puterbaugh
Tampa Bay History Center
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The Tampa Bay History Center is a community oriented
cultural institution that seeks to enlighten and enhance the lives
of the residents and visitors of Tampa and Hillsborough County
to the more than 12,000 years of Florida history. The History
Center’s mission is to serve and educate the community through
discovery, preservation and interpretation of the rich cultural
heritage of the people of Historic Hillsborough County and the
Tampa Bay region and their relation to the state of Florida and
the United States.

The Florida Studies Center draws upon the University of South Florida Libraries’
extensive Floridiana collections and expertise to promote interdisciplinary
teaching and research and to help the Tampa Bay community develop a better
understanding of Florida’s past, present, and future.
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Postcard from the 1914 Gasparilla celebration. The image of a bloodthirsty
pirate seems incompatible with tourism, but an increase of visitors was the
desire of Tampa’s leaders in promoting “Gasparilla Week.” (Hillsborough
County Collection, Tampa Bay History Center, 1996.051.455)
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